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on mortgage lending and securitization—are not designed to protect the economy 
from a housing bubble. Instead, these reforms tinker with the incentives of securitizers 
and lenders to prevent their exploitation of naive investors and borrowers. In 
particular, these changes require securitizers to retain credit risk and lenders to 
assess borrowers’ ability to repay.  
This approach misses the mark. The sine qua non of a bubble is marketwide 
overoptimism about future house prices. Irrational exuberance in a bubble leads 
parties across the entire system of housing finance to make risky bets based on rosy 
beliefs. It is not just investors who underprice credit risk and borrowers who 
overextend. Securitizers and lenders are also eager to take on dangerous levels of 
risk and leverage. The Dodd–Frank Act’s incentive-based reforms, by relying on 
rational behavior by supposedly sophisticated parties, will do little to protect the 
economy from a bubble. They might even increase systemic risk by concentrating 
mortgage risk in large financial institutions. 
Because indirect incentive-based regulation is ineffective in a bubble, more 
direct mandates should be employed. We suggest a number of direct regulations to 
limit mortgage leverage, debt-to-income levels, and other contractual features that 
enable or induce borrowers to take out larger loans. We show how such limits can 
curb bubbles, lower defaults, and reduce household exposure to housing risk. While 
such limits would undoubtedly entail costs, such as restricting access to mortgage 
credit and homeownership, we suggest straightforward ways to mitigate many of 
these concerns. Our critique of incentive-based regulation also provides an 
important new perspective on current legislative efforts to reform the broader 
architecture of housing finance. 
The Dodd–Frank Act’s mistargeted approach reflects in part the growing 
literature in behavioral law and economics that shows how sophisticated firms take 
advantage of biased consumers. Indeed, much of the debate over the appropriate 
response to the Great Recession has been about how to keep Main Street safe from 
Wall Street. We advance this literature by showing that the mistakes of firms have 
important implications for the design of regulation. Our analysis calls for a 
fundamental paradigm shift. The central policy challenge is to keep Main Street 
and Wall Street safe from themselves. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2008 and its aftermath are a sobering 
reminder that the main source of systemic risk in the economy is a real 
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estate bubble. Between 1996 and 2006, house prices in the United States 
soared by over 120%.1 As the bubble inflated, mortgage lenders made loans 
with steadily lower down payments and little regard for the 
creditworthiness of borrowers. Most of these loans were sold to other 
financial institutions that packaged them into mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS) and then resold them to investors. The bursting of the bubble in 
2006 left in its wake economic ruin. The collapse of house prices froze 
consumer spending and left households mired in debt. The resulting wave 
of mortgage defaults that struck financial institutions triggered a broader 
breakdown in credit markets. The Great Recession that followed has taken a 
heavy human toll in lost homes and jobs, and these hardships have fallen 
disproportionately on low income, working class families.  
Many of the reforms to the financial system following the crisis should, 
in principle, make it more robust to a future housing bubble. The landmark 
Dodd–Frank Act2 imposes higher capital requirements on banks,3 creates a 
new resolution regime to safely wind down insolvent financial institutions,4 
and tasks a new Financial Stability Oversight Council with identifying and 
addressing emerging systemic risks.5  
The Dodd–Frank Act, however, takes a different tack in its reforms to 
the mortgage market. Rather than addressing the risks to the economy 
posed by a future housing bubble, the Act focuses on protecting naive 
investors and borrowers from opportunistic securitizers and predatory 
lenders. First, the Act directs banking regulators to require securitizers to retain 
at least 5% of the credit risk of any assets that they securitize.6 Second, it 
requires mortgage originators to “make[] a reasonable and good faith 
determination” that each borrower has “a reasonable ability to repay” the loan.7 
 
1 S&P/Case–Shiller National Home Price Index, S&P DOW JONES INDICIES, 
http://us.spindices.com/indices/real-estate/sp-case-shiller-us-national-home-price-index (last visited 
May 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/HM2C-6UD2 (mouse over graph, and compare the 
index numbers from January 1996 (81.46) and January 2006 (180.84)).  
2 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act), Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 
18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44, 49 & 112 U.S.C.).  
3 Id. §§ 165–166, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5365–5366 (2012).  
4 Id. §§ 201–217, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394.  
5 Id. § 111–112, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5322. 
6 Id. § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2012). 
7 Id. § 1411(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1639c. In addition to these major reforms, the Dodd–Frank Act 
included a host of more minor fixes to the mortgage market, many of which have been 
implemented by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. For example, section 1461 of the 
Dodd–Frank Act and its associated rulemaking, the 2013 Escrows Rule, “lengthen[ed] the time for 
which a mandatory escrow account established for a higher-priced mortgage loan (HPML) must 
be maintained.” Amendments to the 2013 Escrows Final Rule Under the Truth in Lending Act 
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The Act thus relies on changing the incentives of sophisticated market 
participants to end their exploitation of the less sophisticated. 
 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 30,739, 30,739 (May 23, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026); see also 
Dodd–Frank Act § 1461, 15 U.S.C. § 1639d (requiring that an escrow account be maintained for a 
minimum of five years, with certain exceptions). The rule “established an exemption from the 
escrow requirement for certain creditors that operate predominantly in ‘rural’ or ‘underserved’ 
areas.” Amendments to the 2013 Escrows Final Rule Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation 
Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 30,739; see also Dodd–Frank Act § 1461, 15 U.S.C. § 1639d (enabling the Federal 
Reserve Board to exempt creditors operating in rural or underserved areas from requirements by 
regulation). Another rule, the Homeownership Counseling Amendments to the Truth in Lending 
Act and Homeownership Counseling Amendments to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
requires, inter alia, “that consumers receive counseling before obtaining high-cost mortgages and 
that servicers provide periodic account statements and rate adjustment notices to mortgage 
borrowers.” Amendments to the 2013 Mortgage Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement 
Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 62,993, 
62,933 (Oct. 23, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1024 & 1026). The rule “amends Regulation Z 
(Truth in Lending) by expanding the types of mortgage loans that are subject to the protections of 
the Home Ownership and Equity Protections Act of 1994.” High-Cost Mortgage and 
Homeownership Counseling Amendments to the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z) and 
Homeownership Counseling Amendments to the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 6856, 6856 ( Jan. 31, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1024 & 1026); see 
also Dodd–Frank Act §§ 1431–1433, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1602(aa), 1639 (implementing a broader definition 
of which mortgages are subject to rules for “high-cost mortgages”). The 2013 Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act Appraisals Final Rule “require[s] creditors to provide to applicants free copies of 
all appraisals and other written valuations developed in connection with an application for a loan 
to be secured by a first lien on a dwelling.” Disclosure and Delivery Requirements for Copies of 
Appraisals and Other Written Valuations Under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation 
B), 78 Fed. Reg. 7216, 7216 ( Jan. 31, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002); see also Dodd–Frank Act 
§ 1474, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (“Each creditor shall furnish to an applicant a copy of any and all written 
appraisals and valuations developed in connection with the applicant’s application for a loan that is 
secured or would have been secured by a first lien on a dwelling promptly upon completion . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). The 2013 Interagency Appraisals Final Rule requires 
appraisals for “higher-risk mortgages.” Appraisals for Higher-Priced Mortgage Loans, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 78,520, 78,520 (Dec. 26, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 34, 226, & 1026); see also Dodd–
Frank Act § 1471, 15 U.S.C. § 1639h (“A creditor may not extend credit in the form of a higher-risk 
mortgage to any consumer without first obtaining a written appraisal of the property to be 
mortgaged prepared in accordance with the requirements of this section.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). The Loan Originator Compensation Requirements Under the Truth in Lending 
Act impose requirements and restrictions concerning loan originator compensation, including bans 
on what is sometimes referred to as yield-spread premiums. Loan Originator Compensation 
Requirements Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 11,280, 11,280, 11,321 
(Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026); see also Dodd–Frank Act §§ 1401–1403, 1414, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1639 (defining “mortgage originator” and restricting certain forms of mortgage 
originator compensation). Two other recent rules provide new restrictions and requirements for 
mortgage servicers under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and the Truth in Lending 
Act. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X), 
78 Fed. Reg. 10,696 (Feb. 14, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024); Mortgage Servicing Rules 
Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 10,902 (Feb. 14, 2013) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
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In this Article, we identify the costs of the Dodd–Frank Act’s borrower 
and investor protection paradigm in terms of economic and financial 
stability and chart a better way forward. The mortgage market should be 
reformed to make the economy more robust to a housing bubble. The sine 
qua non of a bubble is marketwide overoptimism about future asset prices. 
Such overoptimism makes the Act’s indirect, incentive-based approach 
ineffective or even counterproductive. The Act’s approach will produce little 
benefit in terms of improved incentives and will likely increase, rather than 
reduce, systemic risk by concentrating mortgage risk in systemically 
important financial institutions. A better approach to addressing the risks of 
housing bubbles would be to regulate directly mortgage leverage and other 
contractual features that induce borrowers to take out larger and riskier loans.  
The Dodd–Frank Act’s approach to mortgage regulation reflects in part 
the influence of an important new academic literature applying insights 
from behavioral economics to legal policy.8 A recurring theme in the initial 
wave of scholarly work in behavioral law and economics is how sophisticated 
firms can take advantage of biased consumers through contract design.9 
This asymmetric view of behavioral biases leads naturally to the borrower 
 
8 For examples of this literature, see generally THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013); Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The 
CARD Act and Beyond, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (2012); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 
NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004); Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Mutual Ownership, 
105 J. PUB. ECON. 39 (2013); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ullen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000); 
Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2003); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Psychological 
Foundations of Behavioral Law and Economics, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1675.  
9 See generally, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, 
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012) (analyzing the rationale behind common 
design choices in consumer contracts and the impact of those features on consumers); Michael S. 
Barr et al., Behaviorally Informed Home Mortgage Credit Regulation (arguing that consumers 
frequently do not behave as rational agents due to psychological limitations, which firms actively 
exploit), in BORROWING TO LIVE: CONSUMER AND MORTGAGE CREDIT REVISITED 170 
(Nicholas P. Retsinas & Eric S. Belsky eds., 2008). An illuminating recent review of this literature 
supports our characterization of the existing work in the field as based on an asymmetric view of 
behavioral biases. See Botond Kőszegi, Behavioral Contract Theory, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1075, 
1076 (2014) (“In almost all applications, researchers assume that the agent . . . behaves according to 
one psychologically based model, while the principal . . . is fully rational and has a classical goal 
(usually profit maximization).”).  
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and investor-protection approach taken in the Dodd–Frank Act.10 Similarly, 
the leading treatment of the recent housing bubble in existing legal 
scholarship considers “irrational exuberance” exclusively on the part of 
borrowers, which the authors conclude cannot explain the increase in the 
supply of mortgage credit during the boom.11 We advance this literature by 
also considering mistakes by firms. We show that the marketwide 
overoptimism about house prices in a housing bubble—among sophisticated 
lenders and securitizers in addition to investors and borrowers—has 
important implications for the design of regulation. Mortgage regulation 
should not just seek to prevent lenders and securitizers from exploiting the 
mistakes of naive borrowers and investors; rather, it should also protect the 
economy from the mistakes of lenders and securitizers. Our analysis implies 
that the mistakes of firms (and consumers) undermine indirect incentive-
based regulatory approaches and points toward more direct regulatory 
mandates.12 
To motivate our analysis, we begin in Part I with an overview of the 
essential role of the housing bubble in the Great Recession. The bursting of 
a housing bubble produces a severe economic downturn through two main 
channels: (1) losses to financial institutions that result in a financial crisis 
(the “banking channel”) and (2) a fall in household wealth that reduces 
consumption (the “household channel”). The main source of systemic risk is 
the threat of a future housing bubble, and the mortgage market plays a key 
role both in fueling housing bubbles and in linking them to the broader 
economy. Mortgage regulation should therefore be designed to perform 
well in the face of a bubble and to mitigate its macroeconomic effects 
through these channels. 
We then analyze the Dodd–Frank Act’s reforms to the mortgage market 
and show that they fail this test. We start in Part II with what many 
consider a centerpiece of the legislation: the risk retention requirement. 
Barney Frank himself recently declared that “to me . . . the single most 
 
10 The Obama administration’s point person on the Dodd–Frank Act, Professor Michael 
Barr, had previously written about the implications of behavioral economics for mortgage 
regulation, focusing on borrower protection. See generally Barr et al., supra note 9.  
11 See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 
1177, 1212 (2012) (arguing that demand-side explanations based on borrower exuberance are 
incomplete because “any increase in housing-finance demand was outstripped by an increase in 
housing-finance supply”).  
12 For a general argument that behavioral failings often point toward more direct regulatory 
mandates and a critique of the preference in behavioral law and economics for light-touch 
regulatory tools, see Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and 
Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2014).  
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important part of the bill was risk retention.”13 But to what market failure is 
a mandatory risk retention requirement a useful regulatory response?  
The standard answer is moral hazard. It is now conventional wisdom 
that lenders made loans to riskier borrowers in the run-up to the crisis 
because they lacked “skin in the game.” Lenders sold the loans to 
securitizers that in turn passed them off to MBS investors. The Dodd–
Frank Act requires securitizers to retain credit risk so that they have 
incentives to monitor better the quality of the mortgages that they buy and 
thereby protect investors. 
But the risk retention requirement fits uneasily with the canonical 
models of information economics. The standard result in such models is 
that when one party has less information about the quality of a loan than 
another party, the less-informed party will rationally be wary of purchasing 
the loan. If some form of risk retention by the seller is optimal to align 
incentives, then market participants will contract for it. Under the 
conventional economic view, a regulatory risk retention requirement is not 
useful.  
To justify the risk retention requirement, we need to identify not just a 
first-order market failure, like moral hazard, but also a second-order market 
failure: failure of private responses to the first-order market failure. To this 
end, we consider the naive-investors theory, which posits that investors are 
unable to appreciate the severity of the moral hazard problem. If investors 
are naive, then forcing securitizers to retain some skin in the game could 
create needed incentives for securitizers to superintend originators’ 
underwriting.  
The risk retention requirement, however, will not effectively mitigate 
the risks posed by a housing bubble and might in fact exacerbate them. Risk 
retention relies on incentives by imposing additional costs on securitizers 
when mortgages default. This might be a sensible approach if securitizers 
make optimal decisions based on rational beliefs about the prospect of 
default. But overoptimism about future house prices in a bubble leads 
market participants to underweigh the probability of default and blunts the 
incentive benefits of risk retention. Moreover, a binding risk retention 
requirement would further concentrate mortgage risk on securitizers. As 
recent experience painfully demonstrates, the “tail risks” of mortgage loans, 
if held by financial institutions, can result in a run on those institutions by 
their short-term creditors and a breakdown in credit markets.  
 
13 Floyd Norris, Mortgages Without Risk, at Least for the Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2013, at B1. 
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Evidence from the recent housing boom and bust confirms that the risk 
retention requirement will be ineffective in a housing bubble. The market-
determined level of risk retention by securitizers during the recent boom 
was in fact too high, not too low. The same Wall Street banks that led the 
league tables for the creation of MBS also bore much of the brunt of the 
losses when the underlying loans failed. There is also little evidence that 
selling MBS to naive investors caused the decline in underwriting standards 
preceding the crisis, and there are good reasons to think it did not. The 
most influential evidence purportedly showing that securitization led to lax 
screening has now been discredited.14 And contrary to the naive-investors 
theory, sophisticated contractual arrangements, put in place over decades of 
experience with securitizing mortgages, were employed to mitigate the 
incentive problems posed by securitization.  
We turn in Part III to the second pillar of the Dodd–Frank Act’s reforms 
to mortgage underwriting—the ability-to-repay rule. We show that it has an 
analytic structure that parallels that of the risk retention requirement. The 
ability-to-repay rule also cannot be justified under the standard rational 
choice theory of contracting. Rational borrowers can assess their own ability 
to repay, so there is no reason to depart from the traditional contractual 
norm of caveat emptor. To justify the ability-to-repay rule, we need to posit 
a reason for a contractual failure.  
The leading explanation—which we call the naive-borrowers theory—is 
that lenders exploit borrowers’ misunderstanding of the risks embedded in 
mortgage contracts by offering loans that have an inefficiently high risk of 
default. A popular account of the recent financial crisis is that lenders 
marketed loans with low initial “teaser” interest rates and payments, which 
fooled borrowers into thinking that they could afford the loan. When the 
monthly payments reset to a higher amount, the borrower would default 
unless the borrower could refinance.  
But why would lenders find it profitable to make loans that are designed 
to default? Enter securitization, deus ex machina. The standard argument is 
that originators have incentives to engage in such predatory lending because 
they can pass on the credit risk to securitizers. The naive-investors theory 
and the naive-borrowers theory thus work together to provide a coherent 
justification for the ability-to-repay rule. 
The ability-to-repay rule was intended to protect borrowers by 
discouraging this form of predatory lending. It functions primarily as a type 
 
14 See generally Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Securitization and Moral Hazard: Evidence from 
Credit Score Cutoff Rules, 63 J. MONETARY ECON. 1 (2014) (arguing that credit score cutoff rules 
do not support the conclusion that securitization led to lax screening). 
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of liability rule for negligent mortgage underwriting and in practice imposes 
liability on the originator only in the event of a default. Like the risk 
retention requirement, the ability-to-repay rule relies on changing the 
incentives of more sophisticated market participants to control mortgage 
underwriting and to protect the less sophisticated.  
 A housing bubble undermines the ability-to-repay rule in much the 
same way that it does the risk retention requirement. In a bubble, 
originators underweigh the prospect of default, blunting the incentives 
created by the rule. Moreover, the ability-to-repay rule focuses on a narrow 
aspect of underwriting—the affordability of the loan—and does nothing to 
prevent deterioration of other aspects of underwriting in a bubble, including 
credit histories and down payments. Evidence from the recent crisis 
confirms that the ability-to-repay rule will be ineffective in a bubble.  
In Part IV, we develop the contours of a better approach. Mortgage 
regulation can and should be designed to protect the economy from housing 
bubbles. To be effective, such regulation must be robust to the irrational 
exuberance that pervades all sides of the market during a bubble. 
Overoptimism about house prices in a bubble will defeat indirect, incentive-
based regulation. Accordingly, direct regulatory mandates will be more 
effective in protecting both banks and borrowers. Similarly, because 
regulators are also susceptible to bubbles, regulation should be based on 
simple, fixed rules and should not rely on discretionary judgments by 
regulators to counteract bubbles in real-time. 
One simple but powerful tool for combating bubbles is an ex ante limit 
on mortgage leverage. Requiring substantial down payments would limit 
the incidence and magnitude of debt-fueled housing bubbles. It would also 
provide a buffer that protects mortgages from a fall in house prices and 
reduce the exposure of households to undiversified, highly leveraged 
investments in housing. While a leverage limit would restrict access to 
mortgage credit and therefore potentially to homeownership, there are 
straightforward ways to mitigate these costs through public grants and 
guarantees. Our analysis suggests a set of other direct regulatory tools to 
further mitigate bubbles, including caps on the debt-to-income ratios of 
mortgages and restrictions on contractual features, like teaser rates, that 
encourage borrowers to take out unsustainable loans in a bubble. Finally, 
our critique of incentive-based regulation provides an important new 
perspective on current legislative efforts to reform the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and the broader architecture of housing 
finance. 
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Much of the debate over the policy responses to the recent financial 
crisis has been about how to keep Main Street safe from Wall Street. Our 
analysis calls for a fundamental paradigm shift. The central policy challenge 
is to keep Main Street and Wall Street safe from themselves. 
I. THE HOUSING BUBBLE AND THE GREAT RECESSION 
The story of the Great Recession is largely the story of a housing 
bubble. This is not unusual. The recent boom and bust in the United States 
is simply a particularly severe episode of a historical pattern of countries 
experiencing real estate bubbles that precipitate financial crises followed by 
protracted economic downturns. The importance of housing bubbles 
motivates the basic goal of this Article: to evaluate recent and potential 
reforms to mortgage regulation in terms of how effectively they mitigate 
risks posed by housing bubbles. In this Part, we set the stage by briefly 
describing the recent housing bubble and its essential role in the Great 
Recession.  
 A. The Housing Bubble of 1997–2006 
The decade leading up to the financial crisis of 2007–2008 witnessed 
unprecedented growth in U.S. house prices. Figure 1 shows the long-run 
trend in real (that is, inflation-adjusted) house prices.15 For most of the 
twentieth century, house prices on average experienced essentially zero 
growth. From 1890 to 1997, house prices increased nationally by a total of 
7%, an annual growth rate of 0.06%.16 But beginning in the late 1990s, house 
prices increased sharply. From 1997 to 2006, real house prices increased by 
85%, an annual growth rate of about 7%.17 
 
 
15 These data are from ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 13 (2d ed. 2005), 
and regularly updated versions are available for download online at Robert Shiller, Online Data, 
YALE U. DEPARTMENT ECON., http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm (last visited May 11, 
2015) (follow “US Home Prices 1890–Present” hyperlink), archived at http://perma.cc/D493-
VTKK.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
  
1550 University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 163: 1539 
 
Figure 1: Long-Run House Prices 
 
Nominal house prices increased even more sharply, as shown in Figure 2 
below, growing by a total of 135% over this period, an annual growth rate of 
9%.18 In many major cities, the boom was even bigger. The S&P/Case–
Shiller 10-city composite home price index, also shown in Figure 2, tripled 
from 1997–2006.19  
 
 
 
 
18  S&P/Case–Shiller National Home Price Index, supra note 1. Nominal house prices may be 
even more important than real house prices for setting the expectations of future price growth that 
are so crucial in a bubble because they are more salient than real house prices, a phenomenon 
known as the “money illusion.” See Markus K. Brunnermeier & Christian Julliard, Money Illusion 
and Housing Frenzies, 21 REV. FIN. STUD. 135, 135 (2008) (defining “money illusion” as “the 
inability to properly distinguish changes in nominal values due to changes in real fundamentals 
from changes merely due to inflation”); Franco Modigliani & Richard A. Cohn, Inflation, Rational 
Valuation and the Market, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Mar.–Apr. 1979, at 24, 31 (describing “a world of no 
money illusion, in which creditors are aware of the nature of the effect of inflation on adjusted 
profits”). 
19 The ten cities included in the index are Boston, Chicago, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, 
Miami, New York City, San Diego, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. S&P DOW JONES 
INDICES, MCGRAW HILL FIN., S&P/CASE–SHILLER HOME PRICE INDICES: 
METHODOLOGY 8 (2015), available at http://us.spindices.com/documents/methodologies/methodology 
-sp-cs-home-price-indices.pdf. 
50
70
90
110
130
150
170
190
210
1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2020
S&
P
 /
 C
as
e-
Sh
ill
er
 R
ea
l H
om
e 
P
ri
ce
 I
nd
ex
Year
  
2015] Regulating Against Bubbles  1551 
 
 
 
 
 
This unparalleled increase in house prices was like a “rocket taking off.”20 
But that rocket fell swiftly back to earth. Beginning in 2006, house prices 
crashed, and, by 2012, they had fallen nationally almost 40% from their 
peak.21 Like the takeoff, the crash was even more pronounced in many major 
cities, as shown in Figure 2. And it is noteworthy that a similar boom-and-
bust cycle in house prices occurred over this period in many other countries, 
including Ireland, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom.22 
This pattern in prices—a rapid run-up followed by a crash—is the 
characteristic pattern of an asset bubble. But what does it mean to say that 
there was a “bubble” in housing? The theory of asset bubbles is at an early 
stage of development and remains controversial. The leading account, which 
we follow here, was developed by Professor Robert Shiller in work for 
which he recently won the Nobel Prize. Shiller defines a bubble as a 
 
20 SHILLER, supra note 15, at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21 S&P/Case–Shiller National Home Price Index, supra note 1. 
22 See R. Glenn Hubbard & Christopher J. Mayer, The Mortgage Market Meltdown and House 
Prices, 9 B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 6-15 (2009) (comparing house prices and related 
data in a selection of countries worldwide). 
Figure 2: The Housing Bubble
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situation in which “excessive public expectations of future price increases 
cause prices to be temporarily elevated.”23 In Shiller’s theory, bubbles are 
fundamentally a psychological and sociological—not just an economic—
phenomenon.24  
The process begins with an initial increase in house prices caused by 
some precipitating factor.25 That increase sparks enthusiasm among 
potential homebuyers, who then expect a similar increase in prices in the 
next period and buy homes on the basis of that expectation. This generates 
a feedback loop as the increased demand for housing pushes prices up 
further and reinforces expectations of still more price increases.26 The 
media dutifully plays its role through news accounts of people making a 
killing in housing, which generate further enthusiasm.27 Leverage amplifies 
this process.28 Homebuyers who put 5% down on a house that experiences a 
 
23 Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, 2003, at 299, 299. For a similar definition, see Joseph E. Stiglitz, 
Symposium on Bubbles, J. ECON PERSP., Spring 1990, at 13, 13, where the author explains that “if 
the reason that the price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling price will be 
high tomorrow—when ‘fundamental’ factors do not seem to justify such a price—then a bubble 
exists.” In his book Irrational Exuberance, Shiller offers a more expansive definition of “speculative 
bubbles” as 
a situation in which news of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm, which spreads 
by psychological contagion from person to person, in the process amplifying stories 
that might justify the price increases and bringing in a larger and larger class of 
investors, who, despite doubts about the real value of an investment, are drawn to it 
partly through envy of others’ successes and partly through a gambler’s excitement. 
SHILLER, supra note 15, at 2. 
24 The summary here draws on SHILLER, supra note 15, at 147-48, 157-58.  
25 See, e.g., JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 1-6 
(2009) (suggesting that the Federal Reserve’s holding of interest rates at an historically low level 
was a precipitating factor for the recent housing bubble); Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 
Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of Common Causes (suggesting that a confluence 
of international forces, including current account deficits, interest rate policies, and private and 
public debt policies were precipitating factors), in ASIA AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
131, 131-32 (Reuven Glick & Mark M. Spiegel eds., 2009). 
26 See SHILLER, supra note 15, at 147-73 (explaining psychological factors, such as herd 
behavior, that may contribute to major shifts in markets). 
27 See generally Cindy K. Soo, Quantifying Animal Spirits: News Media and Sentiment in the 
Housing Market (Univ. of Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1200, 2013), available at 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/99759/1200_Soo.pdf?sequence=1 (arguing 
that sentiment may help explain the boom and bust of the housing market and analyzing the 
language of relevant newspaper articles to determine their effect on such sentiment). 
28 See John Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle (“[V]ariation in leverage has a huge impact on 
the price of assets, contributing to economic bubbles and busts.”), in 24 NBER 
MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL 2009, at 1, 2 (Daron Acemoglu et al. eds., 2010). 
  
2015] Regulating Against Bubbles  1553 
 
10% increase in value, for example, will have tripled their initial 
investment.29  
Surveys of recent homebuyers document outsized expectations of future 
price increases during housing booms. For example, in successive surveys in 
each of the years 2003 through 2007, the mean annual house price increase 
expected by homebuyers in Orange County, California, over the next ten 
years ranged from a low of 9.5% in 2006 to an astounding high of 17.4% in 
2004.30 These survey responses are consistent with the view that 
overoptimism about future price increases drove the housing bubble. 
Moreover, they are difficult to reconcile with other models of asset pricing.31 
In part because of their psychological aspect, bubbles are difficult to 
recognize as they are forming. Shiller argues that, in a bubble, “new era” 
narratives naturally emerge to justify the price increases based on 
fundamentals.32 In the case of the recent housing boom, a few 
commentators—most prominently Shiller himself—declared that a bubble 
had formed in the housing market.33 But other economists challenged this 
view, arguing that house prices were consistent with fundamentals, once 
 
29 It is easier to see the effect of leverage with a simple numerical example. Suppose the 
house is initially worth $100,000, and the buyer puts $5000 down, borrowing the other $95,000 to 
buy the house. With a 10% increase in value, the home is now worth $110,000. The debt owed 
remains at $95,000 (assuming for simplicity that the owner has not yet paid down the debt or 
incurred any interest expenses), so the buyer now has tripled his or her equity investment in the 
house from $5000 to $15,000 ($110,000 - $95,000 = $15,000).  
30 Karl E. Case et al., What Have They Been Thinking? Homebuyer Behavior in Hot and Cold 
Markets, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2012, at 265, 276. 
31 See Nicholas Barberis et al., X-CAPM: An Extrapolative Capital Asset Pricing Model 3 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19189, 2013) (canvassing alternative asset price 
models and arguing that they fail to account for the evidence on expectations of future returns); 
see also Robin Greenwood & Andrei Shleifer, Expectations of Returns and Expected Returns, 27 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 714, 742 (2014) (“One difficulty with models in which investors extrapolate cash flows, 
however, is that investors’ expectations are essentially uncorrelated with changes in 
fundamentals.”). 
32 SHILLER, supra note 15, at 2. Professors Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff describe 
this phenomenon as the perception that “this time is different.” See generally CARMEN M. 
REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT (2009). 
33 See Case & Shiller, supra note 23, at 340-41 (noting that indicators of a bubble were present 
in many cities and that the consequences of a possible decline in prices would be severe); David 
Leonhardt, Be Warned: Mr. Bubble’s Worried Again, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2005, § 3 (Sunday 
Business), at 1 (noting that Shiller was “arguing that the housing craze is another bubble destined 
to end badly”). The Economist magazine repeatedly warned of a global housing bubble from 2003 
through the eventual collapse. See Pam Woodall, House of Cards, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2003, at 3 
(warning that a housing bubble was in progress and would inevitably burst); see also, e.g., After the 
Fall, ECONOMIST, June 18, 2005, at 11 (same); In Come the Waves, ECONOMIST, June 18, 2005, at 
73 (same). 
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properly understood.34 No less an authority than then-Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers Ben Bernanke declared in 2005 that 
increases in house prices largely reflected strong fundamentals.35 Wall 
Street economists similarly predicted in this period that house prices would 
continue to appreciate, albeit at a slower rate.36 Since the crash, of course, 
virtually everyone now agrees that in the boom house prices had diverged 
substantially from their fundamental value.37 
Crucially, overoptimism about house prices in the recent housing bubble 
was not confined to homebuyers. The same “bubble fever” infected lenders, 
securitizers, and MBS investors.38 Among the key pieces of evidence is that 
so many holders of MBS, including sophisticated financial institutions, 
failed to hedge their exposures and suffered large losses when house prices 
fell.39  
The behavior of market participants we have described is based on 
“irrational exuberance,” to use the phrase famously coined by Alan 
Greenspan.40 Can a bubble based on such irrational behavior be sustained if 
“smart money” investors recognize that housing is overvalued? The short 
answer is yes. One reason is that institutional constraints inhibit the ability 
 
34 See, e.g., Charles Himmelberg et al., Assessing High House Prices: Bubbles, Fundamentals and 
Misperceptions, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2005, at 67, 90 (“Our evidence does not suggest that house 
prices cannot fall in the future if fundamental factors change. . . . However, this [possibility] does 
not mean that today houses are systematically mispriced.”); Christopher Mayer & John M. 
Quigley, Comments and Discussion, Is There a Bubble in the Housing Market?, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2003, at 343, 355 (commenting that Case and Shiller “greatly 
overinterpret the consistency of their findings with the presence of an asset bubble”). 
35 The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 109th Cong. 7 (2005) 
(statement of Hon. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers) (“Although 
speculative activity has increased in some areas, at a national level these [house] price increases 
largely reflect strong economic fundamentals, including robust growth in jobs and income, low 
mortgage rates, steady rates of household formation, and factors that limit the expansion of 
housing supply in some areas.”). 
36 Leonhardt, supra note 33. 
37 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser et al., Can Cheap Credit Explain the Housing Boom? (noting that 
neither interest rates, approval rates, or down payment requirements were capable of explaining 
the 1996–2006 housing boom), in HOUSING AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 301, 350 (Edward L. 
Glaeser & Todd Sinai eds., 2013); Hubbard & Mayer, supra note 22, at 3 (“[T]he acceleration of 
real estate prices above fundamentals . . . . appears to be a common denominator in the later stage 
of the property boom.”).  
38 Christopher L. Foote et al., Why Did So Many People Make So Many Ex Post Bad Decisions? 
The Causes of the Foreclosure Crisis, in RETHINKING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 136, 137-38 (Alan S. 
Blinder et al. eds., 2012). 
39 See infra notes 149-73 and accompanying text. 
40 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., The Challenge of Central Banking in a 
Democratic Society, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer Lecture of the American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1996/19961205.htm. 
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of rational investors to exploit market mispricing. For example, unlike 
stocks, there is no easy way for arbitrageurs to sell a home “short.”41 More 
fundamentally, even those who are fully rational and recognize the existence 
of a bubble might be drawn into the market in a way that reinforces these 
bubble dynamics. Rational speculators might attempt to “ride the bubble” 
by buying into the market in expectation that the bubble will continue to 
inflate while planning to get out right before it bursts.42 Such speculation 
can further inflate the bubble.43 
 B. The Bubble’s Role in the Great Recession 
The housing bubble played an essential role in the financial crisis and 
the Great Recession that followed. As the bubble inflated, it encouraged—
and was fueled by—an expansion in credit. Originators, securitizers, 
investors, and borrowers alike believed that house prices would continue to 
appreciate and put little or no weight on the possibility that prices would 
decline. These price expectations led market participants to believe that 
there was little risk of mortgage default, causing an increase in riskier 
lending. The 1997–2006 boom in house prices led to the 2006–2010 crash in 
house prices. The bursting of the bubble triggered a massive wave of 
mortgage defaults that ultimately caused a broader financial crisis and a 
sharp reduction in credit in the economy. It also led to a reduction in 
consumption by households, who suddenly found themselves much poorer 
and less able to borrow, which further slowed down the economy. 
1. The Rise in Risky Lending as the Bubble Inflated 
To explain further the role of the boom and bust in house prices, we 
begin with a key economic principle: as long as the house is worth more 
than the outstanding loan amount, mortgages generally do not default. To 
see why, consider the borrower’s perspective. If the house is worth more 
 
41 Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, The Efficiency of the Market for Single-Family Homes, 79 
AM. ECON. REV. 125, 132 (1989). 
42 See Franklin Allen et al., Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric 
Information, 61 J. ECON. THEORY 206, 207 (1993) (providing a rational model in which 
“[e]verybody realizes the stock is overpriced but each person thinks he may be able to sell it at a 
higher price to somebody else before the true value becomes publicly known”); see also Dilip Abreu 
& Markus K. Brunnermeier, Bubbles and Crashes, 71 ECONOMETRICA 173, 173-74 (2003) 
(developing a model in which rational speculators ride bubbles produced by behavioral agents).  
43 See J. Bradford de Long et al., Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing 
Rational Speculation, 45 J. FIN. 379, 380 (1990) (showing how rational speculators, when combined 
with investors who predict future price increases based on naive extrapolation, can increase price 
volatility). 
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than the balance owed on the mortgage, the borrower would not default 
even if he or she could no longer make the loan payments. Instead, the 
borrower would simply sell the house, pay off the balance due on the 
mortgage, and keep his or her equity. This is why the standard model of 
mortgage default is called the “double-trigger” model.44 A job loss or other 
change in the household’s financial circumstances that makes the mortgage 
unaffordable is not by itself sufficient to trigger a mortgage default. Only if 
the house is worth less than the borrower owes on the loan—referred to as 
having “negative equity” or as being “underwater”—would a borrower 
default on the mortgage rather than sell the house.45 
The bubble thus provides an explanation for the decline in underwriting 
standards and the expansion of subprime lending during the boom.46 If 
market participants think that house prices will inexorably rise, then they 
will put little weight on the possibility of default. A bubble therefore leads 
to “asset-based lending,” in which lenders look to the value of the house 
rather than the creditworthiness of the borrower to ensure repayment. In a 
bubble, lenders are willing to lend to borrowers with a history of credit 
problems who would be considered too risky in normal times. Similarly, in a 
bubble, down payments are considered less important since lenders rely 
instead on future house price appreciation to provide an equity buffer. The 
bubble also explains the shift toward no-documentation underwriting 
practices during the boom.47 The view that the house would continue to 
appreciate in value reduces the benefit to the lender of costly verification of 
the borrower’s income and assets. As the lender’s concern about the negative 
equity trigger diminishes, the lender will expend fewer resources to 
investigate the credit risk factors that predict affordability.48 
 
44 Christopher L. Foote et al., Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence, 64 J. 
URB. ECON. 234, 241 (2008). 
45 For recent empirical evidence on the important role of negative equity and changes to 
households’ financial situations in triggering mortgage default, see generally Ronel Elul et al., 
What “Triggers” Mortgage Default?, 100 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 490 (2010). 
46 Foote et al., supra note 38, at 137-38.  
47 See Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 
2009, at 27, 43-44 (noting that the number of no- and low-documentation loans increased between 
2005 and 2008 and that these loans have a much higher default rate than fully documented loans); 
see also Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 1848, 1850 (2011) (showing that as loan quality decreased, the fraction of low-
documentation loans increased). 
48 This is particularly true for low loan-to-value ratio loans (i.e., loans for which the amount 
owed is a relatively small percentage of the value of the home that secures the loan). As one 
prominent mortgage banker explained, “If I’m making a 65%, 75%, 70% loan-to-value [loan], I’m 
not going to get all the documentation.” FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 110 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (quoting Herb Sandler, CEO, 
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A bubble in the housing market also helps explain the emergence of the 
specific contracts used for riskier borrowers in the subprime mortgage 
market. About three-quarters of subprime mortgages issued from 2003 to 
2007 were hybrid adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) that began with a fixed 
interest rate for an introductory period but reset to a potentially much 
higher adjustable interest rate after the introductory period expired.49 Such 
contracts can be optimal if the borrower and the lender expect the house to 
appreciate in value.50 The relatively low initial payments help the borrower 
to afford the loan at first and provide a way for borrowers to stretch their 
resources to take out a bigger loan. The borrower and lender alike believe 
that the house collateralizing the loan will continue to appreciate in value so 
that, at the end of the initial period of low monthly payments, the borrower 
will be able to refinance the loan and receive more favorable terms given the 
appreciation in the value of the collateral.51 This refinancing would also 
typically generate fees for the initial lender, either through prepayment 
penalties on the initial loan or because the initial lender also refinanced the 
loan.52 In effect, these contracts served as a way for both lenders and 
borrowers to speculate on future house prices during the bubble.53 
 
Golden West) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/ 
cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. When the lender is caught up in a bubble, this 
approach would also apply to high loan-to-value ratio loans: because the lender believes the house 
will continue to appreciate, there is little risk of default and hence little value in documenting the 
borrower’s income and assets. 
49 Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,540 ( July 30, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
226). 
50 See Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007, at 12-19 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 14358, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14358.pdf (explaining that a 
subprime mortgage is designed to allow the borrower and lender to benefit from house price 
appreciation over a short period of time). 
51 See id. at 3 (“The key security design feature of subprime mortgages was the ability of 
borrowers to finance and refinance their homes based on the capital gains due to house price 
appreciation over short horizons and then turning this into collateral for a new mortgage (or 
extracting the equity for consumption).”).  
52 Id. at 17. 
53 See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Financial 
Markets, the Economic Outlook, and Monetary Policy, Speech at the Women in Housing and 
Finance and Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon ( Jan. 10, 2008), available at http:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080110a.htm (“Although poor underwriting 
and, in some cases, fraud and abusive practices contributed to the high rates of delinquency that 
we are now seeing in the subprime ARM market, the more fundamental reason for the sharp 
deterioration in credit quality was the flawed premise on which much subprime ARM lending was 
based: that house prices would continue to rise rapidly.”). 
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In our view, the housing bubble itself was a primary cause of the 
expansion in risky lending during the boom.54 In a recent article attempting 
to reconcile the bubble with an alternative, moral hazard–based view of the 
crisis, Professors Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter argue the opposite: an 
expansion in risky lending caused the housing bubble and not the other way 
around.55 In particular, they argue that the shift toward private 
securitization of mortgages in the 2000s ushered in unchecked moral 
hazard.56 Because mortgage originators were able to pass risky mortgages on 
to investors, they lowered their lending standards.57 The resulting boom in 
subprime lending in turn caused the housing bubble.58 In Levitin and 
Wachter’s account, the bubble was epiphenomenal; moral hazard from 
securitization was the root cause of the crisis. Their view of the bubble as a 
mere side effect of securitization motivates their policy recommendations, 
which are targeted at reducing moral hazard.59 
Levitin and Wachter’s view, however, is based on an oddly cramped 
account of bubbles. They view irrational exuberance as a demand-side 
phenomenon that affects only consumers, not lenders or investors. Based on 
this assumption, they argue that irrational exuberance cannot explain the 
expansion in credit supply during the boom.60 As evidence, they assert that 
the fall in MBS yield spreads—in effect, the price charged by the market for 
mortgage credit risk—is inconsistent with the irrational exuberance view of 
the bubble:  
There was undoubtedly a great deal of irrational or misguided consumer 
behavior in real-estate investment. But this behavior required readily 
available financing. Shiller’s demand-side theory cannot explain the 
movement in [MBS]-yield spreads during the bubble and is, therefore, an 
incomplete explanation. Credit relationships are two-sided, and the 
 
54 See Robert J. Shiller, Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and Home Ownership 17 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13553, 2007) (arguing that “boom 
psychology” encouraged lenders because “the boom reduces the default rate on lower-quality 
mortgages”); see also Foote et al., supra note 38, at 137-38 (“A ‘bubble fever’ . . . infected both 
borrowers and lenders. If both groups believed that house prices would continue to rise rapidly for 
the foreseeable future, then it is not surprising to find borrowers stretching to buy the biggest 
houses they could and investors lining up to give them the money.”). 
55 See Levitin & Wachter, supra note 11, at 1181 (“[T]he bubble was, in fact, primarily a supply-
side phenomenon . . . .”). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 1252-55. 
60 Id. at 1212. 
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evidence from [MBS] spreads indicates that any increase in housing-finance 
demand was outstripped by an increase in housing-finance supply.61 
But as we—and Shiller before us—have emphasized, the housing bubble 
was a marketwide phenomenon that affected the financial institutions on the 
supply side of the credit market just as it did the mortgage borrowers on the 
demand side.62 A fall in MBS spreads is thus wholly consistent with—
indeed, predicted by—the irrational exuberance view of the bubble. As 
lenders and MBS investors formed overoptimistic beliefs about future 
house price appreciation, their assessments of mortgage default risk fell, 
resulting in lower prices for mortgage credit. As we discuss in detail below, 
many of the financial institutions most involved in the creation of 
mortgages and MBS retained risks that resulted in catastrophic losses when 
the bubble burst.63 This is inconsistent with a simple moral hazard story. 
Levitin and Wachter’s view that securitization was the root cause of the 
bubble and the mortgage crisis also cannot explain the boom-and-bust 
cycles in house prices over the same period in many other countries that did 
not experience a shift toward securitization.64 We return to this moral 
hazard theory in our discussion of the risk retention requirement below.65  
Levitin and Wachter’s one-sided view of irrational exuberance in the 
bubble reflects the more general asymmetric view of behavioral biases that 
dominates the behavioral law and economics literature.66 This asymmetric 
view pits perfectly optimizing firms against mistake-prone consumers. The 
result is a regulatory approach designed to protect biased consumers from 
being exploited by sophisticated firms. A central contribution of this Article 
is to explain the policy implications of a proper understanding of bubbles as 
 
61 Id. at 1212 (emphasis added). 
62 See Shiller, supra note 54, at 18 (“The boom psychology encouraged potential homeowners 
and encouraged lenders as well. Home buyers were encouraged by the potential investment 
returns. Mortgage lenders were encouraged since the boom reduces the default rate on lower-
quality mortgages. The subprime mortgage market was virtually nonexistent before the mid 1990s, 
and rose to account for a fifth of all new mortgages by 2005. Denial rates for mortgage applications 
plunged after around 2000.”). 
63 See infra notes 149-72 and accompanying text; see also Viral V. Acharya & Matthew 
Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITICAL REV. 195, 197 (2009) (“[E]specially from 
2003 to 2007, the main purpose of securitization was not to share risks with investors . . . . The net 
result was to keep the risk concentrated in the financial institutions—and, indeed, to keep the risk 
at a greatly magnified level, because of the overleveraging that it allowed.”).  
64 See Hubbard & Mayer, supra note 22, at 6-15 (reviewing worldwide evidence of causes of 
the housing boom). 
65 See infra Section II.B. 
66 See, e.g., BAR-GILL, supra note 9. 
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marketwide phenomena, entailing irrational exuberance not only among 
consumers but also among financial intermediaries. 
2. The Bursting of the Bubble and the Great Recession 
By the peak of the boom in 2006, housing wealth had ballooned to $30.8 
trillion, up from only $15.6 trillion at the start of the run-up in 1997.67 In the 
process, households had accumulated $10.5 trillion in mortgage debt.68 
When the bubble burst, the dramatic fall in house prices wreaked havoc on 
the economy. The diagram in Figure 3 summarizes the two main channels 
of this dynamic: the banking channel and the household channel. 
 
Figure 3: The Housing Bubble and the Great Recession 
We begin with the banking channel. The bursting of the bubble led to a 
precipitous jump in mortgage defaults. When the bubble burst, many of the 
 
67 All housing wealth figures are in 2006 dollars. Following Matteo Iacoviello, we calculate 
housing wealth as the market value of all residential assets in the United States. Matteo Iacoviello, 
Housing Wealth and Consumption 1-3 (Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Int’l Fin. Discussion 
Papers, Paper No. 1027, 2011). The value for owner-occupied homes is taken from Entry B.101, 
Row 3 of the Flow of Funds Historical Annual Tables 2005–2014 and the Historical Annual Tables 
1995–2004. The value of rented homes is taken from Table B.103, Row 4 of the Flow of Funds. BD. 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., Z.1 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC 
ACCOUNTS, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/data.htm.  
68 Mortgage Debt Outstanding, FED. RES., http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/ 
mortoutstand/current.htm (last visited May 11, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/27SK-CFP7 (follow the 
“Historical Data (CSV)” hyperlink; scroll to data entry for 2006Q4). 
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risky mortgages made during the boom ended up underwater.69 Mortgages 
made in the late stages of the boom ended up the furthest underwater 
because those mortgages were taken out near the peak of the home’s value.70 
Similarly, loans with lower initial down payments ended up further 
underwater because they had less of an equity buffer to absorb a decline in 
the value of the house. These negative equity mortgages were at high risk of 
default.71 As the recession took hold and unemployment rose, many 
households that were underwater could no longer afford their mortgages or 
strategically defaulted.72 The resulting losses to financial institutions 
sparked a full-blown financial panic, and the resulting reduction in credit 
led to a sharp fall in business activity and employment.73 
The bursting of the housing bubble also led to a reduction in household 
consumption.74 Housing is a major asset of households and moreover is a 
highly leveraged asset.75 Because of leverage, the fall in house prices led to 
an even larger percentage reduction in household net worth. The fall in 
house prices also eliminated an important source of collateral that 
households borrowed against to finance consumption. In the latter half of 
the housing boom between 2001 and 2005, households extracted about $700 
billion of equity from their homes each year through cash-out refinancings 
and other forms of mortgage debt.76 With households poorer after the crash 
and with less equity in their homes to borrow against, household spending 
sagged, contributing to the Great Recession.77 
 
 
 
 
69 Mayer et al., supra note 47, at 46. 
70 See Christopher Palmer, Why Did So Many Subprime Borrowers Default During the 
Crisis: Loose Credit or Plummeting Prices? 47 (Nov. 15, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://web.mit.edu/cjpalmer/www/CPalmer_ JMP.pdf. 
71 Mayer et al., supra note 47, at 46.  
72 The evidence shows that about 80% of defaults were due to both negative equity and 
income shocks, as opposed to being strategic defaults driven solely by negative equity. See generally 
Neil Bhutta et al., The Depth of Negative Equity and Mortgage Default Decisions (Fin. & Econ. 
Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2010-35, 2010). 
73 See generally Gabriel Chodorow-Reich, The Employment Effects of Credit Market Disruptions: 
Firm-Level Evidence from the 2008–9 Financial Crisis, 129 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2014). 
74 ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE 
GREAT RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 33-35 (2014). 
75 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
76 Karl E. Case et al., Wealth Effects Revisited: 1975–2012, at 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 18667, 2013). 
77 Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, Household Leverage and the Recession of 2007–09, 58 IMF ECON. 
REV. 74, 77-81 (2010). 
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*      *      * 
It is no exaggeration to say that had there not been a bubble in the 
housing market, there would not have been a financial crisis or indeed any 
recession approaching the severity of the Great Recession. It is no 
coincidence that a credit boom and an asset price bubble typically precede 
financial crises.78 Indeed, a bubble in real estate has been the primary 
culprit.79 The five largest preceding banking crises in the post-war period 
(Spain 1977, Norway 1987, Finland 1991, Sweden 1991, and Japan 1992) were 
each associated with a boom and bust in house prices.80 In their celebrated 
book on financial crises, Professors Reinhart and Rogoff find that house 
prices are among the best predictors of a banking crisis.81 The housing 
market has also been at the center of more modest macroeconomic 
fluctuations. As Professor Edward Leamer explains in a paper provocatively 
titled Housing Is the Business Cycle, eight of the ten prior recessions in the 
United States since World War II have been preceded by downturns in 
housing.82 Housing continues to be the single largest asset class in the U.S. 
economy.83 The main source of systemic risk is the possibility of a future 
housing bubble.  
If housing bubbles are the problem, then what is the solution? 
Prudential regulation—the rules that govern financial institutions to ensure 
their stability—provides an important set of traditional tools to mitigate the 
risks posed by housing bubbles. These include limitations on both the assets 
and liabilities of financial institutions. However, the history of financial 
crises shows that prudential regulation is unlikely to be sufficiently effective 
on its own. First, bubbles themselves undermine the operation of prudential 
regulation. In a bubble, regulators are reluctant to take away the punch 
bowl, while financial institutions stand to gain even more from 
circumventing prudential regulation.84  
 
78 REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 32, at 216-17. 
79 Id.; Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Bubbles and Crises, 100 ECON. J. 236, 236-37 (2000) 
(providing examples in many countries of real estate bubbles bursting, leading to years of limited 
economic growth). 
80 Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Is the 2007 Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So 
Different? An International Historical Comparison, 98 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 339, 340-
41 (2008). 
81 REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 32, at 279. 
82 Edward E. Leamer, Housing Is the Business Cycle 13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 13428, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13428.pdf.  
83 Susan J. Smith, Crisis and Innovation in the Housing Economy: A Tale of Three Markets, in 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION: TOO MUCH OR TOO LITTLE? 71, 73 (Michael Haliassos ed., 2013). 
84 In an important new book, Professor Erik Gerding illustrates how, time and again, bubbles 
result in the deterioration of financial regulation, a process he colorfully terms the “Regulatory 
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A second limitation of prudential regulation is the danger of incomplete 
coverage or leakage. As the history of shadow banking demonstrates, 
mortgage risk can easily move from regulated to unregulated institutions. 
For example, regulations covering bank holding companies—a major focus 
of the Dodd–Frank Act—would have no effect on nonbank mortgage 
lenders.85  
A third shortcoming is the considerable uncertainty over how best to 
implement prudential regulation.86 The Dodd–Frank Act contains a number 
of reforms to prudential regulation. These provisions establish the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council (FSOC), which has the power to designate 
nonbank financial companies as systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs).87 They also direct the Federal Reserve to develop enhanced 
prudential standards—including requirements for risk-based capital, risk 
management, resolution plans, and stress tests—for bank holding companies 
and nonbank SIFIs.88 A number of recent reform proposals envision an 
expanded mandate for prudential regulators and monetary authorities to 
identify and counteract housing bubbles (and other sources of systemic risk) 
in real time.89 These proposals include targeted monetary policy to deflate 
asset bubbles and countercyclical prudential limits.90 This type of 
 
Instability Hypothesis.” See ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 2 (2014) (positing “that strong forces act to decay financial regulations at the 
precise moment when they are most needed”). 
85 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, 279-80 (describing the role of shadow banking in 
the financial crisis); see also GERDING, supra note 84, at 427-44 (arguing that the growth of the 
shadow banking system accelerated as the housing bubble expanded); Samuel G. Hanson et al., A 
Macroprudential Approach to Financial Regulation, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 3, 25 (arguing 
that systemic effects from mortgage fire sales come from not only insured depositories, but also 
nonbank financial intermediaries).  
86 See Prasad Krishnamurthy, Rules, Standards, and Complexity in Capital Regulation, 43 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 273, 282-85 (2014) (discussing whether institutionalized cost–benefit analysis could 
lead to better regulation).  
87 Dodd–Frank Act § 113, 12 U.S.C. § 5323 (2012).  
88 Id. § 165, 12 U.S.C. § 5365. 
89 See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 25-26 (2009) (outlining the types of financial institutions that should 
be regulated and which agencies should regulate them); Gabriele Galati & Richhild Moessner, 
Macroprudential Policy—A Literature Review 7-12 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 
337, 2011) (discussing macroprudential tools and other macroeconomic policy tools used to combat 
systemic risk in financial systems); see also GERDING, supra note 84, at 491-95 (describing ways to 
make financial regulation more resilient); Hanson et al., supra note 85, at 7-16 (2011) (discussing six 
proposed tools for regulators to implement a “macroprudential approach to financial regulation”). 
90 See Hanson et al., supra note 85, at 24 (recommending that banks be required to raise new 
dollars of equity as increased capital requirements are phased in, and recommending use of a small 
countercyclical buffer on a country-by-country basis). 
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“macroprudential” regulation requires considerable regulatory foresight and 
sophistication.  
It is beyond the scope of this Article to offer a detailed assessment of 
these reforms, but there are good reasons to be skeptical that they will prove 
successful. The Federal Reserve faces a number of challenges in implementing 
enhanced prudential standards.91 Stress tests are prone to arbitrary 
discretion,92 risk-management requirements may do little beyond creating 
paperwork,93 and risk-based capital regulation can be easily manipulated by 
regulated banks.94 In fact, despite the prodigious volume of regulatory 
output in the aftermath of the Dodd–Frank Act, many commentators 
continue to call for a different approach to prudential supervision that relies 
to a greater extent on simple, all-purpose regulatory tools.95 
Moreover, it would be unwise to design regulation that relies on the 
ability of regulators to identify a housing bubble as it is forming. As we 
have explained, one of the defining features of a housing bubble is 
 
91 See John H. Cochrane, Toward a Run-Free Financial System 4-5 (Apr. 16, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/ 
papers/run_free.pdf (noting that, because previous regulations produce unintended consequences, 
financial regulation continuously expands in an effort to correct problems created by old rules). See 
generally JAMES R. BARTH ET AL., RETHINKING BANK REGULATION: TILL ANGELS 
GOVERN (2006) (conducting the first comprehensive cross-country assessment of bank regulation 
and questioning current international best practices recommendations); Prasad Krishnamurthy, 
Regulating Capital, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2014) (noting the challenges of prudential regulation 
and suggesting a new approach). 
92 See Cochrane, supra note 91, at 34 (“One might think that the Fed would write down rules 
for the stress test. But no, the Fed changes the rules and scenarios each time . . . .”). 
93 See Charles Goodhart, How Should We Regulate Bank Capital and Financial Products? What 
Role for ‘Living Wills’? (suggesting that regulation to improve risk management in individual banks 
is misguided), in ADAIR TURNER ET AL., THE FUTURE OF FINANCE: THE LSE REPORT 165, 
166-67 (2010). 
94 See Krishnamurthy, supra note 91, at 35-42 (reviewing criticisms regarding the effectiveness 
of current capital regulation); Jón Daníelsson et al., An Academic Response to Basel II, at 4 (LSE 
Fin. Mkts. Grp., Special Paper No. 130, 2001) (discussing remaining defects in the Basel 
Committee’s new proposals and arguing that these defects could have destabilizing effects on the 
global financial system). 
95 See Anat R. Admati et al., Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital 
Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive 2-5 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stanford 
Univ., Working Paper No. 86, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1669704 (arguing that imposing higher equity capital requirements would lead banks 
to make better lending decisions and that many of the criticisms of higher equity capital 
requirements inappropriately focus on private costs to banks rather than larger social costs); see 
also Krishnamurthy, supra note 91, at 5 (“[A] group of prominent scholars advocate simple capital 
ratios as the most effective regulatory tool with which to mitigate risk in the financial system.”). 
While both Basel III and the Federal Reserve’s new capital standards increase required capital for 
most banks, these increases are unlikely to significantly enhance financial stability. See 
Krishnamurthy, supra note 91, at 7 (advocating more substantial increases in capital requirements). 
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disagreement over whether increases in house prices are justified.96 When 
there is widespread public concern and an active policy debate over the 
possibility of a bubble, there will usually be some plausible model under 
which house prices can be justified by fundamentals.97 Such alternative 
models will exist even when other models based on fundamentals cannot 
explain house prices. For better or worse, such indeterminacy is endemic to 
asset pricing models and evidence.98 If the burden of proof rests on 
regulators to demonstrate that a bubble exists, then this burden will rarely 
be met. Housing bubbles have a long history,99 but this history provides 
little evidence to suggest that regulators can identify bubbles as they occur 
and take effective measures to counteract them. 
Given the current state of knowledge with respect to prudential 
regulation, regulators should not forego other opportunities to make the 
financial system and broader economy more resilient to housing bubbles. A 
central claim of this Article is that mortgage regulation can and should be 
used to address the risks posed by housing bubbles. The mortgage market 
provides the credit that fuels housing bubbles. It also plays a key 
intermediating role linking housing bubbles to the broader economy. 
Compared to the complexity of financial institutions, mortgages are fairly 
simple contracts to regulate.  
Regulation of the mortgage market therefore presents an opportunity to 
address the risks of housing bubbles where they are easiest to target. 
Despite this opportunity, existing scholarship on addressing the threat 
posed by housing bubbles has largely ignored mortgage regulation, focusing 
instead on reforming traditional prudential regulation like bank capital 
requirements,100 while legal scholarship on mortgage regulation has focused 
 
96 See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
97 See Himmelberg et al., supra note 34, at 68-73 (discussing fallacies about the costliness of 
the housing market and how to accurately assess the state of home prices to determine whether a 
bubble exists). 
98 See generally Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental 
Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591 (1986) (noting that market valuations can differ substantially from rational 
expectations of future cash flows without such differences being statistically discernible from 
realized returns).  
99 See generally CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, 
AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (2005) (recounting the history of asset 
bubbles followed by financial crises); REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 32 (analyzing the 
relationship between past financial crises and housing bubbles). 
100 See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: 
WHAT’S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013) (arguing for reforms 
to prudential regulation to prevent a recurrence of the recent financial crisis).  
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instead on traditional consumer protection issues.101 In Parts II and III, we 
show that the Dodd–Frank Act’s reforms to mortgage regulation are also 
based on a consumer-protection paradigm. Protecting vulnerable borrowers 
from being exploited by predatory lenders is indeed a worthy regulatory 
goal and one very much compatible with the bubble-focused paradigm we 
advocate in this Article. But the Dodd–Frank Act’s exclusive focus on 
consumer protection produces costs in the form of economic instability. In 
Part IV, we outline a better approach: regulating mortgages against bubbles. 
II. RISK RETENTION 
The two principal mortgage-market reforms in the Dodd–Frank Act are 
the risk retention requirement and the ability-to-repay rule. In this Part and 
in the next, we analyze the underlying logic of these reforms and show that 
they have a common structure. Both are premised on the idea that the 
problems in mortgage underwriting revealed by the crisis resulted from 
sophisticated market participants—securitizers and mortgage originators—
taking advantage of less sophisticated investors and borrowers. Both rely on 
reshaping the incentives of these sophisticated market participants to 
improve underwriting. And both will be ineffective, or worse, in the face of 
a housing bubble.  
While our primary goal in this Part is to evaluate the risk retention 
requirement, our analysis also engages the broader issue of the underlying 
causes of the financial crisis. We expose fundamental limitations of the 
dominant narrative, which emphasizes moral hazard in the origination and 
securitization of mortgages. We emphasize a basic fact that any approach to 
reforming the mortgage market must face: when the housing bubble burst, 
the originators and securitizers on the inside of the mortgage market 
suffered catastrophic losses. The analysis that follows thus holds more 
general implications for the design of policy to protect the economy from 
housing bubbles.  
 
101 See generally, e.g., Barr et al., supra note 9 (studying the interaction between consumer 
psychology and market competition and concluding that regulation is needed); Oren Bar-Gill, The 
Law, Economics and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073 (2009) 
(studying a demand-side market failure in the mortgage market where imperfectly rational 
consumers make suboptimal choices); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three 
Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002) (studying 
market failures that give rise to predatory lending); Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits 
of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707 (2006) (applying 
psychology and behavioral economics to the predatory lending problem).  
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A. Background 
Moral hazard posed by securitization was the central concern motivating 
the Dodd–Frank Act’s risk retention requirement. The Treasury Department 
originally proposed the requirement in a June 2009 white paper announcing 
the Obama administration’s financial reform agenda.102 “Lenders and 
securitizers had weak incentives to conduct due diligence regarding the 
quality of the underlying assets being securitized,” the report explained.103 
Accordingly, “federal banking agencies should promulgate regulations that 
require loan originators or sponsors to retain five percent of the credit risk 
of securitized exposures.”104  
Colloquially referred to as the “skin-in-the-game” requirement, the risk 
retention requirement survived in the final bill signed into law in 2010. 
Section 941(b) of the Dodd–Frank Act directs the federal banking agencies 
and the SEC to promulgate a rule requiring securitizers to retain at least a 
5% interest in the credit risk of any asset that they convey to a third party 
through an asset-backed security (ABS).105 The statute includes specific 
standards for the agencies’ risk retention regulation. For example, it 
requires that securitizers be prohibited from hedging their required interest 
in their ABS.106 It also directs the relevant agencies to define the term 
 
102 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION 3 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/ 
FinalReport_web.pdf. 
103 Id. at 44. 
104 Id. The Senate Committee Report on the legislation further described the rationale for 
this approach: 
[L]oans were made expressly to be sold into securitization pools, which meant that 
the lenders did not expect to bear the credit risk of borrower default. This led to 
significant deterioration in credit and loan underwriting standards . . . .  
. . . .  
. . . [I]t proved impossible for investors in asset-backed securities to assess the risks 
of the underlying assets . . . .  
. . . . 
Section 941 [of the Dodd–Frank Act] directs the Federal banking agencies and the 
SEC to jointly prescribe regulations to require any securitizer to retain a material 
portion of the credit risk of any asset that [it securitizes]. When securitizers retain a 
material amount of risk, they have “skin in the game,” aligning their economic 
interests with those of investors . . . . Securitizers who retain risk have a strong 
incentive to monitor the quality of the assets they purchase from originators, 
package into securities, and sell. . . .  
. . . Originators . . . will come under increasing market discipline because 
securitizers who retain risk will be unwilling to purchase poor-quality assets. 
S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 128-29 (2010). 
105 Dodd–Frank Act § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i) (2012). 
106 Id., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(A). 
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“qualified residential mortgage” (QRM), and exempts mortgages that meet 
this definition from the risk retention requirement.107  
B. The Market Failure Theory 
Why might a requirement that securitizers retain a minimum portion of 
the credit risk of the assets they securitize be useful? Or to rephrase in the 
conventional terms of regulatory analysis, to what market failure is such a 
regulatory requirement a useful response? To evaluate the risk retention 
requirement, it is crucial to understand the market failure theory on which 
it is premised. 
1. The Asymmetric Information Theory of Risk Retention 
The most prominent academic defenders of the risk retention approach 
point to moral hazard posed by securitization as a justification for 
mandatory risk retention.108 The basic idea is that when lenders sell the 
 
107 More precisely, if an ABS contains only QRMs, it is exempt from the risk retention 
requirement. Id., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(C)(iii). To define QRMs, the law directs regulators to 
consider features of mortgages that “historical loan performance data indicate result in a lower risk 
of default.” Id., 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4)(B). The agencies issued a proposed rule to implement the 
risk retention requirement in 2011. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090 (proposed Apr. 29, 
2011) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; and 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
However, it met with fierce criticism by an unusual coalition of consumer advocates and the 
banking industry. The focus of their attack was the high down payment needed for a mortgage to 
qualify as a QRM. Imposing risk retention on low down payment loans would “restrict access to 
credit for a wide swath of prospective homeowners to a more expensive and possibly less accessible 
market.” Comment Letter from Consumer Fed’n of Am. to OCC, Fed. Reserve Bd., FDIC, SEC, 
FHFA, and HUD 4 (Aug. 1, 2011), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/ 
CFARiskRetentionRulescommentletter2011.pdf. Accordingly, in September 2013, the agencies 
proposed a new rule with a substantially broader definition of QRM that eliminated both the 
down payment and credit history requirements. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928 
(proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; and 24 
C.F.R. pt. 267). Defenders of risk retention argued that this broad definition of QRM would 
substantially weaken the Dodd–Frank Act’s risk retention requirement and thereby increase 
systemic risk. Comment Letter from Sheila C. Bair, Senior Advisor, Pew Charitable Trusts, to 
Robert deV. Frierson, Sec’y, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 30, 2013), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2014/January/20140106/R-1411/R-1411_111813_111631_580446 
904665_1.pdf. The agencies published a final rule in December 2014 that included this expanded 
definition of QRM. Credit Risk Retention, 79 Fed. Reg. 77,602 (Dec. 24, 2014) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373 & 1234; 17 C.F.R. pt. 246; and 24 C.F.R. pt. 267). 
108 See Benjamin J. Keys et al., Mortgage Financing in the Housing Boom and Bust (reviewing 
evidence that securitization led to lax screening by originators and concluding that “it may be 
beneficial to enforce some mandatory retention of a fraction of lower tranche by 
originators/underwriters to better align their interests with those of investors”), in HOUSING 
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 37, at 143, 194; see also Levitin & Wachter, supra note 11, 
at 1257 (“The major alternative approach to addressing the investor–securitizer, principal–agent 
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mortgages that they originate to securitizers and, ultimately, investors, they 
lack incentives to use the information they generate about the borrowers to 
screen out risky loans.109 The result is too many bad loans.  
Asymmetric information about borrowers can indeed produce incentive 
problems—including moral hazard and adverse selection—that lead to a 
market failure. However, because market actors can voluntarily contract for 
risk retention, a risk retention requirement is not useful under the standard 
models in information economics—an important point missed by these 
proponents of mandatory risk retention.  
To see this, consider a lender that can originate mortgage loans and a 
securitizer that has a lower cost of funds than the originator.110 The lender 
can assess the creditworthiness of loan applicants by, for example, running 
credit checks and documenting the applicants’ incomes and assets. It is 
efficient for the lender to do some investigation of each applicant and to 
lend only to applicants whose creditworthiness is above a particular 
threshold. The securitizer’s lower cost of funds also means that it is efficient 
for the lender to sell all of the loans it originates to the securitizer.  
Suppose, however, that not all of the information the originator 
generates about each loan applicant can be credibly conveyed to the 
securitizer. This information asymmetry poses a problem for loan sales. 
Because the securitizer cannot fully observe the credit quality of the 
borrower, the lender will have incentives to cut corners on investigating 
applicants, to lend to borrowers with worse credit quality than the optimal 
threshold, and to sell those lower quality loans to the securitizer.  
Securitization also entails a subsequent credit risk transfer from the 
securitizer to investors. If the securitizer has better information about the 
quality of the loans than investors, then this second transfer raises a similar 
incentive problem. If the securitizer sells all of the credit risk to investors, 
then the securitizer will not have an incentive to screen the mortgages that 
it buys and packages into MBS or to adopt the optimal contractual practices 
to maintain originators’ incentives to screen borrowers. 
 
problem is the approach taken by the Dodd–Frank [Act], which requires that securitizers retain a 
portion of the risk on their securitizations.”). Levitin and Wachter propose to combat moral 
hazard by prohibiting securitization of nonstandardized mortgages, which is a form of 100% 
originator risk retention. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 11, at 1252-57. 
109 Keys et al., supra note 108, at 169-75.  
110 The informal account that follows is based on a formal model provided in Bubb & 
Kaufman, supra note 14, at 5-6. 
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In the standard economic analysis of asymmetric information, pioneered 
in George Akerlof ’s The Market for “Lemons,” 111 the securitizers and 
investors understand the nature of this incentive problem. They thus adjust 
downward their willingness to pay for loans to reflect their lower expected 
quality. If this incentive problem is severe, the lender may prefer to keep its 
loans rather than to sell them at a steep discount.112 Indeed, this information 
asymmetry is the accepted explanation for the fact that historically banks 
originated loans and did not sell them.113 Information asymmetry reduces 
the trade in loans in the secondary market.  
Surprisingly, some accounts of the incentive problem posed by 
securitization argue the opposite: that information asymmetry allows 
securitizers to increase the volume of trade in mortgage claims before the 
market later collapses. For example, Levitin and Wachter argue that 
“[s]ecuritization’s fee-based business model and its inherent information 
asymmetries create a potential ‘lemons’ problem because securitizers are 
tempted to push ever more questionable product on investors.”114 In their 
account, information asymmetry leads to exploitation of relatively 
uninformed mortgage borrowers and MBS investors by informed financial 
intermediaries like lenders and securitizers.115 Investors paid inflated prices 
for MBS filled with lemons and allowed securitizers to increase the volume 
of trade in the secondary mortgage market.116 Levitin and Wachter 
characterize their analysis as the standard economic analysis of asymmetric 
information, concluding that “[t]he bubble and its aftermath play out 
George Akerlof ’s lemons problem exactly as predicted.”117 And this 
conclusion motivates their proposal to ban securitization of nontraditional 
 
111 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490-91 (1970) (analyzing the adverse consequences of asymmetric 
information). 
112 See id. (explaining that asymmetries of information may create a situation where there is 
essentially no market at all for a good and no trades take place).  
113 Gary B. Gorton & George G. Pennacchi, Banks and Loan Sales: Marketing Nonmarketable 
Assets, 35 J. MONETARY ECON. 389, 390 (1995) (“Historically, financial intermediaries have 
created loans that were not later sold.”). 
114 Levitin & Wachter, supra note 11, at 1230. 
115 See id. at 1231-32 (“Potential principal–agent problems exist both between mortgage 
borrowers and financial intermediaries and between mortgage investors and the financial 
intermediaries. . . . The combination of information asymmetries on both sides of the housing–
finance market meant that borrowers were entering into overly leveraged purchases at rates that 
underpriced risk, while investors were making the leverage available too cheaply.”). 
116 Id. at 1230-31. 
117 Id. at 1230 n.181.  
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mortgage products, which is equivalent to a 100% risk retention requirement 
for such mortgages.118 
However, this dynamic boom-and-bust account is not part of the 
standard equilibrium analysis of lemons markets. As we have explained, in 
the standard analysis, rational buyers do not get duped initially by being 
sold lemons. Rather, they understand the incentive problem from the start, 
which either reduces trade or prevents the market from forming in the first 
place.119 Asymmetric information alone is insufficient to explain a boom in 
low quality mortgages.120 As we explain in more detail below, for asymmetric 
information to lead to such an outcome, there must also be some form of 
investor naiveté about the incentive problem.121 This analytic point is crucial 
for understanding the underlying causes of the mortgage crisis and for 
evaluating potential reforms. 
In the standard analysis, market participants have incentives to devise 
contractual solutions to the incentive problems posed by asymmetric 
information in order to efficiently expand trade in mortgages. One private-
ordering solution is risk retention by the originator.122 By retaining a 
 
118 Id. at 1252-57. 
119 See Akerlof, supra note 111, at 488 (“As a result [of the lemons market,] there tends to be a 
reduction in the average quality of goods and also in the size of the market.”). 
120 The standard economic analysis requires a reduction in asymmetric information to produce 
more trade in the secondary market. Indeed, one explanation for the expansion of securitization is 
that the innovations in tranching and other credit enhancements create securities that are less 
sensitive to information asymmetries. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitization 
(“Securitization has important features that make it very attractive as collateral. A desirable 
feature of collateral is that it is information-insensitive, so it preserves value.” (citation omitted)), 
in 2A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1, 33 (George Constantinides et al. eds., 
2013).  
121 See infra notes 122-40 and accompanying text. Levitin and Wachter go on to argue that 
incentive problems created by information asymmetries elsewhere in the market inhibited normal 
market constraints on the overpricing of MBS. They point, in particular, to incentive problems in 
the credit ratings markets, in resecuritizations of junior tranches of MBS, and in the credit-default 
swap market. Levitin & Wachter, supra note 11, at 1233-52. For Levitin and Wachter, it is 
information asymmetries and incentive problems all the way down.  
122 Gorton & Pennacchi, supra note 113, at 394 (“By retaining a portion of the loan, the bank 
could reduce agency problems since it continues to face a partial incentive to maintain the loan’s 
value. The greater the portion of the loan held by the bank, the greater will be its incentive to 
evaluate and monitor the borrower.”); see also Ingo Fender & Janet Mitchell, The Future of 
Securitisation: How to Align Incentives?, BIS Q. REV., Sept. 2009, at 27, 36 (noting that retention of 
the equity tranche by the originator had traditionally been used in securitization agreements in 
order to align the originator’s incentives); Barney Hartman-Glaser et al., Optimal Securitization 
with Moral Hazard, 10 J. FIN. ECON. 186, 193-95 (2012) (analyzing a model of securitization with 
moral hazard and showing that the optimal incentive contract can be closely approximated by a 
requirement that the originator retain a first-loss equity tranche); Darell Duffie, Innovations in 
Credit Risk Transfer: Implications for Financial Stability 8-12 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working 
 
  
1572 University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 163: 1539 
 
fractional interest in the loans it originates and sells, the originator 
maintains its incentive to screen borrowers. In the now-familiar parlance, 
the originator has “skin in the game” because it bears at least some of the 
costs if borrowers default. Moreover, both the securitizer and investors 
understand the better incentives created by risk retention and are therefore 
willing to pay a higher price for loans in which the originator retains an 
interest. 
The incentive benefits of risk retention come at a cost. Because the 
originator has a higher cost of funds than the securitizer, the efficient 
outcome would be for the lender to sell all of its loans to the securitizer. 
The cost of risk retention is the lost gains from trade in loans. The optimal 
amount of risk retention thus balances the benefits in terms of improved 
incentives against these lost gains from trade. By contracting on risk 
retention, the parties can achieve a second-best outcome that, while not 
first-best efficient, is superior to the even more limited trade that would 
take place in the absence of such contractual incentive devices.123 Risk 
retention by securitizers can also be a useful incentive device to support 
trade between securitizers and investors.124  
While the theory of asymmetric information provides the standard 
rationale for risk retention by originators and securitizers, it does not 
provide a rationale for regulatory imposition of risk retention. Quite the 
contrary. If risk retention is a useful incentive device, then market 
participants will voluntarily adopt it in their contracts. In fact, in the 
standard model, a risk retention requirement can only make the parties 
worse off. Note that the requirement changes behavior only if it mandates a 
greater level of risk retention than what market participants would adopt on 
their own. In the absence of regulation, market participants would bargain 
for a level of risk retention that balances the benefits of improved incentives 
 
Paper No. 255, 2008) (showing that the retention of certain mortgage assets by the originator may 
lead to an efficient outcome in asset-backed security markets). 
123 This is shown using a formal model in Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 14, at 5-6. 
124 Importantly, the Dodd–Frank Act’s risk retention requirement is an obligation of 
securitizers, not originators, to retain at least 5% of the credit risk of any assets they securitize. 
Dodd–Frank Act § 941(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(d)(1) (2012) (“In determining how to allocate risk 
retention obligations between a securitizer and an originator under subsection (c)(1)(E)(iv), the 
Federal banking agencies and the Commission shall . . . reduce the percentage of risk retention 
obligations required of the securitizer by the percentage of risk retention obligations required of 
the originator . . . .”). Under the proposed rule, a securitizer’s risk retention obligation is reduced 
by whatever amount of risk the originator of the assets retains. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 57,928, 57,966-68 (proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 43, 244, 373, 1234; 17 
C.F.R. pt. 246; and 24 C.F.R. pt. 267) (describing the proposed rule’s provisions that would allow 
a securitizer to allocate a portion of the credit risk it is required to retain to the originator). 
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against the costs of foregone trade. A binding risk retention requirement 
would be inefficient because, by definition, the lost gains from trade from a 
higher level of risk retention would outweigh the resulting incentive 
benefits. Asymmetric information can indeed be an important source of 
market failure in the securitization market, but it alone does not justify a 
regulatory risk retention requirement.  
To justify such a requirement, we would need, in addition to the first-
order market failure of moral hazard, a second-order market failure: a failure 
of market participants to adopt the efficient level of risk retention. Only if 
market participants for some reason fail to adopt the second-best set of 
private arrangements to deal with the incentive problem can a mandatory 
risk retention requirement potentially be justified.  
Our analysis of the risk retention requirement bears an interesting 
parallel to the debate between Ronald Coase and Arthur Pigou about the 
nature of the market failure posed by externalities. Pigou’s great insight was 
that some activities have effects on third parties.125 Consider pollution from 
a factory. Such negative externalities create an opportunity for government 
policy to improve the allocation of resources. Pigou’s prescription was to tax 
the externality-producing activity so that the marginal private cost to the 
person or firm engaged in the activity is equal to the marginal social cost.126 
This would result in the socially optimal level of the activity. Coase’s 
response in The Problem of Social Cost was to observe that Pigou’s concept of 
externality is incomplete.127 If all of the parties involved are able to contract 
at low cost, then there is no market failure and therefore no way for 
government to improve on the market outcome. If there are “zero 
transaction costs,” a bargain will be struck and there is no need for taxation 
or regulation. The upshot is that there has to be some transaction cost that 
impedes such a private bargain in order for a Pigouvian tax to be useful. 
Our claim with respect to the risk retention requirement and its 
proponents is analogous to that of Coase with respect to externality taxes 
and Pigou. Proponents of risk retention echo Pigou when they argue that if 
securitizers do not have some skin in the game, then they will sell bad 
mortgages to investors and therefore that government should regulate 
incentives.128 It is true that asymmetric information can lead to a market 
failure even when there are no other transaction costs.129 But we respond, 
 
125 A. C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 134 (4th ed. 1932). 
126 Id. at 192-94. 
127 R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 28-32 (1960). 
128 See Keys et al., supra note 108, at 143. 
129 For this reason, our argument is not a direct application of the Coase Theorem, strictly 
speaking. 
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echoing Coase, that mandating an incentive device that the parties could 
adopt on their own is useful only if there is something impeding their 
ability to do so. In the absence of such an impediment, market participants 
will achieve the second-best (or constrained efficient) outcome—that is, the 
best outcome achievable given the information asymmetry. Having the 
government wade in by requiring a specific incentive arrangement does not 
make sense absent a second-order market failure in the private responses to 
the first-order market failure.130  
2. The Naive-Investors Theory 
We next consider an explanation for such a second-order market failure 
that we call the naive-investors theory. The theory takes as its starting point 
asymmetric information between buyers and sellers of mortgage loans. But 
it also posits an additional asymmetry in understanding of the incentive 
problems posed by securitization. Under this view, sellers in this market—
securitizers and originators—understand that they are incentivized to exert 
little effort to screen loans that they will not ultimately hold. In contrast, 
the buyers—MBS investors—are naive and do not understand the 
incentives of sellers.131 We use the term “naive” capaciously to include any 
reason that MBS investors behave as if they systematically underestimate 
the extent of the incentive problem, including reasons that are not based in 
any behavioral bias.  
 
130 We put aside here the possibility that mortgage originations might produce negative 
externalities—for example, through the spillover effects of mortgage default—that might 
separately warrant some form of regulatory intervention. We simply note that risk retention would 
be an odd approach to limiting the externalities of mortgage default since risk retention increases 
systemic risk externalities by concentrating mortgage risk on the balance sheets of systemically 
important financial institutions. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.  
131 Some accounts of the moral hazard problem posed by securitization explicitly posit some 
form of investor naiveté. See, e.g., Gorton, supra note 50, at 68 (“It is argued that originators and 
underwriters of loans no long[er] have an incentive to pay attention to the risks of loans they 
originate, since they are not residual claimants on these loans. In this view, investors apparently do 
not understand this and have been fooled (fingers point to the rating agencies).”); see also Atif 
Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the U.S. Mortgage 
Default Crisis, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1449, 1482 (2009) (describing data that show an increase in default 
rates when mortgages were sold for securitization as compared to when they were sold to non-
government-sponsored enterprises from 2005 to 2007); Frederic S. Mishkin, Governor, Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., On “Leveraged Losses: Lessons from the Mortgage 
Meltdown,” Speech at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (Feb. 29, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080229a.htm (“Investors apparently 
failed to realize the importance of these agency problems and, it seems, did not insist on practices 
to align the incentives of originators, securitizers, and resecuritizers with the underlying risks.”).  
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The naive-investors theory provides a theoretically coherent case for the 
risk retention requirement. As a result of their naiveté, MBS investors will 
fail to insist on the optimal degree of risk retention—or, more precisely, will 
fail to accurately price MBS based on the incentives of the originators and 
securitizer. Because the optimal incentive contract will not emerge on its 
own through private ordering, a regulator could potentially improve on the 
market outcome by imposing a risk retention requirement.132 
There are a number of institutional and psychological factors that might 
lead investors to behave as if they misunderstand the risks created by the 
incentive structure of securitization. First, investors might simply lack 
experience with securitization. Perhaps it took a full-scale mortgage 
meltdown for investors to appreciate the severe incentive problems at work, 
and perhaps in time that lesson will be forgotten.  
Second, and relatedly, some have argued that securitization leads to 
excessive complexity that prevents investors from understanding the risks 
associated with MBS.133 This complexity transforms the plain-vanilla, 
asymmetric information problem by turning Rumsfeldian “known 
unknowns” into “unknown unknowns.” As we have emphasized, asymmetric 
information on its own does not produce a second-order market failure. 
Faced with a complex securitization that they have little ability to assess, 
rational investors should refrain from purchasing MBS.134 Consequently, 
proponents of this view argue that complexity also led to investor 
misunderstanding.135 If complexity causes investors to misunderstand the 
 
132 See, e.g., Paul S. Willen, Evaluating Policies to Prevent Another Crisis: An Economist’s View, 3 
CATO PAPERS ON PUB. POL’Y 185, 211 (2014) (providing a monetary example to show how 
government policy could have helped align investor and lender interests). 
133 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
211, 220 (2009) (“The complexities of modern investment securities can lead to a failure of 
investing standards and financial-market practices [because] . . . they obscure the ability of market 
participants to see and judge consequences . . . .”); see also Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A 
Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 686-87 (2012) 
(explaining that “financial innovations” like MBS become highly complex over time and may 
escape “close scrutiny by market participants or regulators” as a result of this slow progression).  
134 Put differently, they should purchase fewer MBS than they would if they could assess the 
associated risks.  
135 Schwarcz, supra note 133, at 219 (questioning why MBS investors “did not impose on the 
originator the same strict lending standards that they would otherwise observe but for the 
separation of origination and ownership” and hypothesizing that “by separating the ultimate 
owners of the mortgage loans from the actual lenders, an originate-to-distribute model makes it 
difficult for those owners to always see the big picture”). Professor Katherine Judge makes a 
similar argument. See Judge, supra note 133, at 692 (arguing that “most investors were acquiring 
[MBS] without a complete understanding of all of the information pertinent to their value”). She 
continues: 
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degree of incentive (mis)alignment in MBS, then this is a version of the 
naive-investors theory as we have defined it. 
Third, investor naiveté could result from a failure to understand the 
extent of other agency conflicts in the securitization market. The most 
commonly cited concern in this regard is the incentive problems in the 
market for credit ratings.136 The conventional wisdom is that, because 
issuers pay the rating agencies to evaluate their bonds, the rating agencies 
have an incentive to inflate the ratings of MBS. Any credit rating agency 
that holds the line and gives accurate ratings would lose business as issuers 
would take their bonds elsewhere to be rated. So another version of the 
naive-investors theory is that investors are naive about a different agency 
problem—the agency conflict between credit rating agencies and 
themselves—and put too much faith in the rating agencies to evaluate the 
quality of MBS.137  
 
Without . . . the expectation among mortgage originators that they could quickly and 
easily resell loans into the secondary market, lending standards most likely would 
not have declined as far as they did, and real estate prices would not have escalated 
as high as they did. That capital, however, came in significant part from investors 
who did not have a clear view through to the quality of the loans underlying their 
investments. 
Id. at 693. She suggests that the resulting information loss “may well have contributed to the 
degradation in underwriting standards and practices and the growth of the subprime market.” Id. 
at 694. She distinguishes two distinct issues: 
One is the mispricing of the risk associated with home loans, particularly subprime 
home loans, which was a primary factor in both the real estate and mortgage security 
bubbles. The other, related issue is the extension of loans that were particularly 
unlikely to be repaid even on the excessively generous terms on which they were 
being offered. The claim here is that both may be traced, at least in part, to the 
information loss that resulted from the proliferation of MBSs and CDOs. The 
FCIC’s finding that loans packaged into [private-label MBS] performed 
substantially worse than seemingly similar GSE loans suggests that the presence of a 
fragmentation node increased the probability of low-quality loans being 
made. . . . The empirical evidence is thus consistent with the conjecture that as the 
number of fragmentation nodes [like MBS] increased, so too did the rate at which 
home loans were extended that should not have been.  
Id. at 695. 
136 See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers 
(highlighting the differences between credit rating agencies and other gatekeepers), in FINANCIAL 
GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 60 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. 
Litan eds., 2006); Lawrence J. White, Markets: The Credit Rating Agencies, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Spring 2010, at 211, 216-21 (describing the barriers to entry that keep this market small and the 
controversy that resulted from Enron’s positive credit ratings preceding its bankruptcy). 
137 Patrick Bolton et al., The Credit Ratings Game, 67 J. FIN. 85, 87 (2012) (arguing that while 
some investors in MBS understand rating agencies’ conflicts of interest, “a significant 
fraction . . . of investors are trusting, in that they take the . . . ratings at face value”); Aaron 
 
  
2015] Regulating Against Bubbles  1577 
 
This version of the naive-investors theory, however, just peels back one 
layer of the onion. Why would investors be naive about credit rating 
agencies’ incentives? One possible answer is that investor uncertainty about 
the extent of the rating agencies’ incentive conflict is a natural feature of the 
reputational mechanism that has traditionally been thought to incentivize 
rating agencies’ truthfulness. The incentives of rating agencies are not so 
bleak as the issuer-pays story above suggests. Rating agencies have an 
incentive to resist the temptation to inflate ratings in order to preserve their 
long-run reputations. A rating agency that gives bad ratings will find its 
future ratings lose their value to investors. This reputational mechanism is 
the standard explanation for why market participants value credit ratings in 
the first place.138  
The key issue for such reputation mechanisms is whether the short-run 
gain from inflating the ratings outweighs the long-run reputational cost. In 
boom times, the short-run gain can increase, leading to a breakdown in the 
reputational mechanism. Moreover, investors may be uncertain whether, at 
any given moment, the rating agency has begun to inflate ratings. If rating 
agencies switch from truthfulness to ratings inflation—for example, during 
a period of high demand—there will naturally be a transition period before 
investors realize the deviation.139 
Whatever the ultimate source of this investor naiveté about credit 
ratings, it would result in the systematic mispricing of the incentive 
properties of MBS. If securitizers understand that the rating agencies will 
 
Lucchetti & Serena Ng, Credit and Blame: How Rating Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL 
ST. J., Aug. 15, 2007, at A1 (“A lot of institutional investors bought [MBS] substantially based on 
their ratings, in part because this market has become so complex.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
138 See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 961 (1998) 
(“The value of both debt rating agencies lies in their ability to convince financial purchasers of the 
validity and accuracy of their ratings.”). 
139 This theory is in the spirit of the model by Jérôme Mathis et al., Rating the Raters: Are 
Reputation Concerns Powerful Enough to Discipline Rating Agencies?, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 657 
(2009), in which the authors argue that when the majority of a credit rating agency’s business is 
rating complex products, the agency likely inflates its assessments. One reason that investors may 
be slow to realize a breakdown in the integrity of credit ratings is incentive problems within firms 
that invest in MBS. Bond portfolio managers are commonly incentivized to maximize yield, 
conditioned on complying with a set of constraints on risk-taking. See Bo Becker & Victoria 
Ivashina, Reaching for Yield in the Bond Market, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5-6, 10), 
available at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:11337406 (describing the behavior of 
investors who often buy assets with higher risk to achieve higher yields). A common constraint is 
that the bonds have an investment-grade rating, such as AAA. Id. (manuscript at 2). Such 
incentive arrangements can lead managers to “reach for yield” by purchasing the highest yield 
bonds in the allowed ratings category. Id. (manuscript at 2-3). Inflated ratings, in the short term, 
would result in bond managers purchasing these higher yield bonds on behalf of investors. 
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give inflated ratings to MBS with low quality loans, they will have less 
incentive to superintend the underwriting practices of originators.140  
To summarize, the naive-investors theory posits that investors may 
misunderstand some features of the securitization market that affect the 
incentives of originators and securitizers to screen mortgages. This 
misunderstanding can result in a second-order market failure—a failure to 
adopt the optimal contractual mechanisms and practices to mitigate this 
incentive problem. Therefore, unlike the standard theory of asymmetric 
information, the naive-investors theory provides a coherent explanation as 
to why requiring securitizers to retain credit risk might efficiently improve 
incentives to screen mortgages. 
C. Risk Retention in a Bubble 
While the naive-investors theory provides a coherent account of its 
potential benefits, risk retention also entails costs. In this Section, we 
analyze these benefits and costs specifically in the context of a housing 
bubble in order to evaluate the risk retention requirement’s likely 
macroeconomic effects. The Dodd–Frank Act required the FSOC to study 
the macroeconomic effects of the risk retention requirement in advance of 
the rulemaking implementing the requirement and to report on the study to 
Congress.141 That report fails to engage with the key issues raised by risk 
retention, citing as the only cost the possibility that an excessively stringent 
risk retention requirement will reduce credit availability.142 We show that, in 
a housing bubble, the benefits of risk retention are small, and the systemic-
risk costs are large. Experience from the recent financial crisis shows that 
mandating risk retention is, at best, ineffective in a bubble and, at worst, 
counterproductive. 
 
140 Yet another version of the naive-investors theory similarly based on the breakdown in a 
reputational mechanism is that MBS investors may have misjudged the reputational incentives of 
originators and securitizers to screen mortgages. These mortgage sellers also care about their 
reputations because if the loans they sell perform poorly, they will have difficulty selling loans in 
the future. The strength of these reputational concerns, in turn, is determined by the tradeoff 
between the present gains from selling more low quality loans and any potential future loss of 
revenue. The mortgage boom may have increased the temptation to shirk on screening, leading to 
a breakdown in underwriting, and investors may have been slow to appreciate this change in 
incentives. 
141 Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 946, 124 Stat. 1376, 1898 (2010). 
142 TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, 
MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF RISK RETENTION REQUIREMENTS 27 (2011), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/Section%20946%20Risk%20Retention%20Study
%20%20%28FINAL%29.pdf (“An excessive requirement could unduly limit credit availability . . . .”).  
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1. The Costs of Risk Retention for Financial Stability 
A commonly cited benefit of securitization—and of financial innovation 
more generally—is that it allows a more efficient allocation of risk across 
different actors in the economy.143 Securitization can increase the stability of 
the financial system by moving housing risk outside of the banking system. 
Consistent with this purpose, MBS investors include a wide swath of 
nonbank institutions, including pension funds and insurance companies.144  
In contrast, a requirement that securitizers retain a minimum amount of 
the credit risk of the assets they securitize concentrates risk. Twelve 
underwriters accounted for about 80% of the total volume of private-label 
MBS issuance during the recent boom.145 The leading sponsors of MBS in 
the run-up to the crisis included many of the largest banks and broker–
dealers—Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, Bank of America, 
and Citigroup.146 By concentrating housing market risk on the balance 
sheets of such large, systemically important financial institutions, risk 
retention increases systemic risk.147  
 
143 See Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, Credit Risk Transfer and Contagion, 53 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 89, 95-103 (2006) (demonstrating the beneficial effects of risk sharing across different 
sectors); Vishal Gaur et al., Securitization and Real Investment in Incomplete Markets, 57 MGMT. 
SCI. 2180, 2194-95 (2011) (describing the pooling and tranching of securities); Thorsten V. Köppl, 
Risk Sharing Through Financial Markets with Endogenous Enforcement of Trades, 30 J. ECON. 
DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1987, 1994-95 (2006) (analyzing the efficacy of enforcement 
intermediaries for asset markets); Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Economic Flexibility, Remarks at the HM Treasury Enterprise Conference ( Jan. 26, 
2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20040126/default.htm 
(“The new instruments of risk dispersion have enabled the largest and most sophisticated banks in 
their credit-granting role to divest themselves of much credit risk by passing it to institutions with 
far less leverage.”). See generally FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, FINANCIAL 
INNOVATION AND RISK SHARING (1995) (analyzing various financial innovations and their 
impact on economic welfare). 
144 See Dwight Jaffee et al., Mortgage Origination and Securitization in the Financial Crisis 
(listing the holders of mortgage debt by type of institution), in RESTORING FINANCIAL 
STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 61, 71-72 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew 
Richardson eds., 2009). 
145 SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S 
EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 32 (2008). 
146 See infra Table 1. 
147 While the proposed risk retention rule allows securitizers to allocate part or all of the 5% 
required risk retention to the originator, securitizers, as large, diversified financial institutions, 
generally have a lower cost of funds than most originators. Hence, we expect that the vast majority 
of the required retained interests will be held by securitizers rather than originators. Risk 
retention by large originators raises qualitatively similar costs in terms of systemic risk. The 
concentration of risk in securitizers and originators encourages additional risk taking by these 
institutions to the extent it increases the chances of a government bailout. This, in turn, prompts 
other financial institutions to hold similar risks and free ride on the implicit insurance provided to 
systemically important institutions.  
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2. The Performance of the Risk Retention Requirement in a Bubble 
Whether the incentive benefits of risk retention outweigh the systemic-
risk costs depends on the relative size of these effects. Evidently, the 
drafters of the Dodd–Frank Act concluded that, on balance, the benefits 
outweigh the costs. But given the crucial role of housing bubbles as the 
primary source of systemic risk, it is important to evaluate the performance 
of the risk retention requirement in a bubble.  
The importance of protecting the economy from housing bubbles 
radically undermines the case for mandatory risk retention. First, a bubble 
blunts the effectiveness of risk retention as a way to control underwriting. 
Risk retention operates through incentives. Giving the securitizer skin in 
the game makes default more costly to the securitizer. The theory assumes 
that the securitizer will respond by more carefully screening the mortgages 
it securitizes and insisting that originators adopt appropriate underwriting 
practices. However, in a bubble, overoptimism about future house prices 
leads securitizers to discount substantially the possibility of mortgage 
default. As we have explained, as long as the house is worth more than the 
amount owed on the mortgage, the loan is safe.148 The bubble therefore 
lowers the incentive benefits of risk retention. In the most extreme case, if 
parties put zero weight on the prospect of mortgage default, then risk 
retention provides no incentive benefits.149  
Second, a bubble increases the costs of risk retention as a regulatory 
technique. An important downside of the Dodd–Frank Act’s risk retention 
requirement is that it will force securitizers to retain more housing risk. In 
normal times, the large, diversified financial institutions that sponsor most 
securitizations can manage this risk. But as recent events illustrate, 
mortgages present a “tail risk” that, if sufficiently concentrated on the 
balance sheets of systemically important financial institutions, can 
precipitate a broader financial crisis. What is the nature of this tail risk in 
mortgages? As our discussion of the double-trigger model of mortgage 
default makes clear, it is the possibility of a national decline in house prices. 
Put differently, this tail risk comes principally from housing bubbles. 
 
148 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
149 For rational speculators who understand that there is a bubble in a particular asset market 
and attempt to ride the bubble and dump the assets before the bubble bursts, risk retention might 
produce more useful incentives. Risk retention would make riding the bubble a less attractive 
strategy for such rational speculators since it would prohibit them from selling all of the assets 
before the bubble bursts. A central premise of our analysis, however, is that there is widespread 
overoptimism about house prices during a housing bubble. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying 
text. For evidence that securitizers specifically were overoptimistic about house prices during the 
recent housing boom, see infra notes 164-70 and accompanying text.  
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Because housing bubbles are the main source of system risk, risk retention is 
an ineffective—indeed, a counterproductive—approach to reducing systemic 
risk.150 
3. The Evidence 
Our analysis of risk retention in a housing bubble casts great doubt on 
whether mandatory risk retention would be effective in a bubble. We next 
turn to evidence from the recent boom and bust in the housing market to 
further evaluate risk retention. The evidence corroborates the problems 
associated with risk retention identified above. We start by showing that 
even if the moral hazard problem posed by selling MBS to naive investors 
played a significant role in the decline in underwriting standards during the 
boom, the evidence indicates that, in a bubble, mandating risk retention 
would be ineffective at best. We then show that not only is there little 
evidence for such a moral hazard problem, there are also good reasons to 
think that it did not play a substantial role.  
 a. Evidence on the Costs and Benefits of Risk Retention in a Bubble 
We begin with a key fact: in the run-up to the crisis, securitizers 
retained hundreds of billions of dollars in MBS and suffered massive losses 
as a result.151 Table 1 below provides the MBS holdings as of 2007 of the top 
twenty securitizers of MBS, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of 
the MBS issued by the securitizer and still outstanding. The vast majority 
had large exposures to MBS. It is noteworthy that, in percentage terms, all 
but a handful retained MBS much greater than the 5% required by the 
Dodd–Frank Act, with most retaining greater than 20%. These MBS 
holdings were also large as a fraction of the firms’ assets. For example, one 
recent study estimated Citigroup’s highly rated MBS holdings as of the end 
of 2006, on the eve of the crisis, at 4.8% of assets.152 Including Citigroup’s 
holdings of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) and holdings through 
off–balance sheet conduits raises the estimate to 10.7% of assets.153  
  
 
150 A binding risk retention requirement might reduce the size of a housing bubble simply by 
adding costs to mortgage lending. However, there are much more efficient ways to add costs to 
mortgage lending if that is desirable—for example, by reducing government support of the 
mortgage market. Bubble prevention is not a sensible rationale for requiring risk retention. 
151 See infra Table 1.  
152 Isil Erel et al., Why Did Holdings of Highly Rated Securitization Tranches Differ So Much 
Across Banks?, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 404, 419 (2014). 
153 Id. 
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Table 1: Top 20 Sponsors of Non-Agency MBS, 2000–2007154 
Issuer 
Issued 
MBS 
Outstanding 
2007 
Non-
Agency 
MBS 
Holdings 
2007 
Non-Agency 
MBS 
Holdings / 
Issued MBS 
Outstanding 
Losses on 
Mortgage-
Related 
Assets as of 
May 2008 
Countrywide $280,577 $6640* 2.4% $6953** 
Lehman $143,776 $41,488 29% $3300 
Washington Mutual $119,531 $25,912 22% $9100 
GMAC $115,075 $27,400 24% $10,000*** 
Bear Sterns $114,613 $30,313 26% $3200 
Wells Fargo $104,966 $19,882 19% $3300 
Ameriquest $73,021 Missing Missing Missing 
JPMorgan Chase $70,161 $12,356 18% $9700 
Goldman Sachs $66,577 $46,436 70% $3000 
Credit Suisse $66,118 Missing Missing $9500 
IndyMac $63,198 $7108 11% $1264**** 
Bank of America $56,428 $24,013 43% $14,900 
Morgan Stanley $56,242 $13,150 23% $12,600 
Option One $49,241 $197 0.4% Missing 
New Century $48,530 $234* 0.5% Missing 
RBS $48,143 $102,453 213% $15,200 
Merrill Lynch $47,884 $43,556 91% $37,000 
Deutsche Bank $44,335 Missing Missing $7700 
UBS $38,836 Missing Missing $38,200 
Citigroup $38,403 $40,878 106% $42,900 
 
 
 
154 All dollar figures are in millions. Sources: Issued MBS outstanding and non-agency MBS 
holdings from authors’ calculations from figures in SEC filings and in the Mortgage Market 
Statistical Annual, published by Inside Mortgage Finance. Except where otherwise noted, losses 
are from Yalman Onaran, Subprime Losses Top $379 Billion on Balance-Sheet Marks: Table, 
BLOOMBERG (May 19, 2008, 12:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=aK4Z6C2kXs3A, archived at http://perma.cc/MD6D-ZE76. Issued MBS 
Outstanding 2007 were calculated by averaging the firm’s market share in non-agency MBS in 
years 2004–2007 and multiplying by the total non-agency MBS outstanding in 2007. MBS 
Holdings are gross and do not include any hedges. Losses are net of financial hedges.  
*2006 data.  
**Countrywide losses are calculated by totaling pretax losses from 2007–2008Q2 in mortgage 
banking and banking business segments from SEC filings.  
***GMAC losses as of December 2008 are from SIG-TARP, TAXPAYERS CONTINUE TO OWN 
74% OF GMAC (REBRANDED ALLY FINANCIAL) FROM THE TARP BAILOUTS (2013). 
****IndyMac losses were calculated by totaling pre-tax losses from 2007–2008Q1 from SEC filings. 
  
2015] Regulating Against Bubbles  1583 
 
The figures in Table 1 overstate actual risk exposures because they do not 
take into account whether securitizers hedged these positions.155 However, 
the final column provides actual losses on mortgage-related assets as of May 
2008, which takes into account financial hedges. The losses were large, both 
in absolute terms and as a fraction of their actual MBS holdings. 
Securitizers’ losses were a result of risks that were baked into their 
business model. Securitizers maintained substantial holdings of highly rated 
MBS on their balance sheets as part of their funding model. These 
securities served as collateral in the repo market through which securitizers 
financed themselves.156 They also retained lower-rated tranches and equity 
tranches of MBS they sponsored, which were typically more difficult to sell 
than the senior tranches.157 
Due to lack of data, the estimates of MBS holdings reported above and 
in other studies158 do not distinguish between holdings of MBS sponsored 
by the securitizer and of MBS sponsored by other firms and purchased on 
the market. However, Professor Erel and her coauthors show that, 
controlling for other characteristics, banks’ holdings of MBS are 
significantly correlated with the securitization activity of the firm.159 This 
strongly suggests that a substantial portion of MBS holdings were 
retentions of MBS sponsored by the firm. In contrast, the authors find no 
increase in banks’ MBS holdings as a percentage of assets from the end of 
2006 to the end of 2007.160 This is evidence that MBS holdings are not 
driven by MBS that were in the pipeline for sale but could not be sold when 
the market shut down in 2007. Moreover, we know anecdotally that many 
large firms did indeed retain tranches of the MBS (and CDOs) they 
sponsored.161 
Why did securitizers not foresee that they were exposed to huge losses 
and take steps to prevent them? As proof that such hedging was possible, 
 
155 This concern should not be overstated. Relatively few (fifteen) bank holding companies 
were net buyers of credit protection on MBS. Erel et al., supra note 152, at 417. Bank of America, 
for example, was a net seller of credit default swaps on MBS. Id. 
156 Gorton, supra note 50, at 1-4.  
157 FCIC REPORT, supra note 48, at 43, 70-72; see also Jaffee et al., supra note 144, at 81 (“The 
financial crisis occurred because financial institutions did not follow the business model of 
securitization. Rather than acting as intermediaries by transferring the risk from mortgage lenders 
to capital market investors, they became the investors.”).  
158 See, e.g., Erel et al., supra note 152, at 413-17 (describing study methods). 
159 Id. at 432-35. 
160 Id. at 435.  
161 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 48, at 261 (describing Citigroup’s practice of retaining 
senior tranches in its securitizations). In the CMLTI 2006-NC2 securitization by Citigroup 
discussed infra note 187, Citigroup retained half of the equity tranche. FCIC REPORT, supra note 
48, at 72. 
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note that Goldman Sachs is an outlier in Table 1 in its small losses relative 
to its gross exposures. Goldman moved aggressively to reduce its exposure 
to mortgage-related securities,162 but it had difficulty reducing the 
counterparty risk of its hedges and ultimately relied on the government 
bailout of its principal counterparty, AIG.163  
The best explanation for securitizers failing to protect themselves is that 
they were caught up in the housing bubble and discounted the possibility 
that house prices would fall. A group of economists at the Federal Reserve, 
in what we consider to be some of the most convincing work on this issue, 
document that analysts at the major banks generally understood that MBS 
would suffer huge losses in value if house prices fell but assigned low 
probability to that outcome.164 For example, they uncovered a report issued 
by Lehman Brothers in 2005, reproduced in Table 2 below, that provided 
forecasts of losses on subprime MBS for a set of house price appreciation 
(HPA) scenarios and assigned probabilities to each of those scenarios.165 
The analysts put just 5% probability on the only scenario involving a fall in 
house prices.166 Actual HPA was substantially worse than that most 
pessimistic scenario considered. In contrast, as Kristopher Gerardi and his 
coauthors at the Fed emphasize, the report shows that the Lehman analysts 
understood that a fall in house prices would lead to disastrous performance 
for subprime MBS.167 They find further evidence that Lehman’s optimistic 
views on the housing market were widely shared on Wall Street.168  
 
 
 
 
162 As the FCIC reports, Goldman Sachs began this process in early 2007. FCIC REPORT, 
supra note 48, at 235-36. Goldman was still exposed to the counterparties through which it hedged 
this risk, especially AIG, but other major securitizers did not go so far in this respect. Lehman, for 
example, doubled down on the subprime market at this time. Report of Anton R. Valukas, 
Examiner, at 4, In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 456 B.R. 213 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
163 Karen Mracek & Thomas Beaumont, Goldman Reveals Where Bailout Cash Went, USA 
TODAY ( July 26, 2010, 12:06 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/ 
2010-07-24-goldman-bailout-cash_N.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/AB8B-C7ZH (reporting that 
Goldman Sachs received a $12.9 billion payout overall from the government’s bailout of AIG). 
164 See Kristopher Gerardi et al., Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis, BROOKINGS PAPERS 
ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2008, at 69, 127-41 (presenting written records of market participants 
between 2004 and 2006 that reveal why the investment community did not anticipate the 
subprime mortgage crisis). 
165 Id. at 139; see also Foote et al., supra note 38, at 156. 
166 Gerardi et al., supra note 164, at 139. 
167 See id. (demonstrating how one of the banks studied actually considered a “meltdown 
scenario” where the HPA would reach -5 for three years after 2005). 
168 Id. at 139-40 (“Reinforcing the idea that [the banks] viewed the meltdown scenario as 
implausible, the analysts devoted no time to discussing its consequences . . . .”). 
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Table 2: Lehman Brothers Subprime MBS Loss Scenarios169 
 
Scenario Probability
Cumulative 
Loss 
11% HPA over the life of the pool (aggressive) 15% 1.4% 
8% HPA for life (modestly aggressive) 15% 3.2% 
HPA slows to 5% by end of 2005 (base) 50% 5.6% 
0% HPA for the next three years, 5% thereafter 
(pessimistic) 15% 11.1% 
-5% for the next three years, 5% thereafter 
(meltdown) 5% 17.1% 
 
 
The Chief Risk Officer at Citigroup during the relevant period 
corroborates this view. In testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission explaining why Citigroup had accumulated a $43 billion 
position in AAA tranches of its own securitizations, he explained: 
Clearly, Citi and virtually all other market participants failed to anticipate 
the dramatic and unprecedented decline in the housing market that 
occurred in 2007 and 2008. Risk models, which primarily use history as 
their guide, assumed that any annual decline in real estate values would not 
exceed the worst case historical precedent. And since the beginning of 
World War II, nominal home prices in the United States had never 
decreased by more than five percent in any given year. The actual decline 
had never decreased by more than five percent in any given year. The actual 
decline proved to be many orders of magnitude greater than any other 
yearly decline in the post-war period.170 
In sum, there is persuasive evidence that overoptimism about house prices 
was a significant factor in these firms’ losses on MBS.  
There are of course other potential explanations for the failure of 
securitizers to anticipate these risks. One is based on agency problems 
 
169 Foote et al., supra note 38, at 156.  
170 David C. Bushnell, Former Chief Risk Officer, Citigroup Inc., Testimony Before the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 2 (Apr. 7, 2010), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/ 
cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0407-Bushnell.pdf. 
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within the firm.171 Perhaps the individuals making the decisions to expose 
the firm to these large risks were doing so because of their own misaligned 
incentives. For example, perhaps individual executives were paid based on 
deal flow, had little of their own skin in the game, and therefore walked 
away from the collapse of the firm unscathed.172 Or relatedly, perhaps 
distortions caused by being too-big-to-fail led these firms to place these big 
bets. Heads, they win; tails, taxpayers lose. These agency problems may 
well explain some of the failures of these firms to protect themselves.173 
However, all of these alternative explanations have a common implication: 
mandating risk retention by securitizers will have little incentive effect on 
mortgage underwriting in a bubble.  
The recent financial crisis thus provides compelling evidence that the 
market-determined level of risk retention by securitizers during a bubble is 
not too low—it is too high. The risk retained by most securitizers in the 
recent boom was far in excess of the Dodd–Frank Act’s 5% requirement. But 
hundreds of billions of dollars of skin in the game did not deter the 
aggressive underwriting it took to originate and distribute ever-larger 
volumes of MBS over this period. What it did do was spark a financial crisis 
by concentrating mortgage risk on these large, systemically important 
financial institutions. So even if moral hazard caused by selling MBS to 
naive investors is a significant problem, mandating risk retention will not be 
an effective solution in a bubble. 
It is certainly theoretically possible that risk retention at even higher 
levels than observed in 2007 would have meaningfully improved 
underwriting. But betting that, say, a 60% securitizer risk retention 
requirement would work to prevent another boom and bust in the mortgage 
market is a bit like playing a game of chicken with the financial system. The 
experience of the recent crisis strongly suggests that in the tradeoff posed 
 
171 See Kevin J. Murphy, Pay, Politics, and the Financial Crisis (analyzing the economic 
incentives for bankers to take excessive risks), in RETHINKING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra 
note 38, at 318-22; Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 
255 (2010) (arguing that compensation arrangements that shielded executives from a large portion 
of the possible losses incurred were one of the factors that led to the 2008–2009 financial crisis).  
172 As Alan Blinder memorably put it, “[g]ive smart people go-for-broke incentives and they 
will go for broke. Duh.” Alan S. Blinder, Crazy Compensation and the Crisis, WALL ST. J., May 28, 
2009, at A15. 
173 A recent study examined the personal home transactions of mid-level managers of 
securitizers—decisions for which agency problems play no role—and found that they increased, 
rather than decreased, their housing exposure during the boom. Ing-Haw Cheng et al., Wall Street 
and the Housing Bubble ( Jan. 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2232233. This is powerful evidence for the role 
of overoptimism about house prices in explaining securitizers’ losses.  
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by risk retention between incentives to screen mortgages on the one hand 
and systemic risk on the other, systemic risk dominates.  
b. Evidence on the Naive-Investors Theory 
The evidence on securitizer losses also calls into question a more 
fundamental issue: whether moral hazard caused by selling MBS to naive 
investors is much of a problem in the first place. This version of moral 
hazard predicts that most of the risk from securitization would be passed on 
to investors. But, as we have shown, the aggregate evidence overwhelmingly 
shows that securitization concentrated risk in the same financial 
intermediaries that organized the securitization chain.174 
In the standard rational choice model of moral hazard, the high level of 
trade in mortgages during the boom could only have been achieved if 
market participants had devised effective solutions to mitigate this incentive 
problem.175 Nonetheless, a series of articles based on a particular “natural 
experiment” research design has convinced many economists and 
policymakers that moral hazard caused by securitization did indeed play an 
important role.176 This body of research interprets jumps in the default rate 
 
174 Our view that securitization led to the concentration of risk in financial intermediaries is 
shared by a number of prominent financial economists and macroeconomists. See Acharya & 
Richardson, supra note 63, at 197 (arguing that the net result of securitization was to “keep the risk 
concentrated in the financial institutions”); see also DAVID GREENLAW ET AL., LEVERAGED 
LOSSES: LESSONS FROM THE MORTGAGE MARKET MELTDOWN 33-35 (2008) (estimating 
that about 50% of subprime exposures were held by commercial banks, savings institutions, credit 
unions, investment banks, and government-sponsored enterprises and that leveraged institutions 
hold 55% of outstanding mortgage debt); Hyun Song Shin, Securitisation and Financial Stability, 119 
ECON. J. 309, 313 (2009) (“Thus, far from passing the hot potato down the chain to the greater 
fool next in the chain, the large financial intermediaries end up keeping the hot potato.”); Tobias 
Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial Regulation 11 
(Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 382, 2009) (“[S]ecuritization had the perverse effect 
of concentrating all the risks in the banking system itself.”).  
175 See supra subsection II.B.1. 
176 See, e.g., Wei Jiang et al., Securitization and Loan Performance: Ex Ante and Ex Post Relations 
in the Mortgage Market, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 454, 480 (2014) (“[W]e document the bank’s lack of 
incentive and ability to collect meaningful ‘soft’ information about borrower quality in a time of 
rapid growth supported by the expansion of broker-originated, low-documentation loans.”); 
Benjamin J. Keys et al., Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans, 125 
Q.J. ECON. 307, 354 (2010) [hereinafter Keys et al., Lax Screening] (“The results of this 
paper . . . confirm that lender behavior in the subprime market did change based on the ease of 
securtization.”); Benjamin J. Keys et al., Financial Regulation and Securitization: Evidence from 
Subprime Loans, 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 700, 702 (2009) (arguing that stringent broker laws can 
help align perverse incentives created from moral hazard by requiring brokers to have “skin in the 
game”); Benjamin J. Keys et al., Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime 
and Subprime Mortgage Markets, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 2071, 2075 (2012) (“We conclude our analysis 
by providing further evidence that lenders relax screening of low-documentation loans in the 
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of mortgages at particular credit score thresholds commonly used to screen 
mortgage applicants as evidence that securitization led to lax screening.177 
This research is frequently cited as justifying the risk retention requirement.178  
However, an article one of us recently published in the Journal of 
Monetary Economics shows that this research design has a fundamental flaw, 
and, in fact, provides no evidence that securitization resulted in lax 
screening.179 Although the details are somewhat technical,180 the intuition 
 
subprime market on dimensions that are easily manipulated because they are unreported to 
investors.”); John Krainer & Elizabeth Laderman, Mortgage Loan Securitization and Relative Loan 
Performance 32 (Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F., Working Paper No. 2009-22, 2011), available at 
http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/wp09-22bk.pdf (concluding that during the U.S. 
housing boom in the 2000s, “lenders appear to have securitized loans through private-label 
transactions that were riskier than the loans they retained in their portfolios”); Benjamin J. Keys et 
al., 620 FICO, Take II: Securitization and Screening in the Subprime Mortgage Market 6 (Apr. 
2010) [hereinafter Keys et al., 620 FICO] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (“Our 
results in this paper . . . identify the presence of moral hazard in the low documentation subprime 
market.”). 
177 See, e.g., Keys et al., Lax Screening, supra note 176, at 353-54 (finding “a causal link between 
ease of securitization and screening”).  
178 For example, the Treasury Department cited this line of research in a report supporting 
the risk retention requirement. GEITHNER, supra note 142, at 11. The report notes that “subprime 
borrowers with credit scores just above a threshold commonly used by securitizers to determine 
which loans to purchase defaulted at significantly higher rates than those with credit scores below 
the threshold.” Id. It concludes that “markets are unable, in certain circumstances, to align the 
incentives of parties in the securitization chain adequately” and that “[s]uch weaknesses 
demonstrate the need for regulatory reforms.” Id. at 14; see also Keys et al., supra note 108, at 169-75. 
179 Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 14, at 17.  
180 The economists who originated this research design began with the observation that 
mortgage lenders treated mortgage applicants with credit scores just above 620 differently than 
they treated applicants with credit scores just below 620. Keys et al., 620 FICO, supra note 176, at 
2. In particular, the mortgages they approved to borrowers with credit scores just above 620 
performed substantially worse than mortgages to borrowers with credit scores just below 620. Id. 
The researchers hypothesized that this was due to a rule of thumb in the securitization market: 
that many MBS investors and securitizers were willing to buy only mortgages with credit scores of 
620 or above. Id. at 15-16. Such a rule of thumb would produce a “natural experiment.” Loans to 
borrowers with credit scores of 620 would have a higher probability of being securitized than loans 
to borrowers with credit scores of 619, even though these two groups of mortgage applicants are 
essentially identical. This research design thus interprets the greater level of defaults of loans to 
620-score borrowers as the moral hazard effect of securitization on lender screening. Id. at 6. The 
fundamental problem with this research design is that lenders have long followed a credit score 
cutoff rule in screening mortgage applicants—giving more careful scrutiny to those with scores 
below 620 than to those above—for reasons that have nothing to do with the probability of 
securitization. Bubb & Kaufman, supra note 14, at 17. Their approach was simply a natural way to 
incorporate credit scores into underwriting, in much the same way that doctors follow cutoff rules 
in, for example, the level of the enzyme measured by a Prostate-Specific Antigen (PSA) test to 
determine whether to order a biopsy to evaluate a patient for prostate cancer. Id. at 2-3. 
Accordingly, there are jumps in the mortgage default rate in the absence of any jump in the 
securitization rate at credit score cutoffs all over the mortgage market, including in samples of 
loans originated after the collapse of the private-label MBS market in 2008. Id. at 3. The evidence 
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for this flaw is simple. Credit score thresholds are ubiquitous in lending for 
reasons that have nothing to do with securitization. As a result, there are 
jumps in the default rate of mortgages at these thresholds even when 
securitization rates do not change. Consequently, this research in fact 
provides no evidence that moral hazard caused by securitization was a 
significant contributor to the financial crisis.181 
And there are good reasons to think it was not. The risk retention 
requirement is premised not only on the moral hazard problem posed by 
securitization but also on a failure of private responses to that incentive 
problem. While it is difficult to rule out conclusively all versions of the 
naive-investor theory, there is substantial evidence that the organizational 
and contractual structure of the securitization market was designed to 
mitigate moral hazard. The originate-to-distribute model of mortgage 
lending dates back at least to the 1950s, when independent mortgage 
companies that sold their loans to outside investors grew to become an 
important part of the housing finance system.182 MBS sponsored by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac became the dominant source of funding for 
mortgages beginning in the 1980s.183 Private-label securitization was born in 
1977, roughly thirty years prior to the onset of the recent financial crisis.184 
Over these decades of experience with securitization, many institutional 
mechanisms were developed to mitigate the incentive problems it poses. 
 
from credit score cutoff rules thus provides no evidence that securitization led to lax screening. Id. 
at 2-3.  
181 A paper that is also sometimes cited as supporting the moral hazard hypothesis is Mian & 
Sufi, supra note 131. The authors find that income growth and credit growth during the recent 
housing boom from 2002 to 2005 are negatively correlated across zip codes, suggesting that the 
growth in mortgage credit was not driven by demand-side factors. Id. at 1453. They also find that 
the increase in the rate of securitization is much stronger in zip codes with the most subprime 
borrowers, relative to prime zip codes. Id. at 1453-54. Moreover, they find that default rates 
increased more from 2005 to 2007 in areas in which the fraction of mortgages sold to private-label 
securitizers increased. Id. at 1454. This finding, however, does not provide evidence that 
securitization led to moral hazard in mortgage underwriting. Prior to the recent boom period, 
prime loans were already securitized at high rates given the subsidy provided by the implicit 
government guarantee for MBS sponsored by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which dominate the 
prime market. And it is well understood that subprime originators were largely funded through 
securitization, and that subprime loans were riskier than prime loans. But these facts do not imply 
that securitization caused a decline in underwriting standards through a moral hazard effect. 
182 Foote et al., supra note 38, at 150. 
183 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 48, at 40 (explaining how tax relief and relaxed capital 
requirements enabled Fannie and Freddie to “hold or securitize mortgages worth . . . trillions[] of 
dollars” and become “too big to fail”). 
184 See Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. 
LEXIS 1343 (May 19, 1977) (denying the Bank’s request to exempt the new “Mortgage-Backed 
Pass-Through Certificates” from registration under the Securities Act of 1933). 
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First, originators and securitizers reduced information asymmetries by 
making verifiable disclosures about the loans to investors.185 This 
information formed the basis of lending decisions both for originators who 
retained almost all their loans as well as pure originate-to-distribute lenders. 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, a quantitative revolution automated much of 
the underwriting process, as lending decisions were increasingly based on 
hard information, such as credit scores and debt-to-income ratios, that were 
fed into computer-based underwriting systems rather than on subjective 
judgments of creditworthiness by loan officers in long-term relationships 
with borrowers.186 The result was that underwriting was based on 
information that could be—and, in fact, was—disclosed to loan buyers. 
Because of these disclosures, investors were well aware of the general 
changes in the quality of mortgages during the boom period.187  
These representations about the characteristics of the mortgages were 
backed up by warranties that obligated the securitizer or originator to 
 
185 Foote et al., supra note 38, at 153-54. In fact, the data used by Professors Levitin and 
Wachter to demonstrate that moral hazard led to a decline in underwriting standards were easily 
available to investors. See generally Levitin & Wachter, supra note 11. By definition, this is not 
evidence of asymmetric information.  
186 See Martha Poon, From New Deal Institutions to Capital Markets: Commercial Consumer Risk 
Scores and the Making of Subprime Mortgage Finance, 34 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 654, 664 (2009) 
(detailing the transformation from manual to automated underwriting systems). 
187 For instance, CMLTI 2006-NC2, a Citigroup-sponsored deal containing $947 million of 
MBS sliced into different tranches that typified mortgage securitizations at the time, illustrates 
well the information available to investors. FCIC REPORT, supra note 48, at 71-72 (explaining how 
investors were informed of the risk level associated with each tranche, and noting that the top four 
tranches each received the highest rating (AAA/Aaa) from S&P and Moody’s). Like most 
securitizations of this vintage, CMLTI 2006-NC2 suffered serious losses from 2007 to 2008. Id. at 
221-23. However, the prospectus disclosed to investors that the mortgages backing the MBS were 
high risk. The prospectus stated that the average combined loan-to-value ratio for the loans in the 
pool was 88%; for purchase loans, it was 96%. CITIGROUP MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-
NC2, PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT FOR ASSET-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, 
SERIES 2006-NC2 S-7, S-17 (2006) [hereinafter PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT], available at 
http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2006-09-12_CMLTI_2006-NC2_13R%20_% 
20Prospectus.pdf. About 40% of the loans by principal balance were the notorious “stated 
documentation” loans, in which borrowers simply stated their income and assets with no 
verification by the lender. Id. at S-18. The borrower’s income was verified through two years of W-2 
statements or tax returns in only 23% of the loans. Id. Around 80% of loans were hybrid loans for 
which the interest rate would adjust in two or three years, and 18% of loans were interest only for 
the first five years. Id. at S-22. While the loans included came from most of the fifty states, about 
43% of the loans by outstanding principal were from California and Florida. Id. at S-19. Many of 
the loans were made to borrowers with low FICO credit scores, including 32% with scores below 
600, 50% below 625, and 67% below 650. Id. at S-22. These general characteristics—high LTV, two 
to three year hybrid ARM, interest only, poor documentation, low FICO scores, and geographic 
concentration—indicated that the loans would be at high risk of default if house prices fell and 
were fully disclosed to investors in the prospectus.  
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repurchase the mortgages at par in the event that the representations were 
false.188 Investors thus protected themselves contractually—further evidence 
against the naive-investors theory. Following the crisis, some large 
securitizers made sizeable payments to settle claims based on false 
representations.189 
Second, a range of mechanisms resulted in substantial risk retention by 
both originators and securitizers. We have already discussed securitizer risk 
retention.190 Originators also faced substantial losses if the mortgages they 
originated performed poorly or were of a different quality than the quality 
disclosed. Originators faced the risk of buying back loans that defaulted 
within a given, warrantied period after sale or for which their 
representations were inaccurate;191 the risk that securitizers would “kick out” 
specific loans following due diligence review, requiring the originator to sell 
the loans at a substantial discount;192 the risk that the originator would be 
unable to sell loans still in the pipeline for securitization should the market 
 
188 PROSPECTUS SUPPLEMENT, supra note 187, at S-12. 
189 This includes contractual claims related to Citigoup’s CMLTI 2006-NC2 securitization 
discussed supra note 187. See Citigroup to Pay $1.13 Billion to Settle Securities Claims, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 8, 2014, at B2 (discussing the offer made by Citigroup to settle claims by investors demanding 
that Citigroup buy back billions in residential MBS). See generally RMBS TRUST SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT (2014), available at http://www.citigrouprmbssettlement.com/pdflib/Proposed% 
20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf (outlining the terms of the proposed settlement agreement). The 
agreement would also settle civil suits brought by state and federal regulators for these 
misrepresentations. Press Release, U.S. DoJ, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $7 Billion 
Global Settlement with Citigroup for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic 
Mortgages ( July 14, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-federal-
and-state-partners-secure-record-7-billion-global-settlement; see CITIGROUP COMPREHENSIVE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: STATEMENT OF FACTS (2014) [hereinafter CITIGROUP FACTS], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/558201471413645397758.pdf (providing detailed 
background information for the settlement); see also CITIGROUP COMPREHENSIVE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: APPENDIX I (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/ 
opa/resources/93201471413713173954.pdf (listing securitizations which the Justice Department 
found to have a significant percentage of defective loans). Citigroup acknowledged that it had 
received information through the due diligence process “indicating that, for certain loan pools, 
significant percentages of the loans reviewed did not conform to the representations provided to 
investors.” CITIGROUP FACTS, supra, at 1. For example, in three of the CMLTI RMBS issued by 
Citigroup in 2006, some of these loans were missing documentation or had not been originated in 
compliance with underwriting guidelines or applicable federal law. Id. at 6.  
190 See discussion supra Section II.A–C. 
191 Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage 
Credit 6 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 318, 2008).  
192 See, e.g., Final Report of Michael J. Missal, Bankruptcy Court Examiner, at 66, In re New 
Century TRS Holdings, Inc., No. 07-10416, 2008 WL 850030 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 29, 2008), 
available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/Final_Report_New_Century.pdf 
(providing an example where investors reviewed loan pools and “kicked out” loans that did not 
meet expectations). 
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cease to accept its loans more generally;193 and the risk of losing valuable 
servicing rights retained by the originator.194 As we discuss in more detail in 
the next Part, these arrangements caused originators to suffer catastrophic 
losses when the housing bubble burst.195 These mechanisms suggest that 
market participants were quite sophisticated about the incentive problems 
posed by securitization. 
 Finally, the moral hazard story does a poor job explaining the timing of 
the decline in mortgage underwriting standards or why similar problems did 
not emerge in other securitized asset classes. A vibrant secondary market for 
private-label MBS was in place long before the subprime boom without 
apparent incident.196 If there was an inherent flaw in the incentive structure 
of mortgage securitization, why did it not manifest earlier? Similarly, many 
other types of assets are securitized and make use of sophisticated devices 
designed to mitigate incentive problems.197 While markets for other types of 
asset-backed securities (ABS) suffered a loss of liquidity from the general 
financial crisis, there has been no indication of a breakdown in incentives. 
Why would the same investors understand the incentive problem and 
contract for protection for some asset classes but not others? In this sense, 
the underwriting dynamics and performance of MBS in the early-to-mid 
 
193 Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 191, at 24-25. 
194 Id. at ii. 
195 See infra Table 3. 
196 The secondary market in securitized jumbo loans, which are not insured by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac, grew substantially over the course of the 1990s. Everson W. Hull, Securitized 
Jumbo Mortgages: 1986–2005, at 2 (Office of Fed. Hous. Enter. Oversight, Working Paper No. 07-1, 
2007). In fact, jumbo originations exceeded subprime originations in all years except 2004–2006. 
Id. at 19. But the market for securitized jumbo loans over the course of the 1990s was not 
accompanied by any substantial change in the credit quality or loan performance. Id. at 19-22. The 
credit quality and performance of Alt-A loans was also relatively stable in this period. See Rajdeep 
Sengupta, Alt-A: The Forgotten Segment of the Mortgage Market, 92 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
REV. 55, 56, 61-62 (2010) (noting that Alt-A mortgages are typically underwritten to borrowers 
with high FICO scores and that the share of originations across the various FICO score categories 
was relatively stable during this period). 
197 These assets included credit card and other business receivables, student loans, 
automobile loans, and small business loans. For many asset classes, explicit risk retention 
agreements by securitizers were a standard contractual feature. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE 
FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON RISK RETENTION 41 (2010), available 
at http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/securitization/riskretention.pdf (explaining 
how mechanisms developed to mitigate incentive and information problems by putting the risk 
back on securitizers or originators). For example, securitizers of student loans often held a 
subordinate tranche of the securitized pool. Id. at 46. Similarly, it was common for securitizers of 
credit card loans to hold a “vertical slice” of 4-12% of the asset pool, known as the seller’s interest. 
See Adam J. Levitin, Skin-in-the-Game: Risk Retention Lessons from Credit Card Securitization, 81 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 813, 831 (2013) (explaining how this “‘vertical’ slice” or “seller’s interest” 
aligns the interests of card issuers with investors).  
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2000s was unique, both relative to the MBS market in the past and to the 
contemporaneous ABS market. The naive-investors theory cannot explain 
this difference. In contrast, irrational exuberance in a housing bubble 
provides a parsimonious explanation for why mortgage underwriting 
standards specifically eroded during the run-up to the crisis, and why 
participants on all sides of the market suffered large losses as a result. 
To be clear, we are not arguing that securitization played no role in the 
crisis. To the contrary, securitization was a key factor in the collapse of the 
financial system as the wave of mortgage defaults burst upon its shores. 
Securitization ended up concentrating mortgage risk on the balance sheets 
of large, systemically important financial institutions and creating opacity as 
to the ultimate bearer of this risk.198 But the case for securitization causing 
moral hazard in mortgage underwriting is both theoretically and empirically 
weak.  
In sum, the high levels of risk retention by securitizers during the 
bubble strongly imply that reforms should focus on reducing securitizers’ 
exposure to the MBS they sponsor, not increasing it. And there is little 
compelling evidence for the moral hazard problem that the Dodd–Frank 
Act’s risk retention requirement was intended to solve. Accordingly, as a 
regulatory tool, risk retention should be abandoned. 
III. ABILITY TO REPAY 
We turn now to the second pillar of the Dodd–Frank Act’s reforms to 
the mortgage market: the ability-to-repay rule. While at first glance the 
requirement that lenders make a reasonable determination of the borrower’s 
ability to repay may seem to have little relation to the risk retention 
requirement, we show that there are important parallels. Both the risk 
retention requirement and the ability-to-repay rule aim to improve 
mortgage underwriting through incentives for supposedly sophisticated 
market participants. As such, in the face of a bubble, the ability-to-repay 
rule suffers from the same basic problem as the risk retention requirement. 
 A. Background 
Section 1411 of the Dodd–Frank Act creates a duty for creditors making 
a residential mortgage loan to make “a reasonable and good faith 
 
198 For an authoritative account of this process, see generally Gary Gorton & Andrew 
Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 425 (2012), in which the 
authors explain how securitization caused volatility in the repo market by obscuring the magnitude 
and party-specific exposure of subprime risks.  
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determination based on verified and documented information that, at the 
time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to 
repay the loan, according to its terms.”199 The statute and its implementing 
rule provide some guidance on the contours of this duty. Lenders must 
consider the borrower’s credit history, employment status, income, debt-to-
income ratio, and assets.200 More concretely, lenders must verify the 
borrower’s income and assets using third party documentation, such as tax 
returns, payroll receipts, and bank statements.201 In calculating the monthly 
debt payment on the mortgage to determine its affordability, lenders must 
use a payment schedule of substantially equal payments that fully pays off 
the loan over its term202 based on the greater of the “go-to” fully indexed 
interest rate and any initial introductory “teaser” interest rate.203 However, 
the statute and implementing regulations do not mandate any specific 
standards for how lenders use this information to determine a borrower’s 
ability to repay. They simply impose a duty to make a “reasonable” 
determination in “good faith.”204 Importantly, the rule applies only to the 
originator’s underwriting of the loan’s affordability, not to the size of the 
borrower’s down payment. This is consistent with the rule’s goal of borrower 
protection. 
The ability-to-repay rule relies on a mix of public and private 
enforcement. Both the CFPB and state attorneys general have broad 
authority to enforce the rule.205 Mortgage lenders are liable to the borrower 
for special statutory damages for violating their duty to determine the 
 
199 Dodd–Frank Act, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 2142 (2010) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1639c (2012)) (amending the Truth in Lending Act). 
200 Id., § 129C(a)(3), 124 Stat. at 2143 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c).  
201 Id., § 129C(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 2143 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c). 
202 Id., § 129C(a)(6)(D)(iii), 124 Stat. at 2145 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c); 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1026.43(c)(5)(i)(B) (2014). 
203 Dodd–Frank Act, sec. 1411(a)(2), § 129C(a)(6)(D)(iii), 124 Stat. at 2145 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1639c); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c)(5)(i)(A) (2014). 
204 See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6461 ( Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026) (“[Section] 
1026.43(c) and the accompanying commentary describe certain requirements for making ability-to-
repay determinations, but do not provide comprehensive underwriting standards to which 
creditors must adhere. . . . [C]reditors are permitted to develop and apply their own proprietary 
underwriting standards and to make changes to those standards over time in response to empirical 
information and changing economic and other conditions.”).  
205 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 5561–5567, 5581 (2012) (transferring authority to the CFPB to enforce 
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and granting expansive investigatory and enforcement powers 
of consumer financial protection laws); 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (giving state attorneys general authority 
to enforce the ability-to-repay rule). 
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borrower’s ability to repay.206 Borrowers can also raise a violation of the 
ability-to-repay rule as a defense in a foreclosure action and by recoupment 
or setoff against the creditor or an assignee of the mortgage to reduce the 
amount the borrower owes.207 This assignee liability raises the prospect that 
ability-to-repay violations on securitized mortgages could impose costs on 
investors in MBS. However, securitizers have already put in place changes 
to representations and warranties that require originators to buy back loans 
for which they violated the ability-to-repay rule.208 These contractual 
provisions put both the cost of liability for violating the ability-to-repay rule 
and the cost of the resulting default back on the originator. 
The statute provides lenders some protection from ability-to-repay 
liability for loans that meet the definition of a “qualified mortgage” 
(QM).209 The definition focuses largely on product features rather than 
underwriting procedures. In particular, to meet the QM definition, 
 
206 A creditor that violates the ability-to-pay rule is liable to the borrower for an amount 
equal to the sum of (i) any actual damages sustained by the borrower, (ii) general TILA statutory 
damages up to prescribed thresholds for individual and class actions, (iii) attorney fees and court 
costs, and (iv) all finance charges and fees paid by the consumer unless the lender demonstrates 
that the failure to comply is not material. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). The statute of limitations for a 
violation of the ability-to-repay rule is three years from the violation. Id. § 1640(e).  
207 Dodd–Frank Act, sec. 1413, § 130(k), 124 Stat. at 2148-49 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(k)). 
Due to the effect of the statute of limitations, the recoupment or setoff is limited to the first three 
years of finance charges and fees. Id., § 130(k)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 2149 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1640(k)(2)(B)). 
208 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(4) (2014). 
209 Dodd–Frank Act, sec. 1412, § 129C(b)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. at 2146-47 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1639c(b)(1)-(b)(2)) (allowing lenders to presume a borrower’s ability-to-repay if the mortgage is 
a QM). The extent of the protection from liability afforded QMs depends on whether the 
mortgage loan is “higher-priced.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b) (placing additional restrictions on higher-
priced mortgage loans). “Higher priced” is defined as  
[a] consumer credit transaction secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling with an 
annual percentage rate that exceeds the average prime offer rate for a comparable 
transaction as of the date the interest rate is set by 1.5 or more percentage points for 
loans secured by a first lien on a dwelling, or by 3.5 or more percentage points for 
loans secured by a subordinate lien on a dwelling.  
Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,603 ( July 30, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226). For 
higher-priced loans, which roughly correspond to the “subprime” market, meeting the definition of 
QM provides only a rebuttable presumption that the lender has complied with the ability-to-repay 
rule. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii). A borrower can rebut that presumption by showing that, at the 
time the loan was originated, the borrower lacked sufficient income both to make required debt 
payments and to meet living expenses. Id. § 1026.43(e)(1)(ii)(B). In contrast, for non-higher-
priced loans, which roughly correspond to the “prime” market, meeting the definition of QM 
provides the lender with a conclusive presumption that it has complied with the ability-to-repay 
rule (i.e., a safe harbor that forecloses liability). Id. § 1026.43(e)(1)(i). 
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mortgages may not have negative amortization or interest-only features,210 
or fees and points above 3% of the loan amount,211 and must provide for 
regular periodic payments that are substantially equal.212 The underwriting 
aspects of the QM definition are minimal: the borrower’s income and assets 
must be documented using third party records,213 the loan must be 
underwritten using the maximum interest rate permitted under the loan 
during the first five years,214 and the total debt-to-income (DTI) ratio must 
be no more than 43%.215 
While the ability-to-repay rule is often described as a “requirement,” it 
functions primarily as a liability rule for a type of negligent mortgage 
underwriting and in practice will impose liability only if the borrower 
defaults.216 As long as a borrower continues to repay, there would be little 
basis for either a private suit or a public enforcement action under the rule. 
The fact that a borrower has been able to make the payments on the loan 
would serve as strong evidence that the lender was not negligent in 
determining the borrower’s ability to repay. When a borrower does default 
on a mortgage, the creditor already suffers the resulting reduction in value 
of the loan. The ability-to-repay rule can add additional costs to creditors 
that fail to take reasonable care at the time of origination to avoid making a 
loan that the borrower could not repay. The only specific requirement is 
that lenders document borrowers’ income and assets using third party 
records. This bright-line rule will likely result in the end of the explicit “no 
documentation” mortgage programs that grew in popularity in the run-up to 
the crisis. However, with the exception of this documentation requirement, 
what constitutes reasonable care is largely left undefined. 
As a liability rule, the ability-to-repay rule attempts to control creditor 
behavior through incentives by imposing additional costs on creditors ex post 
in the event of a default if the lender failed to make a reasonable 
 
210 Dodd–Frank Act sec. 1414, § 129C(f) , 124 Stat. at 2151-52 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1639c(f )). 
211 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(3)(A). 
212 Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(i). 
213 Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(v). 
214 Dodd–Frank Act sec. 1412, § 129C(b)(2)(A)(v), 124 Stat. 2146 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
1639c(b)(2)(A)(v)). 
215 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi). The 43% DTI ratio is relatively liberal. In contrast, the 
GSEs’ underwriting guidelines use 36% as the standard benchmark. Ability-to-Repay and 
Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 
6408, 6505 ( Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). 
216 In its notice of final rule, the CFPB notes the “litigation [under the ability-to-repay rule] 
likely would arise only when a consumer in fact was unable to repay the loan (i.e.[,] was seriously 
delinquent or had defaulted).” Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the 
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 6512. 
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determination of the borrower’s ability to repay. This creates incentives for 
lenders to take greater care in evaluating mortgage applicants’ ability to 
repay. In addition, it operates as a standard, rather than a rule, since what 
counts as “reasonable” is only given content ex post upon default. The 
protection from liability afforded to QMs introduces a rule-like feature that 
creates incentives for lenders to make loans that comply with the bright-line 
rules of the QM definition. For securitized mortgages, the ability-to-repay 
rule also functions as a form of originator risk retention since originators are 
contractually obligated to buy back mortgages that violate the ability-to-
repay rule.  
B. The Market Failure Theory 
The Dodd–Frank Act’s ability-to-repay rule targets a particular form of 
predatory lending that entails extending credit on the basis of the value of 
the collateral without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan.217 
Such lending practices result in loans with relatively high default risk, 
which subjects borrowers to potential costs such as high finance charges 
paid prior to default, loss of equity in their home, and ultimately loss of 
their home to foreclosure.218 However, for such loans to count as 
“predatory,” they have to make the borrower worse off ex ante.219 In the 
standard rational-choice model, a borrower would never take such a loan. 
Accounts of predatory lending depart from this standard model by 
assuming that borrowers are imperfectly rational and that lenders exploit 
their mistakes by offering loans that have an inefficiently high risk of 
 
217 OCC ET AL., EXPANDED GUIDANCE FOR SUBPRIME LENDING PROGRAMS 10-11 
(2001) [hereinafter GUIDANCE], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
srletters/2001/sr0104a1.pdf (explaining a number of predatory lending practices); Engel & McCoy, 
supra note 101, at 1262 n.11 (explaining the risks of subprime lending for consumers). 
218 Engel & McCoy, supra note 101, at 1262 (describing predatory practices as a “violation[] of 
the norm that no mortgage shall be made to anyone who, on the face of the loan application, 
cannot afford the monthly payments”); see also Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 44,541-42 
( July 30, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226) (describing the different consequences of predatory 
lending on unsuspecting consumers). 
219 Predatory lending is generally defined as a form of credit that makes borrowers worse off 
than their alternatives. See ROBERT E. LITAN, A PRUDENT APPROACH TO PREVENTING 
“PREDATORY” LENDING 1 (2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2001/ 
02/lending-litan (“[Predatory lending] has come generally to refer to mortgages extended under 
terms that are more onerous to borrowers than if they were more fully informed about the loans 
themselves and the alternative sources of finance that may be open to them.”); Willis, supra note 
101, at 736 (“Overly risky loans are loans that present a high risk of foreclosure and loss of home to 
the borrower when other, less harmful and on the whole preferable, alternatives to such a loan 
exist.”).  
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default.220 Accordingly, we refer to this predatory lending–based theory as 
the naive-borrowers theory.221 
According to the naive-borrowers theory, lenders design mortgage 
contracts to exploit borrowers’ mistakes in assessing the affordability of the 
mortgage. Part of the standard narrative of the crisis posits that subprime 
mortgage lenders induced naive borrowers to accept so-called “exploding 
ARMs,”222 adjustable rate mortgages, which were “designed to default.”223 A 
common structure was the “2/28 ARM,” which has a fixed interest rate for 
two years before adjusting to a floating interest rate for the remaining 
twenty-eight years of the loan term.224 Some of these loans—“option 
ARMs”—also allow the borrower to pay less than the interest due on the 
loan, resulting in negative amortization (i.e., an increase in the amount 
owed on the loan) and a corresponding erosion of the borrower’s equity in 
the home.225 The naive-borrowers theory posits that these loan structures 
fool borrowers into underestimating the cost of the loan based on the 
relatively low initial monthly payments.226 Under the “exploding ARMs” 
theory of the crisis, when the interest rate resets to a higher floating rate 
(i.e., “explodes”), the resulting “payment shock” makes the loan 
unaffordable. Unless the borrower can refinance the loan at a lower rate, the 
borrower will default. Borrowers fall into this trap, the story goes, because 
of myopia. In choosing which loan to take out and how much to borrow, 
 
220 See Bar-Gill, supra note 101, at 1080-83 (identifying that the subprime market mortgage 
market lends itself to behavioral economics modeling); Willis, supra note 101, at 713-14, 754-806 
(explaining that the subprime mortgage market uses psychology to manipulate consumers into 
buying overpriced home loans). 
221 We drew the terminology “naive borrowers” from an important article on subprime 
mortgage lending that developed this theory. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 101, at 1257 
(“Predatory lending—exploitative high-cost loans to naive borrowers—has dominated the 
headlines in recent years and has sent foreclosure rates soaring.”).  
222 FCIC REPORT, supra note 48, at 6; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Beware of Exploding 
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2007, at B1 (“Especially ingenious—for lenders, at least—were so-
called exploding A.R.M.’s that lured borrowers with unusually low teaser rates that then reset 
skyward two or three years later . . . .”). 
223 ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE 
RESPONSE, AND THE WORK AHEAD 70 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
224 Holden Lewis, Subprime Lenders Yank Most Popular Loan Type, BANKRATE ( July 26, 
2007), http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mortgages/subprime_20070726_a1.asp, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/UMJ6-4EGC (describing the 2/28 ARM structure). 
225 FCIC REPORT, supra note 48, at 106-09 (describing the details and the history of option-
ARMs). 
226 We are broadly sympathetic to the view that teaser rates are used to fool borrowers into 
taking out inefficiently large loans. See, e.g., Bar-Gill & Bubb, supra note 8, at 1006 (attributing the 
attractiveness of credit card teaser rates to the fact that the rates “lower the perceived price of a 
given contract”). 
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they put excessive weight on the initial costs of the loan and insufficient 
weight on what will happen down the road when the rate and monthly 
payment reset.227  
The story cannot end here, however. Why would a lender find it 
profitable to make predatory loans that are “designed to default”? Enter 
securitization.228 Exponents of this view typically argue that subprime 
originators were able to pass off the credit risk of these exploding ARMs to 
securitizers, who sold it on to naive MBS investors.229 As the Senate 
Committee Report on the Dodd–Frank Act explained, 
the ability to sell the mortgages without retaining any risk[] also frees up 
the originator to make risky loans, even those without regard to the 
borrower’s ability to repay. In the years leading up to the crisis, the 
originator was not penalized for failing to ensure that the borrower was 
actually qualified for the loan, and the buyer of the securitized debt had 
little detailed information about the underlying quality of the loans.230  
The naive-borrowers theory and the naive-investors theory thus work 
together to provide an account of the decline in underwriting in the run-up 
 
227 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,525 ( July 30, 2008) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 226) (“A consumer may focus on loan attributes that have the most obvious and immediate 
consequence such as loan amount, down payment, initial monthly payment, initial interest rate, 
and up-front fees . . . .”); Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569, 37,569 
( July 10, 2007) (“The Agencies are also concerned that subprime borrowers may not fully 
understand the risks and consequences of obtaining [a hybrid] ARM loan.”); Bar-Gill, supra note 
101, at 1079 (arguing that borrowers cannot aggregate all the different temporal and cost variables 
effectively); Engel & McCoy, supra note 101, at 1284 (“Introductory teaser rates . . . lull[] loan 
applicants into a false sense of security about their ability to repay.”). 
228 To be clear, securitization is not the only explanation for why lenders would engage in 
predatory lending with inefficiently high default risk. In particular, lenders may be able to extract 
sufficient payments from the borrower, stripping the equity in their home over successive 
refinancings, such that those payments, when combined with the recovery value of the home in 
foreclosure, make the lending profitable. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 101, at 1263 (describing 
the economic strategy of “loan flipping” and “equity stripping”). We focus on the securitization 
explanation because it features prominently in the literature on predatory lending in the run-up to 
the crisis and in the legislative history of the Dodd–Frank Act’s ability-to-repay rule. 
229 See, e.g., Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in 
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6559 ( Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 
1026) (noting that without an ability-to-repay requirement, situations existed where the consumer 
lacked full information or understanding of the risks and costs before entering into a transaction); 
Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,526 (“[O]riginators were not adequately assessing repayment 
ability, particularly where mortgages were sold to the secondary market and the originator retained 
little of the risk.”); Bar-Gill, supra note 101, at 1080-81 (citing securitization as the “main culprit” in 
explaining lenders’ willingness to make these high default risk loans to naive borrowers); Engel & 
McCoy, supra note 101, at 1286-88 (discussing the incentive problems that encourage brokers to 
deceive lenders and lenders to deceive market participants). 
230 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 41 n.121 (2010). 
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to the crisis. Originators duped borrowers into taking out loans they could 
not ultimately afford and then sold them to securitizers, who in turn duped 
investors into buying MBS backed by these bad mortgages. It was this 
account that motivated the Dodd–Frank Act’s ability-to-repay and risk 
retention approach to reforming the mortgage market.231  
The ability-to-repay rule was intended to prevent predatory mortgage 
lending from recurring.232 As detailed above, it subjects originators to 
potential liability if they fail to make a reasonable determination that the 
borrower can afford the loan, including any potential “payment shock” 
embedded in the loan terms.233 For securitized mortgages, a finding that the 
lender failed to make a reasonable ability-to-repay determination for a 
defaulted mortgage would trigger an obligation of the originator to buy back 
the mortgage. These liability and risk retention components of the ability-
to-repay rule provide lenders with incentives to take reasonable care in 
underwriting the affordability of mortgage loans. 
We agree that predatory mortgage lending is an issue of concern. 
However, even on its own terms—that is, evaluating the rule as a form of 
borrower protection—the ability-to-repay rule is unlikely to be sufficiently 
effective. Lenders remain free to offer teaser loan structures that fool 
borrowers into thinking that the loan is less costly than it is and induce 
them to take out larger loans than is efficient. The ability-to-repay rule 
discourages only extreme versions of these teaser rate structures that truly 
“explode” into unaffordable loans when the payments reset and therefore 
risk liability. If teaser loans fool borrowers into underestimating the costs of 
loans, then lenders will continue to have strong incentives to offer forms of 
these loans even under the ability-to-repay rule. 
 
231 The Senate Committee Report explains further:  
Too often . . . loans have been made without the careful consideration as to the long-
term sustainability of the mortgage. Loans are being made without the lender 
documenting that the borrower will be able to afford the loan after the expected 
payment shock hits without depending on rising incomes or increased 
appreciation. . . . Unfortunately, many of these mortgages were packaged by big Wall 
Street banks into mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and sold in pieces all over the 
world.  
Id. at 13-14. 
232 See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 6408 (“The final rule describes certain minimum requirements for 
creditors making ability-to-repay determinations [for mortgages] . . . .”). 
233 Recall that to avoid liability, lenders must use a payment schedule of substantially equal 
payments that fully pays off the loan over the term of the loan based on the greater of the “go-to” 
fully indexed interest rate and any initial introductory “teaser” interest rate. See supra notes 202-04 
and accompanying text. 
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C. Ability to Repay in a Bubble 
The ability-to-repay rule was designed to protect naive borrowers from 
asset-based lending. To evaluate the rule, it is critical to consider how it will 
perform in a housing bubble. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) acknowledged as much in its rulemaking to implement the rule, 
stating that 
[t]he period that covers the “bubble” years and the crash that followed is 
also useful to gauge the impacts of the final rule. It is exactly the lending 
conditions during those years, and the damage they caused, that the statute 
and the final rule are primarily designed to prevent.234  
However, in its cost–benefit analysis of the final rule, the CFPB failed to 
consider the implications of overoptimism about future house prices—the 
defining feature of a bubble—for the efficacy of the rule.235 Here, we show 
that the rule will in fact do little to prevent a recurrence of asset-based 
lending in a bubble. 
1. The Performance of the Ability-to-Repay Rule in a Bubble 
A housing bubble undermines the effectiveness of the ability-to-repay 
rule much as it does the risk retention requirement. First, in practice the 
ability-to-repay rule imposes liability on the originator only in the event of 
a default. As we have explained, default generally occurs only when the 
house price has fallen below the value of the loan. In a bubble, originators 
will underestimate the possibility that house prices will fall and therefore 
will underweigh the prospect of liability under the ability-to-repay rule. A 
bubble thus blunts the incentives for underwriting created by the ability-to-repay 
rule. Lenders caught up in a bubble are likely to engage in asset-based 
lending, the ability-to-repay rule notwithstanding.  
Second, even though the bright-line requirement that lenders document 
borrowers’ income and assets will end explicit no-documentation loan 
programs, this is unlikely to improve underwriting materially in the face of 
a bubble. It is true that no-documentation loans performed worse during 
the crisis than full-documentation loans.236 But this difference does not 
 
234 Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 6558. 
235 Id. at 6555-75 (discussing the mortgage qualification requirements intended to prevent 
loans from being issued to consumers who have no realistic chance of repaying them). 
236 See Demyanyk & Hemert, supra note 47, at 1858 (comparing delinquency rates for no-
documentation and low-documentation loans with delinquency rates for full-documentation 
loans). 
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represent the causal effect of requiring documentation. In a bubble, lenders 
faced with the ability-to-repay rule can simply document the borrower’s 
income and assets as required and still make the loan. Because the lender 
and borrower expect the house value to appreciate and therefore do not 
expect the loan to default, the documentation requirement only adds some 
cost to underwriting the loan and does little to change the lenders’ 
incentives to make the loan. 
Third, the ability-to-repay rule focuses on only one dimension of 
underwriting: the borrower’s ability to make the payments on the loan given 
their expected resources. It creates little incentive to maintain other key 
features of mortgage underwriting standards that decline in the face of a 
bubble, including credit scores and down payments. In a bubble, a lender 
would be willing to make low down payment loans to borrowers with poor 
credit histories, betting that house prices will rise and prevent default. The 
ability-to-repay rule poses little risk of liability for such loans even when 
they default. And when the bubble bursts, those loans are at high risk of 
default. 
2. The Evidence 
To better evaluate the likely performance of the ability-to-repay rule in a 
bubble, we turn to evidence from the recent housing bubble. We begin with 
the losses that originators suffered when the bubble burst. Consider the fate 
of the top fifteen originators of subprime mortgages by total volume from 
2004–2007, detailed in Table 3 below. Six went through bankruptcy or 
insolvency as a result of losses incurred in the mortgage market. The others 
were either shut down by their parent or sold after absorbing crippling 
losses. Clearly, the major subprime originators had skin in the game.  
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Table 3: Top 15 Subprime Mortgage Originators 2004–2007237 
 
Originator Outcome 
Ameriquest Subprime mortgage unit shut down and assets 
sold to Citigroup on August 31, 2007.
HSBC Suffered $48 billion in impairments on 
subprime mortgages before shutting down 
subprime mortgage unit in 2009.
 
237 The top fifteen subprime mortgage originators for 2004–2007 were identified using 
figures in Mortgage Market Statistical Annual, published by Inside Mortgage Finance. See 
Countrywide Fin. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) ( July 8, 2008); OFFICE OF THRIFT 
SUPERVISION, OTS FACT SHEET ON WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK 3 (2008); $3B in Write-
Downs Send Countrywide to $893M Loss, USA TODAY (Apr. 29, 2008, 9:18 AM), http:// 
usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/companies/earnings/2008-04-29-countrywide-loss_N.htm, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8P3U-T26Q; Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, Lehman Closes Subprime Unit and 
Lays Off 1,200, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/ 
23/business/23lend.html, archived at http://perma.cc/2ZVQ-24EQ; Cerberus, H&R Block Quit Deal 
for Option One Mortgage, USA TODAY (Dec. 4, 2007, 2:40 PM), http:// 
usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/2007-12-04-cerberus-block_N.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/A5DC-RX42; Geoffrey Colvin, GE Under Siege, FORTUNE (Oct. 15, 2008, 10:27 AM), 
http://archive.fortune.com/2008/10/09/news/companies/colvin_ge.fortune/index.htm, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EKW7-8WN3; Gregory Corcoran, Citi’s Math Problem, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 
2007, 10:15 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2007/11/05/citis-math-problem, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/TX8Q-EDY5; Eric Dash, Citigroup Buys Part of a Troubled Mortgage Lender, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/01/business/01citi.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0, 
archived at http://perma.cc/WNA3-GLW2; Geraldine Fabrikant, Bracing for Home Loan Losses, 
Wells Fargo to Take Big Charge, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/11/28/business/28bank.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8WBD-LDWY; Fremont, Former 
Subprime Lender, Emerges from Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK ( June 15, 2010, 5:34 AM), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/fremont-emerges-from-chp-11-backed-by-signature, archived 
at http://perma.cc/XB5A-56J5; Bradley Keoun & Steven Church, New Century, Biggest Suprime 
Casualty, Goes Bankrupt, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2007, 4:38 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aXHDSbOcAChc, archived at http://perma.cc/34XR-VR8C; Ari 
Levy & Linda Shen, Washington Mutual Falls on $22 Billion Loss Estimate, BLOOMBERG ( June 9, 
2008, 3:26 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a.mZDxKk0bFA&refer= 
home, archived at http://perma.cc/GZY7-PFR7; Stephen J. Lubben, The Challenges in ResCap’s 
Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 15, 2012, 2:41 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/ 
05/15/the-challenges-in-rescaps-bankruptcy, archived at http://perma.cc/4GNN-M5G6; Merrill 
Lynch to Close Subprime Lending Unit, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Feb. 29, 2008, 7:32 
AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/02/29/merrill-lynch-to-close-subprime-lending-unit-report-
says, archived at http://perma.cc/36TB-EECB; Sara Schaefer Muñoz, HSBC Makes Another Go at 
the U.S., WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704534904575131913306941780 (last 
updated Mar. 22, 2010, 12:01 AM), archived at http://perma.cc/H7ZD-5TSH; Jonathan Stempel, 
Aegis Mortgage Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2007, 5:56 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/08/13/aegismortgage-bankruptcy-idUSN1337247520070813, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7F2L-YDWP. 
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New Century Filed for bankruptcy on April 2, 2007.
Countrywide Financial Sold to Bank of America on July 1, 2008 after 
posting losses of more than $3 billion.
Option One Shut down by parent H&R Block on 
December 4, 2007 after suffering losses of 
more than $1.5 billion over the previous five 
quarters.
CitiMortgage Citigroup announced $10-13 billion of 
mortgage-related write-offs in 2007.
First Franklin On February 28, 2008, Merrill Lynch 
announced that it would wind down First 
Franklin after Merrill Lynch reported write-
downs and losses of $24.4 billion in 2007. 
Washington Mutual WaMu was seized by OTS and placed into 
receivership with the FDIC on September 25, 
2008 after announcing expected losses of $22 
billion.
Wells Fargo Recognized losses of $1.4 billion in the fourth 
quarter of 2007 on home equity loans.
WMC Mortgage Shut down by parent General Electric in 
December 2007 after losing almost $1 billion. 
Fremont Investment & 
Loan 
Parent Fremont General filed for bankruptcy 
in June 2008.
GMAC Residential 
Funding 
Filed for bankruptcy May 15, 2012. 
Aegis Mortgage Corp. Filed for bankruptcy August 13, 2007.
Accredited Home 
Lenders 
Filed for bankruptcy May 1, 2009. 
BNC Mortgage Shut down by parent Lehman Brothers on 
August 22, 2007 prior to Lehman’s bankruptcy 
filing. 
 
These originators’ losses are informative about the ability-to-repay rule 
for two reasons. First, recall that the “designed to default” claim on which 
the ability-to-repay rule is premised has to explain why originators would 
have an incentive to make such loans in the first place. The standard 
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explanation is that the originators were passing off the default risk to 
securitizers who sold it on to naive investors. The evidence shows that in 
fact originators were to a significant degree “eating their own cooking.”  
Second, and relatedly, the large losses suffered by originators make it 
implausible that adding still more losses through ability-to-repay liability 
would have materially affected their incentives to underwrite loans. Most 
obviously, the fact that many of these lenders became bankrupt raises the 
standard “judgment proof” problem with using liability to control risky 
behavior.238 Because of limited liability, the ability-to-repay rule would not 
have imposed additional costs for making risky loans on the relevant 
decisionmaker for many of these originators. Moreover, the fact that 
originators’ large amounts of skin in the game were insufficient to deter the 
risky underwriting practices during the boom suggests that incentive-based 
tools such as liability under the ability-to-repay rule are ineffective. As with 
securitizers, there are multiple potential explanations for why these loan 
originators failed to protect themselves from the wave of defaults. 
Overoptimism about house prices is our leading candidate, but other stories 
based on agency problems within firms lead to the same conclusion: 
additional incentives from the threat of liability under the ability-to-repay 
rule would have done little to improve their underwriting. 
Additionally, the “exploding ARMs” story in fact accounts for little of 
the recent wave of mortgage defaults. The evidence shows no marked 
increase in the rate of defaults for subprime hybrid ARMs when loan 
payments increased.239 On the contrary, such loans defaulted in large 
numbers even before the reset date. For the worst performing vintage of 
2/28 hybrid ARM loans in 2007, loan payment amounts actually fell at the 
reset date.240  
In fact, loans without any payment reset feature accounted for the 
overwhelming majority of defaults. In only about 12% of mortgage 
foreclosures from 2007 to 2010 did the borrower experience a payment 
increase prior to defaulting.241 Most defaulting mortgages had a fixed rate 
 
238 S. Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45, 45 (1986) (explaining 
that “liability does not furnish adequate incentives to alleviate risk” due to the judgment proof 
problem). 
239 See Foote et al., supra note 38, at 140-43. See generally Kristopher Gerardi et al., Subprime 
Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., 
Working Paper No. 07-15, 2007) (analyzing and comparing home foreclosures for different types of 
mortgages in Massachusetts over the period of 1989–2007); Shane M. Sherlund, The Past, Present, 
and Future of Subprime Mortgages (Fed. Reserve Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working 
Paper No. 2008-63, 2008) (studying the default rates of subprime mortgages from 2000 to 2007). 
240 Foote et al., supra note 38, at 141. 
241 Id. at 142. 
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because fixed rate mortgages comprised the majority of mortgages. Fixed 
rate mortgages defaulted less often than variable rate mortgages, but the 
difference was not large. For subprime mortgages originated between 2005 
and 2007, about 53% of 2/28 ARM mortgages experienced a ninety-day 
delinquency before 2010, compared with 48% of fixed rate mortgages.242 
The primary mistake that borrowers made was not in misunderstanding 
that the monthly payments would increase. It was in expecting house prices 
to continue to rise—a mistake that was shared by the lender as well as the 
ultimate owner of the loan. It is this mistake that poses the primary threat 
to financial and economic stability. The ability-to-repay rule does little to 
prevent it. 
Given our analysis, a better regulatory response to the market failure 
represented by the naive-borrowers theory would be to impose clear, bright-
line rules on mortgage practices that are publicly enforceable ex ante—that 
is, without having to wait for a default. We suggest two such rules in Part 
IV below: a cap on borrower debt-to-income ratios and a ban on teaser 
payment structures. Moreover, the main policy tool we suggest in Part IV 
below—a mortgage leverage limit—would, among other benefits, help 
maintain the affordability of loans over the housing cycle. 
*      *      * 
In sum, the Dodd–Frank Act’s reforms of the mortgage market were 
designed based on a particular view of the crisis that emphasizes 
opportunistic behavior of sophisticated market participants vis-à-vis the less 
sophisticated. They were not designed to address the primary threat to 
economic stability: the possibility of a future housing bubble. An interesting 
question is why the Act’s mortgage reforms were mistargeted in this way. 
Such an inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article. We simply point out 
that this episode is consistent with the view developed by Professor Roberta 
Romano that the political economy of financial regulation leads Congress to 
quickly enact major financial reforms in the wake of a financial crisis before 
a clear understanding of the causes of the crisis comes into view—so-called 
“regulating in the dark.”243 Some of the early empirical work on the 
mortgage crisis seemed to demonstrate that moral hazard caused by 
securitization played a central role.244 Moreover, a literature in behavioral 
 
242 Id. at 143. 
243 See generally Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: 
THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012). 
244 See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text (discussing a series of articles by economists 
and policymakers positing that moral hazard played a role in the crisis). 
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law and economics that emphasizes the exploitation of naive market 
participants by sophisticated firms was cresting in the same period.245 As 
Romano explains, the need to act quickly in the wake of a crisis leads 
Congress to reach for “off-the-shelf ” reform proposals.246 These scholarly 
literatures might have helped lead Congress astray. 
IV. MORTGAGE REGULATION AGAINST BUBBLES 
In this Part, we outline an approach to mortgage regulation that would 
more effectively protect the economy from future housing bubbles. We 
argue that direct regulatory mandates, rather than indirect incentive-based 
tools, should be used to protect banks and borrowers from themselves. In 
particular, we show how limits on leverage and debt-to-income ratios for 
mortgages can both reduce the incidence of housing bubbles and mitigate 
their effects. We also suggest other limitations on mortgage lending 
practices, such as teaser payment structures, and provide a new perspective 
on the current legislative efforts to reform the broader architecture of the 
housing finance system. 
Our goal in this Part is modest. We aim to identify types of regulation 
that are well suited to mitigating housing bubbles and to qualitatively 
analyze their principal benefits and costs. The benefits arise largely from 
alleviating the severe macroeconomic downturns that housing bubbles can 
produce when they burst, like the Great Recession from which the United 
States is now emerging. Other benefits include a reduction in 
overinvestment in housing as a bubble inflates. To be clear, each of the 
policies that we propose would also produce costs. The costs vary by 
regulatory tool but largely flow from preventing borrowers from getting 
loans that they demand and that lenders would otherwise provide. Choosing 
the optimal combination and level of these policies would require a more 
detailed quantitative analysis. We leave that quantitative exercise for future 
work. Nevertheless, we think it likely that, once properly calibrated, these 
policies would produce positive net benefits.  
A. Direct Regulation to Protect Banks and Borrowers from Themselves 
As we explained in Parts II and III, the Dodd–Frank Act’s mortgage 
reforms are based on what we have called asymmetric theories of behavioral 
biases. These theories identify one party in a market that does not rationally 
 
245 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing this literature). 
246 Romano, supra note 243, at 89. 
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pursue its self-interest. They then attempt to modify the incentives of other 
rational participants in the market to achieve a better outcome. Both the 
risk retention requirement and the ability-to-repay rule attempt to regulate 
incentives by imposing additional costs on financial institutions when 
mortgages default. 
However, indirect incentive-based regulation is ineffective when both 
sides of a market transaction are subject to behavioral biases. The 
marketwide irrational exuberance that is the defining characteristic of an 
asset bubble produces exactly such a situation. In a housing bubble, 
overoptimism about future house prices causes financial institutions to 
underestimate the probability of default, thereby diluting the incentives 
created by such indirect regulation.247  
Bubbles also undermine other classic types of incentive-based 
regulation. Consider, for example, a Pigouvian tax on mortgage lending. 
One way to conceive of the regulatory problem is to think of each mortgage 
loan as imposing a small, systemic risk externality. A Pigouvian tax on 
mortgage loans could address this externality by making private actors face 
the true social cost of their actions. A tax set equal to the size of the 
externality would make the decision problem faced by private actors mirror 
the social decision problem of choosing optimal lending and borrowing 
behavior. The tax allows actors to bring their private information about the 
private costs and benefits of lending to bear in reaching an efficient 
outcome. This ability of a tax to harness private information underlies the 
 
247 Professor Gerding makes a related point about the breakdown of incentives during a 
bubble by showing how stock market bubbles undermine compliance with antifraud rules. Erik F. 
Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. 
REV. 393, 441 (2006). A boom in asset prices increases the benefits of committing securities fraud, 
while at the same time postponing the time when any reputational costs and legal liability from 
the fraud will be incurred. Id. at 432. Further reinforcing this dynamic is the reduction in 
probability of detection during a boom in fraud, which overloads the resources of enforcement 
agencies. Id. This “compliance rot” has a similar effect on compliance with prudential regulation 
during bubbles. GERDING, supra note 84, at 218-22. In contrast to our approach, Gerding suggests 
that the way to make securities law more robust to a bubble is to increase the threat of liability 
during a bubble to maintain compliance incentives, for example, through countercyclical 
enforcement budgets. Id. at 441-48. Gerding also suggests using incentive-based pay to motivate 
regulators during bubbles. Id. at 497-98. We are skeptical that incentive-based schemes can be 
fine-tuned based on the state of the housing market for the same reasons we are skeptical of other 
forms of countercyclical macroprudential regulation. See supra notes 86-99 and accompanying text. 
A more robust approach is to devise regulatory tools that do not rely on incentive schemes that 
break down in a bubble. Compliance with simple, broad-based rules prohibiting specific mortgage 
practices can be made stronger to avoid a bubble. Gerding’s analysis underscores the need to 
design such rules to be easily enforced on an ex ante basis. 
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conventional view that taxes are superior to quantity regulation for 
addressing externalities.248 
 However, in a bubble, borrowers and lenders overestimate the private 
benefits of loans. The excessive optimism of market participants 
undermines the ability of a tax to harness private information. In this 
setting, a Pigouvian tax equal to the size of the externality would not 
produce the efficient outcome. One response would be to set the tax above 
the external social cost to counteract the effect of this optimism. However, 
this overestimation of benefits varies across individuals and across the 
boom-and-bust cycle of the housing market. The optimal tax would have to 
vary, in a complicated way, along both these dimensions. In our view, it 
would be particularly difficult for regulators to design such a contingent tax 
because it requires them to know when a bubble is taking place. Errors in 
setting the tax would result in a system that did too little to discourage 
lending in a bubble but inefficiently depressed the mortgage market in 
normal times. Moreover, such a complex Pigouvian tax would distort the 
decisions of rational individuals who are not swept up in the bubble. We 
return to the challenges a bubble poses for corrective taxation in subsection 
IV.B.4 below. 
Mortgage regulation against bubbles should rely instead on direct 
mandates.249 When borrowers, lenders, and investors alike are susceptible to 
a bubble mentality, it is best to directly regulate their ability to act on it. 
Direct regulation could protect banks by preventing the erosion of mortgage 
underwriting standards as a bubble expands. It could also protect 
households by reducing the leveraged exposure of homeowners to housing 
by limiting the accumulation of mortgage debt. Finally, it could reduce the 
incidence and magnitude of housing bubbles. Regulators are also susceptible 
to bubbles, and this risk should be taken into account in regulatory design. 
Simple fixed rules will likely perform better than discretionary regimes that 
 
248 See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, On the Superiority of Corrective Taxes to 
Quantity Regulation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2002) (explaining that taxes are more effective 
than regulation when taxes can be adjusted to account for the magnitude of the harm). 
249 The question of whether to address externalities by regulating prices or quantities is an 
old one in the theory of regulation. See, e.g., Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 477, 477 (1974) (discussing whether it is better to regulate by directly limiting an 
activity or fixing prices such that the market regulates itself through market actors’ self-interest). 
The standard neoclassical analysis is that, as long as a sufficiently flexible tax schedule is feasible, 
corrective taxes are superior to quantity regulation. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 248, at 3-4. 
Behavioral biases, however, undermine the argument that Pigouvian taxes are the most effective 
way to address externalities. See Bubb & Pildes, supra note 12, at 1673-77. We leave a more 
complete and formal analysis of the effects of behavioral biases on the optimal externality policy to 
future work. 
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rely on regulators to identify bubbles and counteract them in real-time. We 
turn now to a set of specific mortgage regulations that could further these 
aims. 
B. Limiting Mortgage Leverage 
In our view, the most promising tool of mortgage regulation for 
combating bubbles is a simple leverage limit on any mortgage loan taken on 
a home. As an illustration, consider a maximum combined loan to value 
(CLTV) ratio250 of 90%.251 This would require all homebuyers to make an 
initial down payment that is at least 10% of the purchase price of the home. 
Any subsequent mortgage transactions, such as a home-equity loan or a 
cash-out refinance, would be prohibited from bringing the CLTV ratio 
above 90%.252 Similarly, negative amortization would be regulated to 
prevent a rise in the loan balance from increasing the CLTV ratio above the 
limit. 
Leverage limits for home mortgages have a long history under federal 
law.253 While historically they were implemented through prudential 
regulation, rather than the mortgage-level rule we propose, they nonetheless 
applied to the bulk of the housing finance system. Beginning in the 1970s, 
however, these leverage limits were rolled back,254 and today’s mortgage 
 
250 The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of a mortgage loan is the ratio of the loan amount to the 
value of the home. The combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratio on a home is the ratio of the total 
value of all mortgages on the home (including second-lien mortgages) to the value of the home. 
251 A quantitative assessment of the precise optimal level of such a limit is beyond the scope 
of this Article. 
252 It would be sensible to allow an exception to the leverage limit for refinance loans that 
simply take advantage of lower interest rates and do not extract any equity from the home. This 
would allow a borrower to refinance at lower interest rates even if home prices have fallen since 
the home was purchased. 
253 The New Deal reforms to the housing finance system in the early 1930s imposed an 80% 
LTV cap on mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and on those 
originated by federal savings and loan associations. National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48 
Stat. 1246, 1248 (1934); 24 C.F.R. § 203.10(b) (1938). National banks remained subject to the 50% 
LTV cap imposed by the Federal Reserve Act. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 
251, 273 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
254 Mortgage leverage limits were substantially loosened in the 1970s, when the LTV cap on 
S&Ls increased to 95% and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were authorized to securitize loans with 
no LTV cap, subject only to the requirement that loans with LTV above 80% carry mortgage 
insurance. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633; 
Amendments Relating to Flexible Payment Loans, 39 Fed. Reg. 9427 (Mar. 11, 1974). In 1982, the 
statutory limits on LTV for national banks were eliminated and the LTV limit for FHA loans 
increased to 95%. Garn–St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 
Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). Today, the FHA will generally 
insure loans with down payments as low as 3.5%. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD 
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CLTV ratios are largely unregulated.255 Reinstituting a mortgage leverage 
limit today would simply be a return to a policy that worked well for 
decades. These decades include the dramatic expansion in homeownership 
that followed World War II, when the homeownership rate rose from 44% 
in 1940 to 62% by 1960,256 not far from where it stands today.257 
One could easily imagine more complicated versions of this simple 
policy designed to optimize its benefits and costs. For example, the limit 
could be relaxed in periods in which house prices are not rising to avoid 
unnecessary costs. But we think there is a real danger in such discretion: it 
may be politically difficult for regulators to tighten the limit when 
conditions become frothy. Moreover, even a fixed-percentage CLTV limit 
would function countercyclically because it would be more likely to bind 
when house prices rise. 
In this Section, we first explain how a mortgage leverage limit would 
lower the incidence and magnitude of housing bubbles by preventing the 
buildup of mortgage debt. We then turn to specific ways that a leverage 
limit would mitigate the effects of housing bubbles on the economy through 
the banking and household channels. We conclude by considering the costs 
of a leverage limit.  
1. Limiting the Incidence and Magnitude of Housing Bubbles 
A mortgage leverage limit would reduce the incidence and magnitude of 
housing bubbles. During a bubble, the growth in house prices usually 
outstrips the ability of borrowers—particularly first-time homebuyers—to 
make a down payment on a new loan.258 A sustained boom in the housing 
 
4115.1, MORTGAGE CREDIT ANALYSIS FOR MORTGAGE INSURANCE 2-A-4 (2011), available at 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=4155-1_2_secA.pdf. 
255 Depository institutions are subject only to a requirement that they adopt a prudent policy 
on high LTV lending. OCC ET AL., INTERAGENCY GUIDANCE ON HIGH LTV RESIDENTIAL 
REAL ESTATE LENDING 1-4 (1999), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
srletters/1999/sr9926a2.pdf (noting that high LTV loans are becoming more common and desirable 
for consumers and that institutions may be involved in such lending as long as appropriate risk 
management programs are in place). 
256 Daniel K. Fetter, How Do Mortgage Subsidies Affect Home Ownership? Evidence from the 
Mid-Century GI Bills, AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POLICY, May 2013, at 111, 112.  
257 The rate of homeownership as of the fourth quarter of 2014 stood at 64%. ROBERT R. 
CALLIS & MELISSA KRESIN, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND 
HOME OWNERSHIP IN THE FOURTH QUARTER 2014 (2015), available at http:// 
www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf. 
258 See generally Mian & Sufi, supra note 131, at 1451-53 (demonstrating that mortgage credit 
growth and income growth in zip codes with a large fraction of subprime loans were negatively 
correlated from 2002 to 2005, but not during other periods). 
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market therefore requires easy credit.259 As is well known, easy credit played 
an integral role in the recent housing boom.260 For example, loans with 
CLTVs of 90% or more accounted for only 10% of subprime mortgage 
originations in 2000, but by 2006 they made up over 50% of such 
originations.261 
A leverage limit would throw some sand into the debt machine that 
allows a bubble to expand. To see why, consider the following simple 
example. Suppose all houses are currently priced at $100,000, and all 
households that do not currently own a house have $10,000 in cash. Suppose 
also that there is no leverage limit in place and house prices appreciate by 
20% so that homes are now priced at $120,000. First-time homebuyers could 
then purchase a home by using their $10,000 to make a down payment and 
borrowing an additional $110,000. The CLTV on such a loan would be about 
92%.262 If instead a CLTV limit of 90% were in place, first-time buyers 
would only be able to purchase a home after increasing their savings by 20%, 
or $2,000.263 In other words, a leverage limit would allow savings growth to 
constrain house price growth, thus making it more difficult for a bubble to 
form in the first place.264  
 
259 There is substantial evidence across countries and historical periods that housing booms 
are accompanied by relaxed credit conditions. See REINHARDT & ROGOFF, supra note 32, at 216-
17 (noting that asset price increases and financial liberalization have both historically preceded 
global and national financial crises); Luca Agnello & Ludger Schuknecht, Booms and Busts in 
Housing Markets: Determinants and Implications, 20 J. HOUSING ECON. 171, 171 (2011) (noting that 
“a major housing boom coupled with strong money and credit growth emerged in the US and 
many other industrialised countries”).  
260 Studies have concluded that easy credit conditions play an important role in fueling the 
growth in subprime lending. See, e.g., John V. Duca et al., Housing Prices and Credit Constraints: 
Making Sense of the US Experience, 121 ECON. J. 533, 550 (2011) (stating that “our results are 
consistent with the view that many asset bubbles are linked to an unsustainable easing of credit 
standards or adoption of risky financial practices that eventually unwind during a subsequent 
bust”). 
261 Gerardi et al., supra note 164, at 82. 
262 $110,000 / $120,000 = 0.917. 
263 This simple hypothetical also highlights the main objection to leverage limits: they limit 
access to homeownership. We discuss that issue below. See infra notes 282-90 and accompanying 
text. 
264 There is strong evidence that leverage and house prices are related through exactly the 
channel we describe in this simple example. House prices are more sensitive to changes in income 
in countries that have a lower regulatory limit on LTVs. Heitor Almeida et al., The Financial 
Accelerator: Evidence from International Housing Markets, 10 REV. FIN. 321, 323 (2006). This finding 
suggests that, as in our example, savings growth constrains house price growth when LTVs are 
capped. The sensitivity of house price growth to income growth is strongest for first-time 
homebuyers. See id. at 345 (concluding that “new mortgage borrowings . . . are more sensitive to 
aggregate income shocks in countries with higher maximum LTV ratios”). In our example, these 
are precisely the households on whom a leverage limit would have such an effect. There is also 
evidence that much of the house price boom and bust during the recent bubble can be explained 
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 A number of countries have successfully used mortgage leverage limits 
to control real estate booms.265 Both cross-country studies and individual 
country case studies support the view that mortgage leverage limits rein in 
housing bubbles.266 In response to the recent housing bubble, for example, 
Hungary, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have adopted or are 
considering mortgage leverage limits.267  
By reducing the incidence and magnitude of housing bubbles, a 
mortgage leverage limit would reduce the most important threat to financial 
and economic stability.268 Prevention is, as they say, the best medicine. 
Leverage limits would, in addition, counteract the negative effects of 
housing bubbles that do form. In particular, leverage limits would 
 
by easing and tightening of the effective LTV ratio imposed by lenders on borrowers. See Duca et 
al., supra note 260, at 549-50 (pointing out that “[m]ost empirical models of US home prices lack a 
measure of mortgage credit standards . . . rendering them less capable of tracking the earlier surge 
of home prices during the mortgage boom and the unwinding of much of that appreciation during 
the early phases of the subprime bust” and that models with a cyclically adjusted LTV ratio for 
first-time homebuyers “imply that much of the boom-bust cycle in US home prices stemmed from 
an easing and subsequent tightening in US mortgage standards affecting potential marginal home-
buyers”). 
265 See IMF, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 129 (2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2011/01/pdf/text.pdf (explaining how countries use LTV 
limits to “serve a number of objectives, including reining in booms in mortgage credit and real 
estate prices; reducing the probability of default when the housing market turns sour; and 
reducing losses, given default, by increasing recover values”). 
266 See Christopher Crowe et al., How to Deal with Real Estate Booms: Lessons from Country 
Experiences, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 300, 316 (2013) (documenting that higher LTV limits are 
associated with greater house price appreciation across a sample of twenty-one countries from 
2000 to 2007); Ashvin Ahuja & Malhar Nabar, Safeguarding Banks and Containing Property Booms: 
Cross-Country Evidence on Macroprudential Policies and Lessons from Hong Kong SAR 5, 8-9 (IMF, 
Working Paper No. 11/284, 2011) (documenting that LTV limits are associated with lower property 
price growth for a sample of thirty countries from 2000 to 2010); C. Lim et al., Macroprudential 
Policy: What Instruments and How to Use Them? Lessons from Country Experiences 19, 53 (IMF, 
Working Paper No. 11/238, 2011) (documenting that the introduction of LTV regulation is followed 
by lower growth in real estate prices across a sample of forty-nine countries from 2000 to 2010); see 
also Crowe et al., supra, at 316 (showing a positive correlation between higher LTV limits and 
higher house prices in a sample of 21 countries); Deniz Igan & Heedon Kang, Do Loan-to-Value 
and Debt-to-Income Limits Work? Evidence from Korea 4 (IMF, Working Paper No. 11/297, 2011) 
(finding that introducing LTV/DTI mortgage leverage limits reduced house price appreciation in 
South Korea). 
267 H.K. Monetary Auth., Loan-to-value Ratio as a Macro-prudential Tool - Hong Kong’s SAR’s 
Experience and Cross-Country Evidence, in BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE INFLUENCE 
OF EXTERNAL MONETARY FACTORS ON MONETARY POLICY FRAMEWORKS AND 
OPERATIONS 163, 163 (2011). 
268 To be effective, a mortgage leverage limit would have to impose a real constraint on banks 
and borrowers. If lenders simply substituted unsecured credit for mortgage credit in a housing 
bubble, then the limit would be ineffective. As long as unsecured credit is an imperfect substitute 
for secured credit, a mortgage leverage limit will have the effect that we describe.  
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counteract the effects of bubbles through both the banking and household 
channels. 
 2. Mitigating the Effect of a Bubble Through the Banking Channel 
A mortgage leverage limit would enhance the robustness of the financial 
system to combat a housing bubble. First, a leverage limit would make the 
performance of mortgage loans less sensitive to changes in house prices. For 
example, if borrowers start with at least 10% of the value of their home as 
equity, mortgages would be unlikely to default unless house prices fell by 
over 10% from their level for the original loan. Borrowers’ equity would 
serve as a buffer for absorbing declines in house prices. Fewer mortgages 
would end up underwater, and for underwater mortgages, the difference 
between the amount owed on the loan and the value of the home would not 
be as large. Consequently, the probability of mortgage defaults and the 
losses to lenders conditional on default would both decrease. This 
phenomenon is sometimes called the “contemporaneous equity” effect on 
mortgage defaults.269  
Second, a leverage limit would screen out borrowers who are more likely 
to default on their mortgage. Low CLTV loans default at lower rates not 
only because they have higher contemporaneous equity but also because 
borrowers who are able to save up for larger down payments tend to be less 
risky.270 A household’s ability to save up for a larger down payment is 
associated with other risk-lowering characteristics, like steady employment, 
careful financial practices, and patience. A leverage limit would thereby 
further lower the risk of mortgage default.  
Third, a leverage limit would lower defaults by reducing households’ 
debt burden. In a bubble, households expect house prices to increase and 
therefore take on greater debt than they otherwise would. As house prices 
rise, households use low down payment loans to stretch their resources to 
afford a more expensive home and take on additional debt through home 
equity loans to finance other expenditures. When the bubble bursts, they 
are left to manage these excessive debts without the equity they expected to 
gain through house price appreciation. 
 
269 See Austin Kelly, “Skin in the Game”: Zero Downpayment Mortgage Default, 17 J. HOUSING 
RES. 75, 94-95 (2008) (explaining the high risk involved with requiring no down payment on a 
mortgage, including the elevated risk of default). 
270 Id.; see also Jan K. Brueckner, Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information, 20 J. REAL 
EST. FIN. & ECON. 251, 252 (2000) (explaining how sorting of risky borrowers into higher LTV 
loans arises due to asymmetric information in lending). 
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A leverage limit would make it more difficult for households to 
accumulate debt in a bubble. For many households, a leverage limit would 
be the binding constraint on how expensive a home they can buy. These 
households would respond by buying a cheaper home or choosing instead to 
rent. Even households with enough liquid resources to make a larger down 
payment would not borrow as much to purchase their homes. A leverage 
limit would also limit homeowners’ ability to extract the equity in their 
home by refinancing or taking out a separate home equity loan. It would 
lower household mortgage debt and monthly mortgage payments, and, 
consequently, homeowners would be less likely to default in response to a 
change in their ability to pay.  
Finally, a leverage limit would reduce the size of mortgage debt as an 
asset class, thereby reducing the systemic risk that mortgages as a whole 
pose to the financial system. The same forces that would lower the 
individual debt of households would also lower the aggregate stock of 
outstanding mortgage debt held by financial institutions. For example, from 
2001 to 2008, the total amount of outstanding mortgage debt on one-to-four 
family homes held by depository institutions nearly doubled from $2.42 
trillion to $4.8 trillion.271 Reducing the overall stock of mortgage debt would 
limit the exposure of the financial system to the risks posed by a housing 
bubble. 
3. Mitigating the Effect of a Bubble Through the Household Channel 
A mortgage leverage limit would also mitigate the effect of housing 
bubbles on aggregate demand through the household channel. A leverage 
limit would make household consumption less sensitive to changes in house 
prices by lowering the overall exposure of households to housing bubbles. 
Prospective homeowners can respond to a leverage limit by either buying a 
less expensive home, making a larger down payment, or some combination 
of both. However, households that are financially constrained can only 
respond by buying a less expensive home, which lowers the sensitivity of 
their consumption to changes in house prices.  
A simple example helps to make this effect clear. Suppose that a 
household has $10,000 available to make a down payment and that, in the 
absence of a leverage limit, lenders require a 5% down payment. Suppose 
the household purchases a $200,000 home, the most expensive for which it 
can afford the down payment. If the price of the home falls by 5%, then the 
household would lose its entire $10,000 in initial home equity. Finding itself 
 
271 Mortgage Debt Outstanding, supra note 68. 
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suddenly $10,000 poorer, the household would cut back on its consumption 
commensurately.  
Now suppose instead that a 90% leverage limit is in place and that the 
household again buys the most expensive home ($100,000) for which it can 
afford the down payment. Now if prices fall by 5%, the household loses 
$5,000—only half of the fall in wealth in the absence of the leverage limit. 
This smaller drop in wealth leads to a smaller drop in consumption. 
A leverage limit has a similar effect on the upside. When house prices 
rise, homeowners can increase their consumption by saving less out of their 
income or by extracting the equity from the home through a second 
mortgage or a cash-out refinancing. A 5% increase in the value of a $200,000 
home gives the homeowner an additional $10,000 in equity to extract. The 
fact that just a 5% increase in home value leads to a 100% increase in the 
household’s equity represents the effect of leverage. However if a leverage 
limit forces a household to purchase a $100,000 home, the same 5% increase 
in house prices yields only half as much additional equity—$5,000—to 
extract for spending. 
This is the basic mechanism through which a leverage limit would 
mitigate the effect of a housing bubble through the household channel.272 
By reducing households’ leveraged investments in housing, a leverage limit 
would make household consumption less sensitive to booms and busts in the 
housing market. This, in turn, would lower the macroeconomic spillovers of 
housing bubbles. 
A leverage limit would not, however, reduce the sensitivity of 
consumption to house prices for all households. A leverage limit can 
actually increase this sensitivity for wealthier households who would 
respond not by reducing the value of the houses they buy but instead by 
increasing the size of their down payments. This possibility exists because 
most mortgages are—either de jure or de facto—non-recourse loans.273  
To see why, suppose that a household again has $10,000 available for a 
down payment and that, in the absence of a leverage limit, it would 
purchase a $100,000 home with no down payment. If house prices were to 
fall by 10% and the household were to default, then the lender would bear 
 
272 Households that are excluded from the housing market by the leverage limit will respond 
in a way that lowers the aggregate sensitivity of consumption to house prices. If house prices go 
up, then prospective homebuyers will lower their consumption in order to afford a down payment. 
If house prices go down, then prospective homebuyers will increase their consumption because 
they do not have to save as much for a down payment. Therefore, the behavior of prospective 
homebuyers will partially offset the positive relationship between house prices and consumption 
for homeowners. 
273 See infra note 274 and accompanying text. 
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the entire loss in value of the home. For most mortgages in the United 
States, if the borrower defaults then, as a matter of either law or practice, 
the lender has recourse only to the property, and not the other assets of the 
borrower, to recover the unpaid portion.274 
Suppose instead that a 90% leverage limit were in place and that, in 
response to the limit, the household would buy the same $100,000 house by 
making a $10,000 down payment. Now if the value of the home were to fall 
by 10%, the household would bear the entire $10,000 loss. The leverage limit 
might then cause the household to cut consumption by more in response to a 
fall in house prices. 
A low (or zero) down payment increases the value to the borrower of 
being able to walk away from the loan if house prices fall. Because the 
lender has recourse only to the mortgaged property, the borrower can, in 
effect, sell the home back to the lender at a price equal to the outstanding 
loan. In the language of finance, this is a put option on the home with an 
exercise price equal to the outstanding loan balance.275 The value of the 
option increases with the borrower’s leverage. The “default put option” 
insures the borrower against downside price risk and thus reduces the 
sensitivity of the borrower’s consumption to house prices. By restricting the 
use of this insurance, a leverage limit can increase the size of the drop in 
consumption for some borrowers when house prices fall. 
The empirical evidence, however, strongly suggests that a mortgage 
leverage limit would, on net, reduce the sensitivity of aggregate 
consumption to house prices. The vast majority of households that take out 
 
274 There are a number of reasons mortgage lenders cannot or do not have recourse to assets 
of the borrower other than the home. The most important of these are procedural rules governing 
the issuing of deficiency judgments and rules limiting the number of actions creditors can take 
against a defaulting borrower. See Ron Harris & Asher Meir, Non-Recourse Mortgages—A Fresh 
Start, 21 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 119, 124 (2013) (explaining the importance of rules governing 
deficiency judgments and the one-action rule, which are procedural rules that effectively create 
non-recourse mortgages). Moreover, federal bankruptcy law serves to cut off recourse to mortgage 
borrowers’ other assets. Id. at 126. Post-foreclosure bankruptcy proceedings can be used to 
discharge any remaining unsecured balance on a mortgage loan that is subject to deficiency 
judgment. Id. at 127. Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have adopted policies generally 
not to seek deficiency judgments. Id. at 126. The household would of course still bear the cost of 
default, which includes the cost of moving as well as the future loss of credit due to a poor credit 
history, but it would have $10,000 available to help in bearing these costs. 
275 In the theory of finance, the equity interest in a home combined with limited liability is 
equivalent to a call option, or the right to purchase the home at an exercise price equal to the 
outstanding debt on the home. A call option is, in turn, equivalent to owning the home, having a 
loan equal to the outstanding debt on the home, and owning a put option with an exercise price 
equal to the amount of this debt. This equivalence is referred to as put–call parity. See JONATHAN 
BERK & PETER DEMARZO, CORPORATE FINANCE 668-69 (2007) (providing examples of the 
put–call parity).  
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mortgages in excess of 90% CLTV have few additional financial assets with 
which to make greater down payments. Our analysis of data from the 
American Housing Survey shows that among households that bought a 
house with 90% or greater CLTV in 2005 and 2006, only 19% had additional 
financial assets available to make a larger down payment.276 The 81% of 
high-CLTV households without additional financial assets would respond to 
the leverage limit by buying a lower-value home (or renting) rather than by 
increasing the dollar amount of their down payment. Second, there is 
compelling evidence that financially constrained households contributed 
disproportionately, relative to wealthier households, to the fall in 
consumption when the housing bubble burst.277 This further reinforces the 
conclusion that the mitigating effect of a leverage limit on financially 
constrained households would outweigh any exacerbating effect on wealthier 
households. Third, macroeconomic studies that explicitly quantify the 
effects of the different forces that we have identified suggest that a CLTV 
limit will substantially lower the effect of house prices on aggregate 
consumption.278  
 
276 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, H150/07, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE 
UNITED STATES: 2007 (2008). The 2007 American Housing Survey asks only about household 
income, not assets. However, it does ask whether the household has received any income from 
dividends on stock or any interest income from savings accounts, CDs, or other interest-bearing 
accounts. We identify households with financial assets based on whether they reported that they 
had received any such investment income. Among households who had less than 90% CLTV at 
origination when they bought a house in 2005–2006, 40% reported having received investment 
income. This is consistent with the fact that the subprime market, which was characterized by high 
CLTV loans, was overwhelmingly made up of less wealthy borrowers with poor credit histories. 
See Gerardi et al., supra note 164, at 79-80 (explaining the connection between loan documentation 
and subprime mortgages); see also Paul S. Calem et al., The Neighborhood Distribution of Subprime 
Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 393, 399 (2004) (reporting that “[t]he 
incidence of subprime financing clearly is highest among African-Americans and among lower 
income borrowers”). 
277 See MIAN & SUFI, supra note 74, at 31-45; Atif Mian et al., Household Balance Sheets, 
Consumption, and the Economic Slump, 128 Q.J. ECON. 1687, 1723 (2013) (finding that “constraints 
bind more for a given decline in home value for poorer households”). 
The counties with the highest measures of household leverage in the United States 
experienced the greatest subsequent decrease in new durable consumption when the housing 
bubble burst. See generally Mian & Sufi, supra note 77 (using cross-sectional measures of household 
leverage to explain the 2007 recession). 
278 See Matteo Iacoviello & Stefano Neri, Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence From an 
Estimated DSGE Model, AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS, April 2010, at 125, 155-56 (finding 
that an increase in allowed LTV from 77.5% to 92.5% increases the sensitivity of consumption to 
house prices and doubles the percentage of the variance in consumption growth—from 6% to 
12%—that is a result of housing collateral); see also Ian Christensen, Mortgage Debt and Procyclicality 
in the Housing Market, BANK CAN. REV., Summer 2011, at 35, 38-39 (finding that lowering the 
maximum LTV ratio from 95% to 80% would lower the sensitivity of consumption to house prices 
in Canada). 
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4. The Costs of Limiting Mortgage Leverage 
A mortgage leverage limit would produce costs as well as benefits. These 
costs represent the lost social gains from loans that would otherwise be 
made.279 We think that in the case of very high leverage loans, the benefits 
of preventing the loan in terms of reduced systemic risk would very likely 
outweigh the costs, but a definitive conclusion would require empirically 
estimating these costs and benefits—a task beyond the scope of this Article. 
Some of these costs stem from distorting homeownership. To analyze 
these distortions, it is useful to distinguish between the effect on the 
extensive margin of homeownership—whether a household owns their 
home—and the effect on the intensive margin of homeownership—how 
expensive of a home a household owns. For many households, the effect of a 
leverage limit on homeownership would be only on the intensive margin. A 
modest leverage limit would not prevent households with funds available to 
make a down payment from purchasing a home. Such a limit might lower 
the quantity of housing consumed by some of these borrowers, but it would 
have virtually no effect on whether they own a home. Indeed, many of the 
loans that would be affected by our proposal have little to do with 
expanding access to homeownership. These include loans for investment 
purposes, loans for second homes, cash-out refinance loans that convert a 
prime mortgage to a high-CLTV subprime mortgage, and Alt-A loans to 
borrowers who, on the basis of their credit score and assets, would be 
eligible for a prime loan.  
Moreover, given the subsidies to mortgage debt that already exist—such 
as the home mortgage interest tax deduction, the tax preference for capital 
gains on sale, and government actions to ensure low and stable mortgage 
interest rates—the effect of a leverage limit on the intensive margin of 
homeownership is more likely to correct existing distortions to housing 
consumption and to counteract the effect of regressive subsidies than to 
introduce any new distortions.280 If these tax subsidies were repealed, then 
the effect of a leverage limit on the intensive margin might pose important 
 
279 There may also be costs associated with borrowers switching from secured mortgage debt 
to unsecured debt if the mortgage leverage limit is binding for them.  
280 These tax subsidies could, in principle, be justified by positive externalities from 
homeownership, but they in fact have little effect on the extensive margin of homeownership and 
largely distort the intensive margin of housing consumption and the use of mortgage credit, as 
well as redistribute income toward the wealthy. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The 
Benefits of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 37, 58 (2003) (arguing 
that tax subsidies encourage the rich to concentrate in particularly high-income communities). 
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costs.281 But these subsidies seem so politically entrenched that it is 
plausible to take them as fixed when analyzing the costs of a leverage limit. 
In our view, a more significant objection to a leverage limit is that it 
might reduce access to homeownership by less wealthy households who have 
limited resources to make a down payment on a house. This would 
contravene a long-standing policy commitment to expanding 
homeownership. Indeed, the Housing and Community Development Act of 
1974 loosened mortgage leverage limits that were then in place in the name 
of increasing access to homeownership.282  
But even for these potential homebuyers, it is not obvious that a modest 
leverage limit would substantially reduce access to homeownership. First, 
while a leverage limit would require households to save more before buying 
their first home, it would also increase their incentive to save for a down 
payment.283 Second, a leverage limit would lower rates of mortgage default, 
resulting in lower interest rates on mortgages and more affordable mortgage 
credit.284 Third, a leverage limit would constrain the runaway growth in 
house prices during boom periods, which would help keep homeownership 
affordable across the housing cycle.285 Consistent with these countervailing 
effects, a number of studies estimate that a modest mortgage leverage limit 
would have a relatively small effect on the rate of homeownership.286  
In addition, there are straightforward ways to ensure access to 
homeownership while preserving the benefits of a mortgage leverage limit. 
The simplest policy would be an explicit government subsidy for low 
income borrowers to meet the down payment requirement. This was the 
approach taken in the 2003 American Dream Downpayment Act.287 
Providing cash grants to low income households to use for down payments 
on a home would transparently achieve the goal of expanding access to 
 
281 While the optimal leverage limit would be lower in the absence of these subsidies, it 
would not impose costs on all households but only on those for whom the limit is binding. 
282 Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633. 
283 Juan Carlos Hatchondo et al., Mortgage Defaults and Prudential Regulations in a Standard 
Incomplete Markets Model 28-29 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Working Paper No. 11-05R, 
2014). 
284 Id. at 3-4. 
285 See supra notes 258-67 and accompanying text. 
286 See Peter Linneman et al., Do Borrowing Constraints Change U.S. Homeownership Rates?, 6 J. 
HOUSING ECON. 318, 330 (1997) (estimating that simultaneously lowering the LTV limit from 
95% to 80% and lowering the maximum debt-to-income limit from 33% to 28% would lower the 
homeownership rate by 3 percentage points); Hatchondo et al., supra note 283, at 28 (estimating 
that an LTV limit of 90% would have almost no effect on homeownership and that an LTV limit of 
80% would reduce homeownership from 66% to 64%).  
287 American Dream Downpayment Act, Pub. L. No. 108-186, 117 Stat. 2685 (2003) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 12701 (2012)). 
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homeownership while still achieving the benefits of a mortgage leverage 
limit for economic stability. 
Second, the federal government could allow for an exception to the 
mortgage leverage limit for loans to low income households and provide an 
explicit government guarantee for those risky low down payment mortgages 
to encourage them while still protecting the financial system.288 Indeed, this 
is the general approach taken by the existing Veterans Administration and 
Federal Housing Administration home loan programs, which contributed to 
the substantial rise in homeownership rates following World War II.289 As 
Professor Ian Ayres and Joshua Mitts point out in a recent paper, a 
relatively small number of high leverage mortgages pose only modest costs 
for economic stability.290 
In our view, if there is a public policy goal of expanding homeownership 
through subsidizing mortgage loans to low income households, then the 
subsidy should be explicit and transparent. The current practice of allowing 
 
288 Such a program would require government-imposed underwriting standards to combat 
the moral hazard problem caused by the government guarantee, much like those the FHA program 
currently imposes. 
289 Fetter, supra note 256, at 112.  
290 Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Three Proposals for Regulating the Distribution of Home Equity, 31 
YALE J. ON REG. 77, 112-13 (2014). Ayres and Mitts raise a subtler objection to prohibiting high 
leverage mortgage loans. They worry that setting a CLTV cap like the 90% cap we suggest would 
result in a large segment of borrowers clustering right at 90% CLTV. Id. This would leave the 
economy particularly vulnerable to a drop in house prices of a little more than 10% since a large 
number of mortgages would go underwater at the same time. Id. This would make it difficult for 
the financial system and economy to absorb the resulting sharp rise in mortgage defaults. Id.  
We think this “clustering” objection is not ultimately a substantial concern. For one, a 90% 
CLTV cap would move mortgages with greater than 90% CLTV down to 90%. With a CLTV cap 
in place, a fall in house prices of greater than 10% would therefore produce no more negative 
equity mortgages than it would without a cap. Indeed, it would result in a smaller amount of total 
mortgage debt with negative equity because the CLTV cap would result in smaller loans and even 
eliminate some of these loans altogether. See supra subsection IV.B.3. Moreover, it may well be 
that, in the absence of a cap, an initial fall of 5% would create enough foreclosures to further 
depress house prices all the way down to 10%. In short, it would be surprising if moving what 
would be even higher CLTV mortgages down to 90% would increase economic instability. 
Furthermore, the CLTV cap would encourage clustering of CLTV at the cap at mortgage 
origination (including to some degree for cash-out refinancings and home equity loans as well as 
purchase mortgages). However, the CLTV of a mortgage evolves after origination. Nominal 
changes in house prices, which generally trend upward with inflation, increase the denominator of 
the CLTV ratio. Amortization of the loan through principal payments decreases the numerator of 
the CLTV ratio. The result is that there would be little clustering near the CLTV cap in the 
overall stock of outstanding mortgages at any point in time. And it is the distribution of CLTV in 
the stock of mortgages that matters for financial stability. 
In any case, the targeted exception to our proposed CLTV cap for mortgages to low income 
borrowers could be designed to mitigate any potential clustering problem, in ways that Ayres and 
Mitts suggest, if the clustering problem turns out to be of practical significance.  
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extremely high leverage mortgages to proliferate in a housing boom is an 
opaque and costly form of public subsidy. As recent events demonstrate, the 
costs of such high leverage loans are ultimately borne by society more 
generally through the severe economic fluctuations that they can produce. 
Perversely, these costs fall disproportionately on low income households. 
Explicit subsidies—either cash grants for down payments or explicit 
government guarantees for high leverage loans to low income borrowers—
can achieve the goal of expanding homeownership at much lower social cost. 
Other costs of a leverage limit stem from restricting the use of 
mortgages to finance other types of consumption. A leverage limit would 
make housing a less liquid asset by preventing households from extracting 
all of the equity from their home through mortgage borrowing. Consider, 
for example, a household that faces an unexpected health expense. A 
leverage limit might prevent the household from paying for that health 
expense by borrowing against their home. But note that the existing 
subsidies for mortgage debt in the tax code produce a distortion in favor of 
financing consumption through mortgage borrowing. A modest leverage 
limit might reduce this existing distortion rather than cause a new one.  
Given the powerful anti-bubble effects of a leverage limit and what 
appear to us to be the modest costs if appropriately designed, we think it 
likely that a modest CLTV cap would produce positive net benefits for 
society. But confirming that intuition by quantifying the tradeoffs outlined 
here is beyond the scope of this Article. 
5. Using Corrective Taxes Instead of a Cap 
An alternative way to control the externalities associated with high LTV 
loans would be through corrective taxation. As we have argued, however, 
irrational exuberance in a bubble would undermine such an approach. To 
see the intuition for this point, suppose that there are two types of loans: 
high LTV loans that impose a systemic risk externality and low LTV loans 
that do not. Suppose that it is efficient for some households to get a high 
LTV loan, but for most households it is efficient to get a low LTV loan. The 
key question is: what policy instrument is the best way to determine who 
gets a high LTV loan? 
One approach would be to assess a tax on high LTV loans to correct the 
externality. Such a tax fundamentally puts the choice of who gets a high 
LTV loan in the hands of individuals. Whoever is willing to pay the tax can 
get a high LTV loan. Consider, however, the selection that results. The 
individuals who get a high LTV loan are the ones who value it most. In the 
neoclassical model, this selection leads to normatively attractive outcomes. 
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A tax is harnessing decentralized information about the social value of high 
LTV loans. But in a bubble this is, potentially, adverse selection: the 
individuals who value high LTV loans the most are the ones who are most 
irrationally exuberant about housing. These are not necessarily the ones for 
whom the social value of a high LTV loan is greatest. 
The upshot is that it might be optimal to abandon the self-selection into 
high LTV loans entailed by corrective taxation in favor of more direct 
allocation rules based on observable proxies for the most socially valuable 
high LTV loans. The ban on high LTV loans with an exception for low 
income households that we suggest is an example of such an approach. The 
problems posed by irrational exuberance in a bubble mean that such a rule 
may well perform better than simply allowing anyone willing to pay a tax to 
get a high LTV loan. 
C. Limiting Debt-to-Income Ratios 
A debt-to-income (DTI) limit on mortgage loans is another useful tool 
for limiting the incidence and mitigating the effects of housing bubbles.291 A 
DTI limit prevents borrowers from obtaining a mortgage that causes their 
monthly debt payments to exceed a given fraction of their monthly income. 
The ability-to-repay rule under the Dodd–Frank Act imposes no limit on 
DTIs, but it does define a safe harbor for “qualified mortgages” that 
requires the mortgage borrower to have a “back-end” DTI—that is, a DTI 
calculated using all of the borrowers’ debt payments, including non-
mortgage debt—of no more than 43%.292 Lenders are free to make loans 
with DTIs above 43%, subject only to the risk that they will be found liable 
if they fail to determine reasonably borrowers’ ability to repay and the 
borrower defaults.293 As we explained in Part III, the threat of liability 
under the ability-to-repay rule will not be effective at mitigating the risks 
posed by housing bubbles. In a housing bubble, such risky loans are 
 
291 See Crowe et al., supra note 266, at 315 (suggesting that DTI limits can curb pressure of 
speculative demand on real estate prices); Ahuja & Nabar, supra note 266, at 8-10 (documenting 
that DTI limits are associated with lower growth in property loans for a sample of thirty countries 
from 2000–2010); Igan & Kang, supra note 266, at 25 (demonstrating that introducing a DTI limit 
lowers household debt and transaction activity in the housing market in South Korea); Lim et al., 
supra note 266, at 25 (documenting that the introduction of DTI limits is followed by slower credit 
growth across a sample of forty-eight countries from 2000–2010).  
292 See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act 
(Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6505 ( Jan. 30, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). The rule 
defines this ratio in terms of gross monthly income. Id. For the purpose of regulating mortgage 
risk, disposable or after-tax income is a better measure. 
293 Id. at 6505-06.  
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precisely the ones that will proliferate. In contrast, a bright-line DTI limit, 
applied to the entire mortgage market, would help rein in bubbles in much 
the same way as a mortgage leverage limit. In fact, the combination of a 
CLTV limit and DTI limit would work in complementary ways.  
We suggest that every mortgage be subject to a “cumulative DTI” limit. 
By “cumulative,” we mean that the debt payments used to calculate a 
mortgage’s DTI for purposes of the limit would include the payments on all 
mortgages secured by the same house. This makes the limit more closely 
targeted at mortgage debt than a back-end DTI ratio limit would be.294 
Here we simply identify the mechanisms through which a DTI limit would 
work as well as the major tradeoffs involved. As with our other analyses, we 
leave the quantitative analysis of costs and benefits of such a limit, as well as 
the calibration of its optimal level, to future work. 
A DTI limit would help rein in the explosive growth in mortgage debt 
that accompanies a housing bubble. Between 2002 and 2008, the ratio of 
outstanding household debt to disposable personal income rose from around 
100% to 130%.295 As Professors Atif Mian and Amir Sufi point out in their 
important research on this issue, mortgage debt grew at a brisk pace even in 
zip codes where average real income growth was negative.296 A DTI limit 
would tether the growth of mortgage debt more firmly to the growth of 
income.  
To illustrate, suppose that a DTI limit of 50% was in place and consider 
a household with a mortgage that is right at the DTI limit. To afford a 10% 
larger mortgage, the household’s income would also need to increase by 10%. 
In this way, a DTI limit would constrain the growth of mortgage debt 
through home purchases, second-lien mortgages, and cash-out refinances.  
Like a leverage limit, a DTI limit would mitigate the effects of bubbles 
through both the banking and household channels. Consider first the 
banking channel. If borrowers hold less debt relative to their income, then a 
shock to their ability to repay is less likely to result in default. Put differently, 
the affordability trigger in the double-trigger model of mortgage default is 
less likely to occur. A DTI limit would also increase home equity levels 
because households would face an additional constraint on their ability to 
 
294 Under a back-end DTI, borrowers who acquire non-mortgage debt before they take on a 
mortgage are treated quite differently from those who acquire such debt afterward. This creates a 
strategic incentive to put off non-mortgage borrowing until after purchasing a home. 
295 How Has the Percentage of Consumer Debt Compared to Household Income Changed Over the 
Last Few Decades? What is Driving These Changes?, FED. RES. BANK S.F. ( July 2009), 
http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2009/july/consumer-debt-household-
income, archived at http://perma.cc/AC4D-GC8G. 
296 Mian & Sufi, supra note 131, at 1453.  
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take on leverage. This increase in equity would lower defaults through the 
contemporaneous equity effect.  
A DTI limit would also mitigate the effects of bubbles through the 
household channel. Lower debt would decrease the sensitivity of household 
consumption to house prices. When house prices rise, it would be more 
difficult for households to borrow to increase consumption. By avoiding a 
boom in consumption in response to a house price boom, a DTI limit would 
also lower the fall in consumption when a bubble bursts. Moreover, house 
prices themselves would be less susceptible to debt-fueled swings. As a 
result of these forces, the aggregate effect of a DTI limit would be to lower 
the house price risk faced by homeowners.297  
Importantly, a DTI limit would be useful over and above a leverage 
limit. To see this, note that a leverage limit would have only limited effect 
on constraining the mortgage debt of current homeowners. In a bubble, 
rising home prices would allow existing homeowners to increase their debt 
at an alarming rate even with a leverage limit in place. For example, suppose 
that a 90% leverage limit were in place and consider a household that buys a 
$100,000 home with a 10% down payment ($10,000). Suppose next that 
house prices rise by 10%. Because the home is now worth $110,000, the 
homeowner’s equity in the house would double to $20,000. By selling the 
house, this equity of $20,000 could be used to purchase a $200,000 home. 
Here, a 10% increase in house prices allows a household to increase its 
mortgage debt by 100%!  
A DTI limit would throw additional sand into the gears of a debt spiral 
by preventing many households from using leverage to ratchet up their 
debt. In the above example, if a DTI limit were also in place, households 
could only double their debt if they did not exceed the DTI limit. A DTI 
limit would also prevent households from using a second mortgage or cash-
out refinance to bring the equity in their homes down to the leverage limit 
whenever house prices increase.298 
 
297 As with CLTV limits, a DTI limit can in theory increase risk for some households. If a 
household responds to the limit by increasing its down payment, then it is more exposed to a fall 
in house prices. However, for the same reasons that we explained above, constrained households 
are more likely to respond by reducing their consumption of housing. See supra subsection IV.B.3. 
As a result, the aggregate effect of a DTI limit will likely lower the sensitivity of household 
consumption to home prices. 
298 In this way, a DTI limit would also help mitigate the “clustering” concern raised by Ayres 
and Mitts. See Ayres & Mitts, supra note 290, at 112-16 (proposing, as a solution to “low-equity 
clustering,” that a mortgage must meet DTI, periodic payment, and repayment conditions to 
qualify for the home mortgage interest rate deduction). 
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The costs of a DTI limit are similar to those of a leverage limit. 
Households that are affected by the limit will either purchase smaller homes 
or choose to rent instead. As a result, the solutions to preserving 
homeownership are also similar. If low income households are provided 
with money for a down payment, their monthly mortgage payments will 
take up less of their income. For higher-income households, the impact of a 
DTI limit will be offset in part by their savings behavior.  
A suitably chosen DTI limit could provide substantial benefits by 
mitigating the effects of a housing bubble. While these benefits do not come 
without costs, providing mortgage assistance to first-time homebuyers with 
lower income and wealth can substantially mitigate any effect on 
homeownership. 
D. Limiting “Teaser” Payment Loans 
While we believe a mortgage leverage limit and a debt-to-income limit 
are the simplest and most effective regulatory tools to deal with the risks 
posed by housing bubbles, additional mortgage regulation could help to 
reduce these risks further. In Part I, we discussed how a number of 
contractual structures that proliferated in the subprime market during the 
recent boom, including hybrid ARMs and payment-option loans, were 
premised on overoptimistic beliefs in continued house price appreciation.299 
These structures share a common feature: they temporarily lower the 
monthly payment required for a given level of mortgage debt.  
Some scholars and consumer advocates have criticized mortgages with 
these features because borrowers may be unaware that their future monthly 
payments will increase or may fail to appreciate the consequences of these 
increases.300 We agree that such mortgages can exploit consumer biases. An 
additional, arguably greater, concern about these “teaser” mortgage loans is 
that they can help fuel a housing bubble. As house prices rise in a bubble, 
teaser payment structures allow borrowers to stretch their resources to take 
out larger loans. Lenders in a bubble push these loans by using the lower 
initial monthly payments to increase demand, counting on house price 
appreciation to fuel refinances or sales.301 Even with a CLTV limit in place, 
these practices would encourage homebuyers to leverage up to the 
regulatory limit. The Dodd–Frank Act’s ability-to-repay rule attempts to 
 
299 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.  
300 See BAR-GILL, supra note 9, at 156-73 (developing a behavioral economics theory of the 
deferred cost structure of subprime mortgage contracts and describing their negative consequences 
for borrowers). 
301 See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
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ensure that borrowers do not take out loans larger than they can afford to 
repay, but as we explained in Part III, it would do little to restrain such 
loans in a bubble.302 
To both protect consumers and safeguard the economy from housing 
bubbles, we suggest restricting the use of mortgage terms that temporarily 
reduce the monthly payments on the loan. Interest-only and payment-
option loans could be prohibited or allowed only in limited circumstances. 
For example, borrowers could be eligible for these loans only if the CLTV 
on the loans were substantially lower, on the order of 80%. Hybrid ARMs 
should be required to keep the initial interest rate fixed for a sufficiently 
long period—seven years or so—to ensure there is enough equity in the 
home before the payment amount resets. An exception could again be made 
for loans with sufficiently low CLTV. 
There are undoubtedly some households that would benefit from these 
mortgage products. For example, these loans might make sense for younger 
borrowers who expect their incomes to grow over the life of their loans. 
Restricting loan choices would impose costs on these borrowers by limiting 
their ability to smooth their consumption of housing over time. But these 
mortgage products have substantial social costs. They facilitate the 
expansion in credit that fuels housing bubbles, exacerbating the risks they 
pose to the economy. Our analysis suggests that restricting these 
contractual structures along the lines outlined here would be a sensible 
reform.  
E. GSE Reform and the Architecture of Housing Finance 
Finally, our analysis has important implications for the reform of the 
secondary market institutions that currently fund the vast majority of 
mortgages. Reform of the GSEs—Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—was 
deferred in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, but legislative efforts are 
now underway to create a new set of institutions to maintain a stable 
secondary market for mortgages. The latest bipartisan bill produced by 
Senators Johnson and Crapo would replace the GSEs with a newly created 
Federal Mortgage Insurance Corporation (FMIC) to provide guarantees of 
MBS.303 Private investors, who would remain the main suppliers of capital 
for the housing finance system, would then purchase the MBS.  
 
302 See supra notes 234-42 and accompanying text. 
303 Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th Cong. 
§§ 101, 201–210 (as reported by Sen. Johnson, Sept. 18, 2014). The basic structure of the bill was 
drafted by Senators Corker and Warner and introduced in 2013. S. 1217, 113th Cong. (as introduced 
in the Senate, June 25, 2013); see also Shaila Dewan, Senators Draft Housing Finance Overhaul, N.Y. 
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Importantly, for an MBS to be eligible for a government guarantee, the 
bill would require private investors to take a 10% first-loss position ahead of 
the FMIC guarantee, or require private guarantors holding at least 10% 
equity capital to insure the MBS.304 This private credit risk sharing 
provision was motivated by a concern that the FMIC guarantee would 
result in moral hazard in originators’ underwriting standards.305 
The requirement that private investors be exposed to the first 10% in 
losses on FMIC-guaranteed MBS echoes the Dodd–Frank Act’s risk 
retention requirement for private-label MBS. It thus suffers from some of 
the same problems in the face of a bubble. In particular, in a bubble, 
overoptimism about house prices would induce these private investors to 
weaken underwriting standards, undermining the hoped-for incentive 
benefits of the private 10% first-loss provision. 
Rather than relying on just an indirect, incentive-based approach to 
maintaining underwriting standards, the new system should use strong, 
direct underwriting standards as a matter of federal law. The Johnson–
Crapo bill imposes only minimal underwriting standards. In particular, 
loans would have to meet the definition of a “qualified mortgage” under the 
ability-to-repay rule306 and have a down payment of 3.5% for first-time 
homebuyers and 5% for others in order to be eligible for the FMIC 
guarantee.307 Some homeownership advocacy groups have opposed even 
 
TIMES (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/business/two-senators-draft-plan-to-
phase-out-freddie-mac-and-fannie-mae.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/4HBV-V9VD 
(noting that the original bill was drafted by Senators Corker and Warner). 
304 See Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th Cong. 
§ 303 (as reported by Sen. Johnson, Sept. 18, 2014) (requiring that the terms and conditions for 
insurance provided under the Act include a “first loss position that satisfies the requirements of 
section 302[] or . . . a guarantee in satisfaction of the requirements of section 311”); see also id. 
§ 302(a) (requiring that private creditors face a “first loss position of . . . not less than 10 percent 
of the principal or face value”). 
305 See Phillip Swagel, Progress on Housing Finance Reform, N.Y. TIMES ( Jul. 8, 2013, 12:01 AM), 
http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/progress-on-housing-finance-reform/?_php=true&_ 
type=blogs&_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/GF5N-GDLH (praising the first loss requirement 
“because . . . investors with their funds at stake have a powerful incentive to enforce prudent 
underwriting”).  
306 See Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th Cong. 
§ 2(29)(A)(i)(II) (as reported by Sen. Johnson, Sept. 18, 2014) (requiring “to the greatest extent 
possible” that qualifying mortgages meet standards “substantially similar to the regulations issued 
by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection under section 129C(b) of the Truth in Lending 
Act”). 
307 See id. § 2(29)(A)(iv) (mandating a minimum down payment for first-time homebuyers of 
3.5% and gradually increasing the down payment requirement up to a maximum of 5%). 
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these minimal leverage limits.308 In our view these mortgage leverage limits 
should be strengthened, not weakened, to mitigate the risks posed by a 
future housing bubble. 
The Johnson–Crapo bill would also establish a “Market Access Fund,” 
funded by a portion of the fees paid for FMIC guarantees, to address the 
housing needs of low income households.309 The statutory language 
envisions this fund being used to provide capital to take the 10% first-loss 
piece for pools of mortgages to low income borrowers.310 However, the 
statute adds a proviso “that amounts for such additional credit support do 
not replace borrower funds required of an eligible mortgage loan.”311 In 
other words, the Market Access Fund could not be used to provide grants to 
borrowers to help them make a required down payment on a mortgage loan. 
In our view, this restriction is unwise. Directing these subsidies directly to 
the down payments of low income borrowers, in combination with tougher 
limitations on the CLTV of mortgages, would help make the housing 
finance system more robust to a housing bubble while also achieving 
homeownership goals.312 
CONCLUSION 
A primary goal of mortgage regulation should be to protect the economy 
from housing bubbles. We analyze the Dodd–Frank Act’s two principal 
reforms to the mortgage market—the risk retention and ability-to-repay 
rules—and show that they share a deep common structure. Together they 
are intended to protect naive investors and borrowers from opportunistic 
banks. Both are motivated by asymmetric theories of behavioral biases. And 
 
308 See, e.g., Letter from Ctr. for Am. Progress to Senators Corker and Warner ( June 26, 
2013), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/housing/news/2013/06/26/68162/corker-
warner-housing-finance-bill-an-important-start-but-falls-short-on-serving-americas-families/ 
(recommending that “[t]o provide flexibility for the system to serve low-wealth borrowers,” the 
Senate should “remove the 5 percent down-payment requirement from the legislation and instead 
permit the FMIC to address down-payment requirements in coordination with other regulators”); 
see also NAT’L CMTY. REINVESTMENT COAL., JOHNSON–CRAPO HOUSING FINANCE 
REFORM LEGISLATION, available at http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/NCRC_Johnson-
Crapo_Access.pdf (recommending that the legislation be amended to “[r]emove the down 
payment requirements[,]” as they would “needlessly shut out many qualified borrowers”). 
309 See Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 2014, S. 1217, 113th Cong. 
§ 504 (establishing the Market Access Fund for the purpose of “address[ing] the homeownership 
and rental housing needs of underserved or hard-to-serve populations”). 
310 See id. § 504(c)(2) (stating that the Market Access Fund can be used to “cover[] a portion 
of any capital required to obtain insurance from the Corporation under this Act”). 
311 Id. 
312 See supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
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both reshape the incentives of sophisticated market participants to reduce 
their exploitation of the naive. 
The sine qua non of a bubble, however, is marketwide overoptimism 
about future house prices. Overoptimism affects the decisions of securitizers 
and lenders, just as it does those of investors and borrowers. In a bubble, 
securitizers are eager to hold dangerous levels of credit risk and lenders 
systematically underestimate default risk. As a result, neither risk retention 
nor the ability-to-repay rule will meaningfully mitigate the risks posed by 
bubbles.  
We outline a regulatory approach that is well-suited to mitigating the 
risks posed by housing bubbles. This approach includes comprehensive 
regulation of mortgage leverage and of other contractual practices that 
encourage larger loans.  
Our analysis moves beyond the existing literature in behavioral law and 
economics that focuses on asymmetric theories of behavioral biases. The 
mistakes of firms—and their interaction with those of consumers—have 
important implications for the design of regulation. In the wake of the 
recent financial crisis and the Great Recession, it is time for behavioral law 
and economics to start taking bubbles seriously. 
 
